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Although the internet enables many important functions of modern life, it is also a 
ground for nefarious activity by malicious actors and cybercriminals. For example, 
malicious websites facilitate phishing attacks, malware infections, data theft, and 
disruption. A major component of cybersecurity is to detect and mitigate attacks enabled 
by malicious websites. Although prior researchers have presented promising results – 
specifically in the use of website features to detect malicious websites – malicious 
website detection continues to pose major challenges. This dissertation presents an 
investigation into feature-based malicious website detection. We conducted six studies on 
malicious website detection, with a focus on discovering new features for malicious 
website detection, challenging assumptions of features from prior research, comparing 
the importance of the features for malicious website detection, building and evaluating 
 
 
detection models over various scenarios, and evaluating malicious website detection 
models across different datasets and over time. We evaluated this approach on various 
datasets, including: a dataset composed of several threats from industry; a dataset derived 
from the Alexa top one million domains and supplemented with open source threat 
intelligence information; and a dataset consisting of websites gathered repeatedly over 
time. Results led us to postulate that new, unstudied, features could be incorporated to 
improve malicious website detection models, since, in many cases, models built with new 
features outperformed models built from features used in prior research and did so with 
fewer features. We also found that features discovered using feature selection could be 
applied to other datasets with minor adjustments. In addition: we demonstrated that the 
performance of detection models decreased over time; we measured the change of 
websites in relation to our detection model; and we demonstrated the benefit of re-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Background and Motivation 
 The Impact of Cybersecurity 
The internet has changed the way we live and work. Over the years, more and 
more aspects of human life have become reliant on the internet. From organizing our 
personal lives to banking and entertainment, the internet plays a large part in how we, as 
humans, exchange information. Pew Research [1] reported that as of 2019, 90% of all 
U.S. adults used the internet. As of June 2019, roughly 58.8% of the world’s population 
(4.536 billion people) use the internet, up from 5.8% in December 2000 [2]. In addition 
to the increasing numbers of people accessing the internet, the internet has a large 
financial impact and is a common place to conduct business. Digital Commerce 360’s [3] 
analysis of U.S. Department of Commerce data estimated that consumers spent $513.61 
billion dollars online in 2018, up 14.2% from online spending in 2017. Although the 
internet has added efficiency to our lives by facilitating communication and changing the 
way we live, the emergence of the internet has also created an opportunity for criminals 
and other nefarious actors to conduct malicious activity. 
The threat from malicious cyber actors is so great that corporate and government 
entities allocate substantial budgets toward detecting, preventing, and remediating cyber 
threats. The financial impact on corporations is large, with Cavusoglu et al. [4] reporting 
in their study of the financial impact on firms with breaches that firms in their sample lost 
2.1% (or $1.65 billion) of their market capitalization within two days of announcement of 
a cyber breach. Experts [5] have projected that more than $1 trillion dollars will be spent 




America and J.P. Morgan Chase spend as much as $500 million each year on 
cybersecurity [6]. Breaches and incidents can be large in terms of the number of people 
and accounts affected and in terms of the loss of money due to litigation and business 
impact. The Yahoo! breach in 2014 resulted in theft of personal information from more 
than 500 million accounts [7]. The Epsilon hack had a financial impact totaling upwards 
of $4 billion [8]. Dyn, which was the victim of a DDoS attack by the Mirai botnet in 2016 
[9], lost roughly 8% of its customers due to the impact of the attack [10]. Given the 
potential for tremendous repercussions from cyber threats, industry and government 
entities recognize the need to protect their assets and their businesses against such 
attacks. 
Cyber-attack goals depend on the motivations of the attacker. Attackers 
commonly seek to either steal information, infect a victim’s network, or disrupt a 
victims’ ability to function. Stealing personal information may enable an attacker to 
misuse the victim’s identity, resulting in financial loss. Information theft also may 
facilitate blackmailing of the victim. Disruption can harm the victim’s reputation or 
simply stop victims from performing their functions. Infection can facilitate information 
stealing and disruption.  
 Websites as Attack Enablers 
Malicious actors can conduct many types of attacks. The most prevalent attacks 
include phishing [11], drive-by downloads [12], denial of service (DoS) [13], or other 
kinds of attacks caused by infection. Phishing occurs when an attacker tries to “trick” a 
victim into entering personal or sensitive information, visiting a malicious website, or 




focused on examining a website or email for suspicious indicators. Drive-by downloads 
occur when a user visits a website and falls victim to malicious code execution that 
typically occurs when the website is being rendered. JavaScript [14] on the website is a 
common attack vector for drive-by downloads. DoS attacks can occur from compromised 
devices or from specific malicious domains. Infection can take many forms, with the 
most sophisticated form resulting in command and control (C2) [15] with a malicious 
website or server. C2 activity occurs when an attacker has compromised a network or 
asset in the network and is running malware on the compromised network. This malware 
typically receives commands or exfiltrates data from or to the C2 infrastructure. The C2 
infrastructure can specify actions to take inside the victim’s network. To communicate 
with this malware, the attacker needs a malicious website or domain. For each of the 
attacks we have discussed thus far, attackers also require a website or domain from which 
to conduct the malicious activity. Detecting malicious websites and blocking 
communication with them is a major component of cybersecurity. 
 The Case for New Detection Techniques 
Cyber threats and cyberattacks increase in complexity over time, making it a 
challenge to detect them. There is a constant battle between attackers and defenders, both 
of which are looking for an advantage. Defenders are at an inherent disadvantage, given 
the need to consider all aspects of their systems and defend each one properly. An 
attacker, on the other hand, has only to identify a weakness or two in order to conduct an 
attack. Furthermore, defenders must account for unknown vulnerabilities that may exist 
in their systems. These vulnerabilities are often in third-party software that defenders did 




remediation mechanisms or patches. For example, Risk Based Security [16] reported that 
22,000 vulnerabilities were disclosed in 2018 without fixes being provided, a trend that is 
expected to continue. 
Defenders have access to a number of tools for detecting and preventing attacks, 
including anti-virus software, network intrusion detection systems, denylists, threat 
intelligence, etc.  Over the years, these tools have evolved to keep up with threats. For 
example, the Morris Worm, an early self-propagating virus, took advantage of a security 
flaw in the sendmail function in Unix [17]. Such security threats encouraged the creation 
of anti-virus software. Early anti-virus software detected viruses by examining hashes of 
files or strings specific to known malware. However, once anti-virus tools began 
detecting viruses with hashes and strings, malware began to adapt by creating variants 
with different binary signatures. At this point, detecting malware with hashes alone 
became infeasible. The anti-virus community adjusted, beginning to detect malware 
families instead of specific files and binaries by using signatures that applied to several 
binaries instead of to a single binary. Evolution by attackers and defenders is natural and 
will continue. With this research, we aimed to assist the detection community by 
exploring additional mechanisms and insights for detecting malicious websites. 
 The Current State of Malicious Website Detection 
The techniques for detecting malicious websites have evolved over the years. A 
common method that is still used today for validation involves visiting a website to 
analyze the web response, analyzing the instructions executed when rendering the 
webpage, and comparing the observations to known malicious behavior. Researchers also 




from visiting a webpage. For example, if a user fetches a webpage in Firefox and 
observes an unexpected event such as an attempted registry change (on Windows) [18] or 
observes an unlikely file change, this may be an indication of a malicious webpage. 
Although this method can be used for validation, it faces two challenges. First, it is time 
consuming and requires additional resources for visiting each website, recording effects, 
and verifying whether the website is malicious. Websites can change very quickly, 
making this effort more complicated. Secondly, this approach may miss malicious 
websites with malicious behavior that does not match a known signature [19].  
Another common technique for detecting malicious websites is to collect 
“features” and use them to create signatures or models for malicious website detection. 
This approach is the foundation of the research in this dissertation. In this paradigm, 
features or observational characteristics – the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) [20] 
structure or Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) [21] tags on the page, for example – 
are extracted from a website. These features are then turned into rules, signatures, or 
models to detect other malicious websites. While this approach provides less certainty 
regarding a website’s maliciousness (the results are typically presented as a probability of 
the website being malicious), the approach can capture commonalities that may exist 
among malicious websites, thereby facilitating detection. Although using features to 
detect malicious websites is increasingly common, it does have challenges. To perform 
this approach, the researcher or practitioner must choose which features to collect. Prior 
researchers have typically collected well-known features to detect malicious websites, but 
rarely re-evaluated whether those features were still useful or whether other features 




studies tended to evaluate an approach on a dataset consisting of a single threat. 
Narrowing experiments to a single type of threat served to focus the research on that 
specific attack, but also required a priori knowledge of the threat, making it less 
applicable when a priori knowledge is unavailable.  
 Research Scope 
 Detecting Malicious Websites 
Although attacks can be detected in many ways, we focused this study on 
detecting a fundamental enabler of malicious activities – the website. The primary ways 
that websites can be misused include: 1) tricking a user into entering sensitive 
information or “faking” a legitimate website (creating what is also known as a phishing 
website); 2) delivering malicious content; and 3) serving as a communication point to 
malware and other malicious software. These misuses are illustrated in Fig. 1-1, 1-2, and 
1-3 below.  
 
 
Fig. 1-1.    An example of a phishing website from  







Fig. 1-2.    A simplified view of drive-by down-load  




Fig. 1-3.    A simplified view of C2 (Images  
courtesy of Pixabay [22].) 
 
 
 Identifying and Comparing New Features for Malicious Website Detection 
Although using features that have already demonstrated potential for detecting 
malicious websites is a popular approach in prior research, there has been little emphasis 
on finding new features for malicious website detection. For example, the <iframe> has 
been a feature used for malicious website detection since at least 2008 [23]. Similarly, the 




detection since at least 2007 [24]. In this research, we evaluated and identified new 
features for malicious website detection.  
In addition to identifying new features for malicious website detection, we also 
quantified and compared the performance of the new features for detecting malicious 
websites and compared it to those of features from prior research. Specifically, we 
compared the rank and importance of those features (both new features and those 
identified in prior research). We determined the importance of each feature by defining 
by how much it contributed to and influenced the performance of the malicious website 
detection models it produced. Additionally, we gathered performance metrics on 
detection models built with learning algorithms [25] and with features identified in our 
approach, as well as with models built from features from prior research.  
 Evaluating our Approach over Multiple Scenarios 
We then went on to evaluate the identified features and their respective detection 
models across a variety of scenarios. Scenarios included sampling to balance our dataset, 
feature transformation, and principal component analysis (PCA) [28] to create meta-
features and components. Such evaluations increased assurance that our approach, 
results, and observations were not specific to a single experimental scenario and would 
prove valid should future researchers replicate our study with different setups.  
We explored sampling scenarios to account for our dataset imbalance and 
explored feature transformation to evaluate whether combinations of features could 
improve malicious website detection. We also experimented with the class weight 
parameter as another method of balancing our datasets. Lastly, we performed 




best performance metrics for our detection models. Parameters were specific to the 
respective classifiers. 
 Bridging a Gap Between Research and Industry 
With this research, we endeavored to bridge research and industry gaps in 
malicious website detection. Although existing research has demonstrated success in 
various studies, the problem of malicious website detection persists. There are 
differences, of course, between an environment in which research is conducted and an 
operational scenario. First, research operates on in-depth knowledge of the malicious 
dataset under study, a factor that often influences the features collected for detection. For 
example, researchers who focused on detecting phishing websites would collect HTML 
and other visual features from webpages since these have been demonstrated to detect 
phishing attacks. In an operational scenario, however, the goal is to prevent the network 
from accessing malicious websites regardless of their nature. To more closely replicate an 
operational environment, we used datasets consisting of common threats, specifically: 
phishing, drive-by downloads, and C2 URLs. Additionally, we treated our evaluation as a 
“black box,” with the ultimate concern being whether or not the malicious website was 
detected. A second difference between research environments and operational scenarios 
involves the features under study. Researchers often select features ahead time (a priori), 
based on the threat or based on what is known to be effective. This assumes that attack 
techniques do not evolve over time. We bridged a third gap between research and 
industry scenarios by limiting our features to those that could be gathered from a 
response to a web request. The benefit of using such features is that they can be 




additional features like domain name system (DNS) requests or search engine ranking, 
but this would require additional overhead and depends on those services being available.  
 Analysis on Different Datasets and Over Time  
Finally, we focused this research on analyzing the applicability of findings from 
this study to other datasets and on conducting a study of feature-based malicious website 
detection over time. Researchers typically face the challenge of generating results that are 
specific to a study’s individual dataset, which in this field often consists of gathering data 
applicable to a single threat and gathering it at a single point in time. To address that 
limitation, we explored whether and how the detection models and their features could be 
applied to other datasets. Additionally, we conducted research on an additional dataset 
that was gathered over time. 
 Research Questions and Approach 
In conducting this research, we evaluated an approach for identifying features for 
malicious website detection in various scenarios and over time. We approached our work 
on the basis of the 13 research questions outlined in the following sections.  
 Research Question 1 
With our first research question, we addressed how well our approach aligned 
with or diverged from prior research. In our survey of prior research on malicious website 
detection, we observed that several features were reused for malicious website detection, 
opening the opportunity to identify new features. We hypothesized that by considering 
additional features (many of which had never been studied for malicious website 
detection in the past), we would identify new features as being important to the detection 




through our approach differed from those gathered from prior research. RQ1 is stated as 
follows:  
RQ1: How do the features identified compare with prior research? 
 Research Question 2 
We used our second research question to investigate whether the identification 
and incorporation of new features improves malicious website detection. Although we 
captured many performance metrics for the models we built, we focused our discussion 
and performance comparison on the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [27] since 
it handles imbalanced datasets. To do so, we built detection models from features 
identified in our research and in prior research, comparing the respective MCCs from 
models built from features exclusively from prior research. We repeated this approach 
under two feature transformation scenarios – feature transformation with feature selection 
and feature transformation with PCA [28]. Hence, RQ2 is stated as follows: 
RQ2: Do the additional features identified improve malicious website detection? 
 Research Question 3 
Our third research question enabled us to examine the effect of dataset imbalance, 
a constraint that is common to malicious website detection experiments. The datasets 
used for malicious website detection experiments typically contain imbalance – an 
unequal number of malicious and benign websites. To investigate the effects of 
conducting experiments with an imbalanced dataset, we trained our models on different 
samplings of our training dataset. We then evaluated the models to determine the impact 




RQ3: Do our results change with no-sampling, under-sampling, and over-
sampling scenarios? 
 Research Question 4 
Here, we aimed to compare the performance of features identified in our approach 
to the performance of those features identified in prior research. To do so consistently, we 
built all of the models with the default parameters provided by [29]. However, it was 
possible that we could obtain better results by performing hyperparameter tuning and 
cross-validation of our models. Therefore, we focused RQ4 on hyperparameter tuning 
and cross-validation of our models, stated as follows:  
RQ4: Does hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation improve our results? 
 Research Question 5 
We focused the fifth research question on the results of using all features in this 
study followed by feature selection to discover features for malicious website detection. 
Using the webpage content features, URL features, and Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) header features as the basis for the detection model provided the best 
understanding of how discovering features (versus selecting them ahead of time) 
performed. RQ5 is stated as follows:  
RQ5: Is feature discovery feasible for malicious website detection? 
 Research Question 6 
Even if the discovered features (those features identified through feature 
selection) performed well, we still would have little understanding as to whether it was 




that gap in understanding, we needed to provide a comparison. RQ6, then, is stated as 
follows. 
RQ6: How do discovered features’ detection ability compare to those from prior 
research? 
 Research Question 7 
The features used in this research can all be derived from the response to a web 
request. As such, the features were available to a normal web browser or HTTP 
environment and did not require any additional resources for collection. Although this set 
of features was limited, it could be used to supplement any other that is available based 
on the specific operational scenario. Hence, we arrived at RQ7, stated as follows. 
RQ7: Can a discovery approach be applied to several threats when only features 
from a web response are available? 
 Research Question 8 
We leveraged three datasets in conducting this study. Prior research has 
demonstrated the difficulty of applying detection models built from one dataset to 
another. However, to verify or refute this observation from prior research, we explored 
RQ8, stated as follows: 
RQ8: How robust are malicious website detection models when applied to a new 
dataset? 
 Research Question 9 
The next area of focus – a follow-on to the previous research question – addressed 




them, could be used to build detection models on another dataset. RQ9 is stated as 
follows: 
RQ9: How do the features identified perform on a new dataset? 
 Research Question 10 
In the next area of focus, we explored whether we could apply aspects from the 
previous research questions to the new dataset to improve malicious website detection. 
RQ 10 is stated as follows: 
RQ10: What aspects from prior experiments can we apply to a new dataset? 
 Research Question 11 
All prior research questions were explored in the context of two datasets, both of 
which were captured at a single point in time. At this point in the research, we shifted our 
approach, focusing the last three research questions on temporal aspects of malicious 
website detection. The first aspect of our temporal study included an evaluation of the 
how detection performance changes over time, with RQ11 stated as follows: 
RQ11: How does detection performance change over time? 
 Research Question 12 
The internet is dynamic, with websites commonly assumed to change over time. 
Prior research has demonstrated that the web changes, but this assumption must be 
revisited for the purpose of this dissertation. To seek a rationale for the results of the 
previous research question, we explored RQ12, stated as follows: 




 Research Question 13 
Once we determined whether websites changed over time, we went on to explore 
the degree of change. We did so by comparing the change in features as a function of 
time (1 week, 2 weeks, … 11 weeks), gathered from several measurements. Research 
Question 13 is stated as follows: 
RQ13: If websites change over time, how much do they change over time? 
 Contributions 
Our contributions are listed below. 
1. We identified new features for malicious website detection and validated the 
use of features from prior research in malicious website detection. 
2. We quantified and compared the performance improvement when 
incorporating new features for malicious website detection. 
3. We evaluated this approach on a dataset consisting of several types of 
malicious websites in order to demonstrate the approach’s potential and 
explored additional datasets. 
4. We evaluated and compared the performance of our detection method over 
several scenarios, varied the ratio of benign to malicious websites, used 
feature transformation, and performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-
validation to explore consistency. 
5. We demonstrated the feasibility of discovering features for malicious website 
detection and the advantages of doing so over choosing features a priori. 
6. We quantified the performance of detection models over time and compared 




 Dissertation Outline 
Figure 1-4 shows a detailed overview of the structure of this dissertation. We have 
structured this dissertation in the following manner. In Chapter 2, we present a survey of 
related work on malicious website detection. Chapter 3 details our methodology. In 
Chapters 4–6, we describe the independent studies conducted on different types of 
features for malicious website detection, dividing the material with: the webpage content 
in Chapter 4, the structure of the website URL in Chapter 5, and the HTTP headers from 
the website in Chapter 6. In each of these chapters, we address research questions 1-4 and 
we outline the similar methods of feature selection, feature ranking, and model training 
and evaluation applied in each, with the main difference being the type of features 
studied. The works described in Chapters 4 and 6 have been published [30], [31] and 
have been presented at two conferences. In Chapter 7, we address research questions 5-7 
and explore our use of all the features studied to that point – webpage content, URL 
structure, and HTTP headers for detection. Chapter 8 investigates research questions 8-10 
and includes details regarding our application of models and features identified through 
this dissertation to a different dataset. In Chapter 9, we conclude with research questions 
11-13 and outline the portion of the research aimed at determining whether and how the 
models for malicious website detection and the features for detection changed over time. 
We discuss limitations in Chapter 10. Finally, we present a summary of the research and 







Fig. 1-4.    A detailed overview of this dissertation 




Chapter 2:  Background and Related Research 
 Introduction 
The techniques for detecting malicious websites have evolved over the years, as 
have the features used to detect them. The three facets common to all approaches to 
detecting malicious websites are: 1) the set of features that characterize a website; 2) the 
method(s) or model(s) used to make the determination; and 3) the dataset(s) used for 
training and validating the methods used to make the determination. In this chapter, we 
provide a survey of related research into each of these facets of malicious website 
detection. Additionally, we discuss four additional relevant aspects: 1) potential 
validation methods on an additional dataset; 2) potential practical implementations; 3) 
relevant performance metrics; and 4) measure of change in a website and training and 
evaluating detection models on different points in time. 
 An Overview of Features for Malicious Website Detection 
The first aspect of malicious website detection is the set of features or quantifiable 
attributes that characterize a website. These features serve as the basis for determining 
whether a website is malicious. Researchers have drawn on a diverse set of features, 
including features in the following three categories: host information, webpage content, 
and communication data. The features in these categories include: the URL, the content 
of the webpage, network traffic to and from the website, information available in the 





 Host Information 
For our purposes, we define host information as being all aspects of a website that 
must be in place before the website is accessed. Examples of host information include the 
URL, information found in the domain name registration system, and the website 
certificate. In this section, we discuss the URL features that are the most prevalent host 
information features used in prior research for malicious website detection. 
2.2.1.1 URL Word-Based Features 
Word-based features are motivated by the observation that phishing URLs often 
contain specific words or can be tokenized based on specific delimiters for further 
analysis. One of the early word-based approaches in malicious website detection and 
classification came from [34], who discovered a list of words notably found in phishing 
website URLs. These words, which included “webscr,” “secure,” “banking,” “ebayisapi,” 
“account,” “confirm,” “login,” and “signin,” were used as a group of features to detect 
phishing URLs. The words “login” and “signin” were found to be particularly prominent 
on their phishing dataset. Ma et al. [35] expanded on this approach and implemented a 
method that separates the path in the URL by special delimiter characters (“/,” “?,” “.,” 
“=,” “-,” “ and “_”) into tokens for further analysis. This approach, referred to as a “bag 
of words” approach, is a common approach to URL feature generation. Ma et al. [36] 
repeated this approach with the addition of an online learning algorithm and continued 
the research [37]. The “bag of words” approach for phishing detection has also been used 
by other researchers [38]-[40] and is one of the primary methods for analyzing URLs. 




malicious website URLs, but the approaches have been used predominantly to detect 
phishing URLs. 
2.2.1.2 Special Characters and URL Structure Features 
Researchers also have explored the use of special characters and the URL 
structure for detecting malicious websites and URLs. This differs slightly from using 
special characters as delimiters for the “bag of words” approach. One characteristic in the 
structure of the URL is the presence of an internet protocol (IP) address [41]. IP 
addresses can be substituted for hostnames and are sometimes used by malicious websites 
to hide malicious domain names for phishing, drive-by downloads, or C2 websites. 
Researchers [42] stated that IP addresses in URLs could be indicative of a malicious URL 
and used the presence of an IP address in the URL as a feature. In addition, they also 
counted the number of hosts in the URL that could be determined by counting the 
number of “.” characters in the URL. The number of dots is motivated by an observation 
that malicious websites use multiple hostnames in order to appear more legitimate. He et 
al. [43] also considered the presence of the “@” character as a feature. Authors [44] 
reused the features mentioned thus far and added the presence of a “shifted” URL, 
multiple top-level domains (TLDs), misspelled domain names, modified URL encoding, 
and modified or mismatched port numbers, along with adding whether the URL was a 
short or a “tiny” URL. IP addresses, multiple hosts, having several TLDs in the URL, 
URL length features, and other special characters have all been used in some manner or 
permutation by researchers [40], [45]-[49] as features for detecting malicious URLs. 
Basnet et al. [50] used the presence of special characters as features and evaluated feature 




primarily been used to detect phishing websites, though some features – including the 
length of the URL, the number of dots (.) in the URL and ratios of characters to numbers 
– have proven successful in detecting other threats such as drive-by downloads and C2 or 
bot URLs. 
Lin et al. [51] reused many features and presented an approach that used ratios 
within website URLs. Examples of ratios include: the length of the domain name divided 
by the length of the entire URL; the length of the path divided by the length of the URL; 
and the length of the argument field divided by the length of the URL. In addition to 
these ratios, [51] also used specific patterns such as letter-digit-letter and the longest 
word length as features. Ahluwalia et al. [52] focused on a specific type of threat – 
domains generated by a domain generation algorithm (DGA) [53] – and solely used URL 
length, number of vowels and consonants, and digits in the second level domain name to 
detect this specific type of malicious URL. The approaches based on ratios and the 
analysis of the distribution of vowels, consonants, and digits have primarily been 
leveraged to detect malicious URLs used by bots or C2 traffic with a detection and false 
positive rate (FPR) of 98.96% and 2.1%, respectively [52]. 
2.2.1.3 Additional Approaches with URL Features 
Researchers [54] took an approach toward URL analysis that defined and used the 
Kolmogorov complexity of the URL string to identify malicious URLs. This approach 
did not require a priori knowledge and could be combined with other methods discussed 
in this section. Kheir et al. [55] classified C2 connections via statistical clustering of the 
URLs generated by a malware testbed. In [56], the authors used character n-grams from 




factors for [56] were their evaluation of the effectiveness of their n-gram approach on 
phishing as well as on spam URL datasets and their comparison of the respective 
performance on these datasets. 
 Webpage Content 
Webpage content consists of the information gathered from the webpage that is 
available when navigating to the website URL. All webpage content features can be 
extracted from the webpage. This section includes a review of those features extracted 
from the webpage that are relevant for malicious website detection.  
2.2.2.1 Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) and Its 
Applicability in Webpage Content 
Term frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) is a statistical measure 
used to evaluate the importance of a specific word to a document [57]. It has been used in 
malicious website detection in several ways. The main methods involving TF-IDF are 
search engine and comparison based. 
The authors of CANTINA [24] and CANTINA+ [46] extracted the top K words 
from a webpage and performed a Google search of those K terms. The authors then 
examined the top N returned results, with whether the webpage appeared in the top N 
results being used as a feature for malicious website detection. The researchers varied K 
(the number of terms) and N (the number of results), with that approach, along with the 
Google search engine, being used by [42]. Researchers [58] used TF-IDF to compare the 
contents of a candidate webpage with the contents of the TLD webpage of the candidate 
webpage. The larger the difference, the more likely it was that the candidate webpage 




TLD page as part of a macro feature they referred to as “URL Identity.” In addition, the 
author of CANTINA+ [46] used TF-IDF to find the presence of specific sensitive words 
throughout the webpage. Researchers primarily used the TF-IDF approach, regardless of 
the specific implementation, as a means of identifying phishing websites. 
2.2.2.2 Webpage Content - Structural Content - Tags and Attributes 
HTML elements and attributes, as well as the document object model (DOM), are 
the defining portions of webpage structure and have served as a basis for multiple 
features for malicious website detection. One well-studied feature is the <iframe>. 
Provos et al. [59] studied the prevalence of drive-by downloads on the web and 
<iframe>s that are often used in malicious content injection common in drive-by 
downloads. Although <iframe>s facilitate content injection and drive-by downloads, 
other structural information can identify other attacks, such as phishing. Whitaker et al. 
[42] used a simple feature – whether the webpage has a password field – as one of many 
features to detect phishing webpages. Authors [43] expanded on this by extracting other 
features including <meta> tag and description tags, the <title> tag, and all text fields 
inside the <body> tag as feature sets to detect phishing websites. Other authors including 
[44], used similar features. Xiang et al. [46] captured the presence of “bad forms,” that is, 
forms with a specific structure (structures where the form was an HTML <form>, where 
keywords were related to sensitive information, and where there was a specific action 
attribute as a feature).  
Basnet et al. [50] expanded the selection of structural features to include password 
fields, as well as counts of various tags within the webpage, including <iframe>s and 




multiple stages of clustering to identify criminal websites that share commonalities. 
Corona et al. [61] took an overall approach similar to the TF-IDF difference between top 
webpage and candidate webpage. Instead of using terms, they used the difference in 
HTML between the candidate webpage and the TLD webpage. Borgolte et al. [62] aimed 
to detect malicious campaigns, extracted different features, and ignored visual 
differences.  
Researchers also examined a group of features related to the URLs and to links 
present in a webpage. Several HTML elements have the href and src attributes, which 
specify links or references to additional resources such as files. The type of resource 
depends on which HTML element specifies the href or src attributes. The resources 
referenced by the href or src attributes can be on the webpage (like a section), or can 
be in another domain or website. Researchers [42] extracted features describing the 
extent to which links and images reference other domains outside of the TLD for that 
webpage. He et al. [43] did the same, extracting the base domain by extracting the href 
attributes from the <a> and <area> elements, while [48] only used the <a> tag in their 
identity builder. Gastellier-Prevost et al. [44] expanded their feature set to other HTML 
elements with the href attribute. With CANTINA+, the authors [46] checked whether 
the majority of URLs in the webpage were within the same domain as the candidate 
webpage. Le et al. [63] used the presence of external links in <frame> tags to capture a 
macro feature they called “foreign contents.” With BINSPECT, the authors [47] counted 
the total number of links and split them into categories similar to those created by other 
authors, including same-origin and different-origin. Eshete et al. [47] also counted the 




who had examined URLs and their relationships to TLD webpages, [50] checked whether 
the respective <iframe> links pointed to internal or external resources or to other 
denylisted URLs and expanded on that research in a later study [64]. 
2.2.2.3 Webpage Content - Defining Page Content Behavior with JavaScript 
Behavioral features of a website come primarily in the form of JavaScript, an 
object-oriented programming language and a foundational technology of the modern 
web. Because JavaScript is a powerful language that can be misused by attackers, it has 
been of interest to various researchers. JavaScript is most commonly misused to enable 
drive-by downloads. JavaScript Anomaly-based Analysis and Detection (JSAND) 
creators [65] focused on identifying malicious webpages with drive-by downloads by 
extracting JavaScript features, gathering features by executing the JavaScript in a 
sandbox and recording features during execution. Although the researchers collected 
several features, they focused their study primarily on the detection and execution of 
suspicious behavior, including suspicious methods and sequences of method calls, the 
presence of likely shellcode, and indicators of JavaScript obfuscation (a method used to 
hide malicious code from someone analyzing the script). Canfora and Corrado [66] also 
leveraged JavaScript features in research focused on the detection of malicious websites. 
The authors addressed features such as the presence of suspicious methods, specific 
sequences of method calls, and indicators of obfuscation. In addition, they compared 
groups of features in order to determine which features were best able to detect malicious 





Other authors approached JavaScript analysis in malicious webpages from the 
abstract syntax tree (AST). Rieck et al. [67] proposed Cujo, which has both static and 
dynamic (execution) analysis components. Cujo is trained on reports detailing benign and 
malicious code, with its performance evaluated with either static features or dynamic 
features alone or with static and dynamic features combined. The authors found that 
using static and dynamic features together improved their accuracies compared to using 
static and dynamic features in isolation. Curtsinger et al. [68] used a mostly static 
JavaScript analysis approach, but made the argument that static analysis was a challenge 
for malicious JavaScript because malicious JavaScript is most likely obfuscated and 
hence is difficult to analyze statically. As a result, they hooked the JavaScript runtime to 
get the de-obfuscated JavaScript before analyzing the JavaScript AST statically. 
Researchers [69] used JStill to leverage the AST, but created four categories: 1) 
JavaScript native functions, 2) JavaScript built-in functions, 3) DOM methods [70] (those 
methods that operate on the DOM), and 4) user-defined functions that group their 
features. With JStill, the researchers captured three differences between malicious and 
benign method invocations: 1) the method arguments, 2) the method definition, and 3) 
the context of a method invocation. Kapravelos et al. [71], with Revolver, also used the 
AST with a focus on AST similarity between known malicious and candidate ASTs.  
2.2.2.4 Combining Page Structure and Behavior for More Holistic Malicious 
Detection 
Although structural features like TF-IDF, HTML, links, and URLs in the page, 
along with behavioral features like JavaScript, can be extracted independently to identify 




of features that combined structural and behavioral features. These features describe the 
exploit, the exploit delivery mechanism, and whether there are attempts to hide elements 
or scripts on the malicious webpage. The authors incorporated specific tags like <frame> 
and <iframe>, as well as indicators of JavaScript obfuscation, among their feature set. 
Choi et al. [72] also looked for the presence of suspicious native JavaScript methods like 
escape(), eval(), link(), unescape(), exec(), link(), and search(), 
combining them with HTML features including tag counts, and counts of zero size, and 
thus invisible, <iframe> tags. Heiderich et al. [73] proposed ICEShield, which lightly 
instruments JavaScript and detects attacks against the DOM tree. This approach 
combined attacks against the DOM with additional heuristics centered around previously 
studied HTML tags and considered the presence of suspicious Unicode as an additional 
feature. With Prophiler, [45] examined the src attributes of <iframe> tags, hidden 
elements, <iframe>s with small areas, and other features commonly found in malicious 
webpages. They also extracted 25 features around JavaScript code. With BINSPECT, the 
authors [47] extracted 25 webpage content features, primarily from prior research, 
including document length, number of words, lines, spaces, average word length, hidden 
elements, and presence of suspicious methods. In addition to capturing a better 
representation of the website, combination approaches are more applicable to detecting a 
wider range of attacks, as in the case of BINSPECT [47], which detected various 




 Communication Data Features 
Communication data features describe the facet of the website that characterizes 
how a client communicates with the website. This includes protocol information, 
metadata from the communications, and traffic summary statistics.  
2.2.3.1 Communication Data Features – HTTP Headers 
HTTP [74] is the primary application level protocol used throughout the web. As 
such, HTTP features are studied and used to detect malicious websites. HTTP features 
are most commonly used to detect C2 traffic and HTTP requests generated from 
malware. Authors [75] and [76] clustered HTTP communications from known malware 
and generated signatures. Researchers [55] executed malware in a sandbox that generated 
HTTP communications and took a clustering approach to grouping URLs in the malware-
generated HTTP traffic to classify the C2 communications. 
Tao et al. [77] gathered HTTP header features from interaction with a webpage 
and recorded attributes from the HTTP requests and responses over a session to a 
candidate webpage. The authors combined these features with non-HTTP features to 
detect malicious websites. Zhang et al. [78] examined features over a session, but focused 
specifically on redirect chains (one or more redirects) between the initial URL and 
destination. Brezo et al. [79] proposed a method of detecting malicious web requests by 
using machine learning and HTTP and transmission control protocol (TCP) 
characteristics. Although they found TCP features, such as packet length, to be the most 
influential in their study, HTTP characteristics still were among the top 10 most relevant 
features. Xu et al. [49] used 15 HTTP header features in addition to taking a “crosslayer” 




they reused the HTTP header content-length, which also was used by [79]. 
Researchers [80] proposed ExecScent, which generated control protocol templates 
(CPTs) from clusters of HTTP requests associated with C2 traffic. CPTs are defined by 
the URL, HTTP headers, and the destination IP address. Researchers [40] and [81] used 
HTTP headers – including the response code, HTTP method, and Boolean values such 
as if the HTTP response content is zipped – in their feature set for malicious website 
identification. Zarras et al. [82] created a method that learned how HTTP based malware 
worked and learned the structure of the HTTP requests sent. They leveraged header 
chains and templates like CPTs to use header chains to detect C2 traffic. Researchers [83] 
used Phishmon to examine the headers and used the length of the respective header 
values as features to detect phishing webpages. 
 The Methods and Models for Detection 
The next aspect of malicious website detection is the method or model used to 
make the determination of whether a website is malicious. The method or model uses 
features that characterize the website to make the determination. In our literature survey, 
we found three types of methods that researchers used for detecting malicious websites: 
1) heuristics, 2) clustering, and 3) supervised machine learning techniques.  
 Heuristics 
Heuristics are simple approaches or rules that have been applied to detecting 
malicious websites. Their use was more prevalent in earlier research. Recent research has 
tended to favor the use of machine learning techniques. The main benefit of heuristics is 
their simplicity and intuitiveness, though they rely strongly on preconceived notions of 




that leveraged heuristics to identify malicious websites. Their approach used many 
features in HTTP responses and the webpage HTML. Prakash et al. [84] used denylists 
as the basis to detect phishing attacks. Researchers [44] defined 20 heuristics from lists 
and acceptlists and implemented them in an anti-phishing toolbar called Phishark to 
differentiate between legitimate and phishing websites. Wang et al. [85], with Phishnet, 
evaluated rule-based and classifier-based approaches for identifying webpages that lead 
to drive-by downloads. In their study, the rule-based system outperformed their classifier, 
further motivating the continued use of heuristics. Nguyen et al. [86] created a heuristic 
with weights for six features to detect phishing websites. Ghafir and Prenosil [87] 
extended this idea, using threat intelligence to automatically update their denylist, which 
was leveraged to identify C2 traffic based on denylists of malicious IPs. Seshagiri et al. 
[88] created heuristics for known attack patterns with JavaScript and HTML. Authors 
[89] created the Phidma algorithm consisting of five layers in a pipeline to identify the 
webpage as legitimate, the five layers being: 1) acceptlist, 2) page features, 3) search 
engine, 4) URL similarity, and 5) accessibility. Heuristics are still relevant; however, 
most researchers in the field of malicious website detection leveraged more sophisticated 
machine learning techniques. 
 Clustering 
Clustering has an advantage over heuristics in that it does not require 
preconceived notions of what malicious looks like. Clustering groups similar data, but 
usually requires larger amounts of data to create more defined clusters. Clustering has 
been successful in identifying several threats including threats detected via the webpage 




Borgolte et al. [62] searched for new web infection campaigns by looking at two 
versions of the webpage, extracting differences in their DOM and assigning the 
difference to specific clusters. Drew and Moore [60] identified criminal websites by 
clustering websites based on metrics gathered from the HTML on the page. Researchers 
[75], [76] performed coarse grained clustering which measures the statistical similarity of 
the HTTP requests including total number of requests, number of GET and POST 
requests, and fine-grained clustering, which considers the structural similarity of the 
HTTP communications generated from malware in their testbed to generate detection 
signatures. Authors [90] built CyberProbe, which probes different servers and builds 
signatures known as fingerprints by clustering request-response pairs (RRPs) in the 
generated traffic. Kheir et al. [55] presented Webvisor, which records HTTP requests 
from known families of malware and then performs clustering of the generated URLs to 
build signatures for C2 channels. Zarras et al. [82] used a dataset of 40,000 malicious 
HTTP requests from 24 malware families and requests to the top 1,000 domains 
from Alexa to generate 7,000,000 HTTP requests and built HTTP templates from 
clustered HTTP headers.  
 Supervised Learning 
The most common method of detecting malicious websites is to build models 
using supervised machine learning techniques. The features are extracted from known 
benign and known malicious websites to build models using one or more supervised 
learning algorithms. Some researchers [40],[42]-[43],[61] and [91] used one classification 
algorithm. This approach has shown success, with [91] being able to classify phishing 




focused on classifying a “large” number of phishing webpages and training their logistic 
regression (LR) classifier [92] on millions of webpages. They evaluated their classifier on 
165,382 phishing webpages during the first six months of their study. Authors [43], [61] 
used a support vector machine (SVM) [93] classifier with a different set of features and, 
unlike [42], used a smaller evaluation dataset of 200 legitimate and 325 phishing 
webpages in their experiment. Authors [40], [43] also leveraged an SVM-based classifier 
while [91] used a gradient-boosting (GB) classifier [94].  
Other scholars [35],[45]-[47],[49]-[50],[72],[83], [95] used up to seven different 
algorithms. Ma et al. [35] leveraged an LR classifier (a naïve Bayes [96] and SVM-based 
classifier) and also recorded the time to test and train their classifiers. Canali et al. [45] 
used random tree [97], random forest (RF) [98], naïve Bayes, LR, J48 [99], and Bayesian 
networks [100] and compared their respective performances. RF was the best performing 
classifier over different feature sets. Similarly, [46] used Bayesian networks, J48, RF, 
AdaBoost (AB) [101], LR, and SVMs. Choi et al. [72] included RakEl [102] and multi-
level K-nearest neighbor (ML-KNN) [103]. Basnet et al. [50] used seven supervised 
classifiers and then combined them with a customized version of the confidence-
weighted, majority-vote algorithm [104]. In [50], the authors used naïve Bayes, RFs, and 
LR classifiers. Researchers [49] performed a similar study with four classifiers and found 
J48 to be the best performing. Researchers [95] also demonstrated applicability of 
decision tree classifiers, particularly J48. Phishmon creators [83] used similar algorithms, 
but added classification and regression trees [105] into their study. 
Authors [106] used batch learning, where models are built on the whole dataset at 




made available. Ma et al. [36] continued their work from [35], but with online learning 
algorithms including Perceptron [108], LR, Passive-Aggressive algorithm [109], and 
confidence-weighted algorithm. Both [39] and [64] used batch learning and online 
learning as well. Other authors, including [48], applied more than one classifier, usually 
in sequence, in their detection schemes. Several algorithms were used, including 
AdaBoost, Bayesian networks, CART, confidence-weighted, C4.5 [110], GB, J48, K-
nearest neighbor (KNN) [111], LR, naïve Bayes, Perceptron, RF, random tree, and 
SVMs. 
 Validation 
Ground truth datasets used for training and evaluation make up the next 
component of malicious website detection. Currently, no standard dataset exists for 
training machine-learning algorithms to detect malicious websites, though some datasets 
have been reused by several researchers. We identified three types of datasets used in 
malicious website detection: 1) well-known datasets, 2) custom datasets, and 3) 
proprietary datasets provided by an external organization. Well-known datasets are 
commonly used as ground truth for malicious and benign websites. Examples of such 
datasets include Alexa.com [112] for benign domains or Phishtank [113] for malicious 
domains (in the case of phishing related studies). Multiple researchers [24], [44], [47]-
[49], [61], [73], [77], [86], [89], [114]-[117] used these predefined datasets. Researchers 
who used the second type of dataset – a custom dataset, commonly generated “randomly” 
or by a crawler – include [23], [35]-[37], [40], [42]-[46], [49]-[50], [62], [64], [66]-[67], 
[69], [72], [81], [91], [95], and [118]-[119]. Although the random and crawler-based 




commonly used to generate data for benign websites. Moreover, this type of method can 
be combined with well-known datasets. The third type of dataset is a dataset provided by 
external organizations. These datasets, used by [55], [91], [119]-[120], are not as 
common. The nuances and differences among datasets used by prior researchers can be 
subtle. As a result, we created Table 2-1 below to briefly describe these works and their 
benign and malicious datasets. A value of “-“ indicates that the specific field was not 
applicable in the respective study or that the author used a custom dataset specific to the 
study. A “*” character indicates that some or all of the data was provided by an 





Table 2-1.  
Datasets from Prior Research (Prior Research  
Leveraged Various Datasets Derived from Numerous  
Sources) 
Datasets from Prior Research 
Work Year Benign Dataset Source Malicious Dataset Source 
[114] 2006 - [121]-[122] 
[24] 2007 [123] [113] 
[23] 2008 [124]-[125] [126] 
[35] 2009 [124]-[ 125] [113],[127] 
[36] 2009 [125] * 
[77] 2010 [112] [128]-[130] 
[42] 2010 - [131], * 
[67] 2010 [112],[132] [133] 
[116] 2011 [112], [121],[123] [113],[122] 
[44] 2011 [112], [135]-[136] *, - [113],[137] 
[45] 2011 [112], [132] [133] 
[63] 2011 [125], [134] [130],[138]-[139] 
[37] 2011 [125] * 
[46] 2011 [124]-[125] [113], [141]-[ 140] 
[47] 2012 [112], [124]-[ 125] [113],[132],[142] 
[50] 2012 [124]-[125] [113] 
[86] 2013 [124] [113] 
[49] 2013 [112] [130], [143]-[146] 
[48] 2013 - [113] 
[62] 2013 - [133] 
[64] 2014 [124]-[125] [113] 
[69] 2014 [112] [147] 
[40] 2014 - - 
[117] 2014 [124] [113] 
[118] 2015 [112] [147]-[150] 
[120] 2015 [151] [151] 
[55] 2015 - [147], [152] 
[115] 2016 [112] [113] 
[66] 2016 - [153] 
[91] 2016 [154] [113] 
[95] 2016 [124] [113], [155] 
[89] 2017 [156] [113] 
[61] 2017 - [113] 
[116] 2018 [157] [113] 







Some prior researchers performed analysis on datasets derived from different 
sources. These datasets can vary temporally (identified in Table 2-2 below as “temporal”) 
or can be drawn from a different corpus (identified in Table 2-2 below as “corpus”). 
Table 2-2 provides a summary of the works of researchers who performed analysis on 
different datasets and how they differed, with “Y” meaning “yes” and “N” meaning “no.” 
 
Table 2-2.  
Prior Research Occasionally  
Tested Detection Methods on  
Different Datasets 
Application to Another Dataset 
Research Corpus Temporal 
[35] Y N 
[38] Y N 
[42] N Y 
[43] Y N 
[45] N Y 
[46] Y N 
[50] N Y 
[63] Y N 
[64] Y N 
[65] Y N 
[82] N Y 
[159] Y N 
[160] Y N 
[161] Y N 
 
 
 Practical Implementation 
An additional component, often specified in the related research, is the 
incorporation of detection models into a practical solution. Rieck et al. [162] tested 
Botzilla on a live university network by incorporating their approach in the open-source 
flow monitor Vermont [163]. They deployed their solution at the central gateway of a 




only monitored the first 256 bytes of each flow to keep stream reassembly to a minimum. 
Cujo, developed by [67], was embedded in a web proxy between the web client and the 
web service. Cujo performed the analysis before data were sent to the web client and 
webpages containing drive-by downloads were blocked. Authors [164] divided their 
solution for detecting clickjacking attacks into two components – a detection unit and 
testing unit. The detection unit combined two browser plugins and the testing unit was a 
single browser plugin. Gastellier-Prevost et al. [44] took a similar approach, 
implementing the Phishark toolbar as a Firefox add-in. Ghafir and Prenosil [87] 
leveraged additional servers to passively analyze network traffic looking for denylist hits. 
Their approach also updated their denylist from various intelligence feeds. DeltaPhish 
was wrapped inside a web application firewall that served as proxy between the user and 
the website in Corona et al.’s [61] live implementation. 
 Performance Metrics 
Performance metrics include the FPR, false negative rate (FNR), true positive rate 
(TPR), true negative rate (TNR), accuracy (ACC), AUC, Precision (Prec), Recall (Rec), F 
Score, and MCC. In some cases, authors specified other metrics such as detection and 
error rate. Currently there is no standard set of metrics used for evaluation that is 
consistent across malicious website detection studies. To better understand the capability 
of prior approaches, we listed related research, the relevant performance metrics, and the 
results. Table 2-3 below lists those works that were most similar to our research, as well 
as those that provided concrete numbers (as opposed to graphs and visualizations alone). 
The table also includes the results from the respective research that we identified as the 




works provided several measurements with slightly different features and datasets and 
quantified additional performance aspects like time. Therefore, the selection of the “best” 
or most “representative” result was somewhat subjective. A value of “-“ indicates that the 





Table 2-3.  
Prior Researchers Did Not Use a Standard Performance Metric 
Performance Metrics from Related Research 
Related 
Research Year TPR TNR FPR FNR ACC AUC Prec. Rec 
F 
Score MCC 
[24] 2007 0.97 - 0.06 - - - - - - - 
[23] 2008 - - 0.0588 0.4615 - - - - - - 
[35] 2009 - - - - 0.99 - - - - - 
[77] 2010 - - 0.001 - 0.922 - - - - - 
[67] 2010 0.944 - 0.00002 - - - - - - - 
[65] 2010 -  - 0.002 - - - - - - 
[42] 2010 - - 0.0003 - - - 0.9754 0.9497 - - 
[45] 2011 - - 0.0988 0.0077 - - - - - - 
[43] 2011 0.9733 - 0.0145 - - - - - - - 
[46] 2011 0.9424 - 0.01948 - - - - - 0.9607 - 
[37] 2011 - - 0.0152 0.0255 - - - - - - 
[44] 2011 - - - - - - - - - - 
[47] 2012 - - 0.189 0.011 0.97 - - - - - 
[54] 2012 0.969 0.9315 0.071 0.031 - - - - - - 
[48] 2013 0.969 - 0.0125 - - - - - - - 
[49] 2013 - - 0.03676 0.09127 0.95161 - - - - - 
[86] 2013 - - - - 0.97 - - - - - 
[165] 2013 - - 0.081 0.017 0.965 - - - - - 
[69] 2013 - - 0.0175 0.0053 - - - - - - 
[40] 2014 - - 0.063 0.076 - - 0.935 0.924 0.93 - 
[117] 2014 - - 0.013 - 0.995 - - - - - 
[159] 2014 - - 0.002 0.005 - - - - - - 
[64] 2014 - - 0.0024 0.0075 - - 0.9955 0.9925 0.994 
0.99
1 
[118] 2015 - - 0.00212 
0.00849
2 - - - - - - 
[81] 2015 - - - - - - 0.935 0.924 0.93 - 
[66] 2016 - - - - - 0.891 0.819 0.819 0.819  
[91] 2016   0.0005   0.999 0.956 0.958 0.957 - 
[95] 2016 - - 0.177 0.022 0.939 -  - - - 
[52] 2017 -  0.021 - - - - - - - 
[89] 2017 0.9054 0.9418 0.0582 0.0946 0.9272 - - - - - 
[56] 2017 - - - - 0.9848 - - - - - 
[83] 2018 -  0.013 - 0.954 - - - - - 
[166] 2018 - - - - 0.964 - 0.964 0.964 0.963 - 





 Measuring Website Change 
For the portion of the research detailed in the ninth chapter of this dissertation, we 
measured the change in a website. It is often assumed that websites change, and prior 
researchers have quantified and measured such change. Researchers [167], motivated by 
the potential benefits of using caching servers, conducted one of the earliest studies in 
measuring change on the web. They found that only 22% of the web resources referenced 
in their traffic dataset were accessed more than once, with half of the 22% being accessed 
from multiple reference sources. In addition, they studied other changes on the webpage, 
including changes in hrefs (hyperlinks), images, email address, telephone number, and 
URL strings in the body of the webpage. Cho and Garcia-Molina [168] instrumented a 
crawler and crawled more than 700,000 pages, capturing whether a webpage changed 
(based on the MD5sum of the webpage). They reported that 40% of all webpages in their 
evaluation dataset changed in less than a week, breaking down which webpages changed 
based on the domain (.com, .netorg, .edu, and .gov). Fetterly et al. [168] expanded on this 
work by monitoring changes in other aspects of the website, including the webpage 
length and HTTP response code. Fetterly expanded on [170] in [171], shifting focus to 
determine how many webpages were duplicates and finding that 29.2% were very similar 
to other webpages and that 22.2% were near-identical. Brewington and Cybenko [172] 
monitored change and the lifetime of the webpages to model and infer change rates.  
Lim et al. [173] measured frequency of web document change over time but did 
so on a “word” level. Ada et al. [174] examined webpage changes at a finer level than 
previous work by developing an algorithm that tracked the movement of DOM elements 




[175] proposed criteria and a new metric for measuring webpage change based on six 
types of changes associated with webpages: “add,” “drop,” “copy,” “shrink,” “replace,” 
and “move.”  
Although past researchers have emphasized the broad study of how websites 
change, we have not identified any metrics useful for our purpose of evaluating detection 
models over time. Although these studies have established that websites change over 
time, we revisited this assumption in Chapter 9. 
 Summary 
From this literature review, we identified three common facets of malicious 
website detection: 1) the features used, 2) the method(s) or model(s) used to make the 
determination, and 3) the dataset(s) for training and evaluation of the models. We 
summarized studies that were performed on different datasets, identified prior research 
that incorporated research methods into practical solutions, and discussed performance 
metrics used in the prior studies. Additionally, we discussed research that measured 






Chapter 3: Methodology 
 Overview 
In our research, we evaluated a method for detecting malicious websites, 
leveraging features proposed in prior research, and also identifying new relevant features 
through statistical analysis. This method can be repeated to adapt with the evolution of 
threats and malicious techniques. Ultimately, we envision the repetition of this method 
over time, in order to identify sets of features and evaluate them for their applicability in 
detecting malicious websites. Although we focused on identifying and evaluating new 
features for malicious website detection and did not develop a new tool, the features that 
were identified and evaluated can be used as part of an additional layer of protection that 
can be hosted in a browser. Figure 3-1 below shows a potential use case wherein a 
detector built from a model using our method could examine and adjudicate the webpage 
before rendering it in a user’s browser. Images courtesy of [22]. Our research consisted of 
several steps leading to malicious website models that can be placed in a user’s browser 






Fig. 3-1.     Methods explored in this research can be applied with other security solutions 
 
 
 High Level Approach 
We sought to identify and evaluate features for malicious website detection and 
evaluate them over time. We also compared the features identified by our approach to 
those identified in prior research in terms of rank and importance and in terms of the 
ability of the detection models they yield. We evaluated this approach over various 
scenarios, datasets, and over time. At a high level, we followed the overall approach 
outlined below. Steps 1-4 correspond to Chapters 4-6. Step 5 corresponds to Chapter 7. 
Step 6 corresponds to Chapter 8 and step 7 corresponds to Chapter 9. 
1. Step 1: Select datasets 
a. Choose malicious and benign datasets for the research. 
i. There are 3 datasets (Dataset 1, Dataset 2, and Dataset 3). 




a. Identify potential features from prior research that represent the three 
facets that characterize a website (host information, webpage content, 
and communication data). 
b. Expand on features from prior research and incorporate new, unstudied 
features. 
c. Select features for malicious website detection. 
3. Step 3: Build detection models 
a. Individually evaluate feature-based malicious website detection using 
features from three facets that characterize a website (host information, 
webpage content, and communication data) by building detection 
models from supervised machine learning techniques over three 
scenarios. Scenarios include no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-
sampling of the dataset to account for class imbalances between our 
malicious and non-malicious datasets. 
b. Rank the importance of features with regard to their ability to detect 
malicious websites.  
c. Apply pair-wise feature transformation techniques to identify 
additional features, followed by feature selection and PCA, and rebuild 
the models to further investigate the consistency of our approach over 
multiple scenarios. 
d. For training and evaluation of the models, use an 80:20 split of 
training to testing data, that is: 80% of the data is used to build the 




e. When applicable, compare the performance of models built with the 
features identified with the performance of models built with features 
from prior research. 
4. Step 4: Tune and cross-validate 
a. Perform hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation of the detection 
models in an attempt to improve performance and demonstrate 
consistency in our models’ detection ability. 
b. Repeat steps 3a, 3b, 3c, and 4a on a training-to-testing split of 70:30 to 
demonstrate that our results are not a product of the initial 80:20 
training-to-testing split from step 3d. 
5. Step 5: Combine features for improved detection 
a. Repeat steps 2 through 4, but use all of the categories of features to 
achieve better detection. 
b. Compare results to features used in prior research. 
6. Step 6: Evaluate on another dataset 
a. Apply the RF model built in Chapter 7 to a new dataset (Dataset 2). 
b. Capture performance metrics on the model. 
c. Retrain a new model on the new Dataset 2, with features identified 
from Dataset 1. 
d. Investigate incorporating data from both datasets in training and 
evaluation. 




a. Measure the performance of a model trained on Dataset 1 and 
evaluated on another dataset (Dataset 3). 
b. Investigate the impact of model re-training on performance, using: 
i. various feature sets, and 
ii. different training intervals. 
c. Evaluate website change over time. 
i. Quantify the number of features (and their importance) relevant 
to malicious website detection change over time with statistical 
tests.  
 Step 1: Select Datasets 
 Dataset 1 
There are many methods for choosing a benign dataset, but there are two popular 
paradigms – either create a new dataset or leverage existing datasets. Creating a new 
dataset has the advantage of enabling the researcher to select websites deemed 
representative of the websites on the internet or websites that are more relevant to the 
research topic. The disadvantage of creating a new dataset, on the other hand, is that it 
requires building a method of gathering relevant websites, such as a crawler, which could 
influence or sway results. Researchers can attempt to minimize influence on their dataset 
selection, but a practical way to remove researcher influence is to use a dataset provided 
by an external party. In our research, we chose a well-known and commonly used benign 
dataset source, the Alexa top one million domains (Alexa Top 1M) provided by [176]. At 
least 10 studies on malicious website decision used the Alexa Top 1M domains as a 




dataset in prior research, we performed an additional check with threat intelligence 
information to ensure that the respective domains found in the Alexa Top 1M were not 
commonly involved in attacks. 
Like the benign website dataset, malicious website datasets typically come from 
two places – a custom or an existing dataset. Just as we chose an existing dataset (the 
Alexa Top 1M) for the benign websites studied, we chose to use a dataset provided by an 
external party – Cisco Talos [177] – for the malicious websites. The dataset consists of 
malicious websites representing several classes of attacks including drive-by downloads, 
phishing websites, and C2 website URLs. By using the dataset provided by Cisco Talos, 
we lessened our influence over the dataset. Specifically, we did not choose the actual 
entries in the list. Additionally, the malicious dataset provided by Cisco Talos allowed us 
to evaluate our approach on an aggregation of websites associated with several types of 
threats and, therefore, attacks. This contrasts with previous researchers, who typically 
focused on a single type of attack or had a priori knowledge into exactly which types of 
threats were present in their malicious dataset. The combination of the benign and 
malicious portions of this dataset are referred to as Dataset 1. It is used primarily in 
Chapters 4–7 and is leveraged minimally in Chapters 8 and 9. Dataset 1 was collected in 
August 2018. 
 Dataset 2 
We derived Dataset 2 from the websites in the Alexa Top 1M collected in January 
2019. Once the collection was complete, we labeled the data using open source threat 
intelligence information provided by Cymon.io [193]. That is, we labeled entries that 




in the Cymon.io data as benign. Like Dataset 1, Dataset 2 can be viewed as being 
provided from an external source, with the choice of entries being outside of our control. 
We used Dataset 2 in the portion of the research outlined in Chapter 8. 
 Dataset 3 
We collected Dataset 3 over a period of 12 weeks, beginning February 2nd, 2020 
and ending April 19th, 2020. We derived this dataset from the Alexa Top 1M as well. On 
February 2nd, 2020, we conducted a query through Censys [176] to determine the Alexa 
Top 1M. After doing so, we began collection of these websites over the following week. 
On each subsequent week (February 9th, February 16th, February 23rd, etc.), we repeated 
the query to Censys, beginning the last collection on April 19th, 2020. We limited 
analysis to the entries that were consistent throughout each week – a total of 106,776 
websites (106,776 websites were present in the Alexa Top 1M on the query conducted 
each week on February 2nd, February 9th, … and April 19th). We used Google Safe 
Browsing [132] as the source of ground truth and labeled our data based on the rating 
provided by this service. This dataset, consisting of 106,766 websites that were 
consistently present in the Alexa Top 1M for a period of 12 weeks and were labeled 
based on Google Safe Browsing, is referred to as Dataset 3 and is used in Chapter 9. 
 Step 2: Discover Features 
The next step in our research centered on the discovery of which features to use to 
detect malicious websites. We surveyed academic and industry papers to determine the 
features that were commonly used to detect malicious websites. Although each researcher 
approached the detection of malicious websites in a slightly different way, we were able 




host information, 2) webpage content, and 3) communication data. These three facets 
describe a website, with each facet consisting of at least one category of feature. For 
example, WHOIS information and website URL structure are both categories of features 
in the host information facet. Images courtesy of [22]. 
 
 
Fig. 3-2.    Defining a website with three facets 
 
 
Host information: We define host information as all information that must be in 
place before the website is accessed, e.g., URL, DNS information, and the presence of 
SSL certificates. 
Webpage content: Webpage content consists of information gathered from the 
webpage fetched from the website URL. It includes the HTML, JavaScript, and any other 
information present on the webpage. Unlike host information, webpage content can be 
swapped out (in the case of updated HTML pages) without having to re-register the 
domain, URL, or any other corresponding information. 
Communication data: We define communication data as information flowing to 




and governs the method or way to communicate with the website, e.g. HTTP headers, 
traffic statistics, and summaries of traffic flow over a period of time. 
There are many categories of features that comprise these three facets, including: 
the structure of the URL, DNS record information, registration information, HTML and 
JavaScript characteristics, information gathered from TCP sessions, and HTTP metadata. 
Although many features exist, we limited our study of features to those that we could 
extract, just as a browser retrieves a website. Doing so reduced overhead during feature 
collection and increased the feasibility of this approach being integrated into a browser or 
other web client. Specifically, we used the URL structure as our host information 
features, we used the HTML and JavaScript on the webpage as our webpage content 
features, and we used the HTTP headers from the website as our communication data 
features. Refer to Appendices A, B, and C for a full list of features studied in this 
research. 
 Extensive Feature Consideration 
Although prior research efforts identified features for detecting malicious 
websites, the researchers often relied on preconceived notions of the features to use. In 
some cases, these features have not changed over the years. For example, [23] counted 
the number of <iframe> elements on a webpage in their study and additional authors 
included this feature as well. Although [23] conducted their research more than 11 years 
ago, they helped establish the use of <iframe> information for detecting malicious 
websites. This single example illustrates the tendency of researchers to assume the 




we included features gathered from previous studies, but also incorporated additional 
features and used additional techniques to determine which were useful.  
 Feature Selection Process 
By gathering an extensive number of features, we ran the risk of overfitting our 
models, which would inhibit detection capability on unknown datasets. Also, using too 
many features could negatively impact computation performance for detection model 
building and evaluation. Thus, making detection decisions with hundreds or thousands of 
features was impractical. We sought, therefore, to identify a smaller set of relevant 
features for potential incorporation into a detector. To find such a set of features, we 
performed a series of feature selection steps after completing our feature collection, 
thereby identifying relevant features. We performed the six steps listed below to select 
features from our feature set. 
1. Remove features for which all the features have the same value. 
2. Remove features that have the same value at least 95% of the time. 
3. Determine the variance inflation factor (VIF) [178], which measures 
multicollinearity (high correlations among independent variables), values for 
each feature and iteratively identify features that have a VIF > 5 [179]. 
4. Determine which features have similar VIF values and high correlation to 
each other (we defined high correlation as having a correlation coefficient 
greater than 0.7 [180]). 
5. Iteratively repeat Step 4 and remove the highly correlated feature with the 




6. At this point, if our feature set consists of 50 or fewer features, we have 
arrived at our final feature set. If there are more than 50 features, however, we 
eliminate features even further with the use of XGBoost (XGB) [181], a GB 
algorithm. First, we calculate the feature importance – a metric between 0 and 
1 that measures how much that feature impacts the algorithm’s ability to make 
a determination regarding whether or not a website is malicious. We then 
iteratively input each feature importance as a threshold to the 
SelectFromModel technique [29], which is a transformer used to select 
features based on their weights. This produces sets of features that have a size 
“n” and corresponding threshold “t.” With each set of “n” features associated 
with each threshold “t,” we rebuild our XGB models to obtain an ACC for 
each set of ‘n’ features. We then iterate through the list of sets with “n” (the 
number of features) decreasing and identify relative maxima in the respective 
accuracies produced by the set of “n” features. When a relative maximum in 
ACC is observed, we stop and use the associated feature set as our final set. 
An example of this is seen in Chapter 4, Section 4.6.1. In Chapter 7 and 9, we 
observed that performing this step could directly (without Steps 3–6) produce 
a set of features for detection; hence, we skipped Steps 3–6 when performing 
feature selection in Chapters 7 and 9. 
 Step 3: Build Detection Models 
 Supervised Machine Learning Techniques 
We used supervised machine learning classifiers to build our models. In its 




via a mapping function. However, the mapping function is learned from an algorithm that 
requires a known or labeled dataset as input. In our work, we had access to a corpus of 
labeled training data, both malicious and benign websites, which made a supervised 
learning approach feasible. The supervised classifiers used to build our models belong to 
several classes of machine learning algorithms: nearest neighbors [111], generalized 
linear models (GLMs) [92], ensemble methods [182], and neural networks (NNs) [183]. 
Among the models, four are ensemble methods and provide a measure of feature 
importance: adaptive boosting (AB), extra trees (ET), RF, and GB. The other models do 
not provide a measure of feature importance, but represent other classes of algorithms: 
bagging classifier (BC) [184] is an ensemble method [182], LR is a GLM, and KNN is a 
nearest neighbor [111] method. Covering additional classes of algorithms (other than 
those that incorporate feature importance), provides better insight into the effectiveness 
of the features identified and demonstrates consistency across various learning 
algorithms.  
In this research, we leveraged: FPR, FNR, ACC, AUC, MCC, Prec, and Rec. We 
chose these metrics based on our motivation to present thorough and transparent results, 
on the prevalence of the metrics in previous research, and on the ability of the metrics to 
describe the detection ability of our models based in various ways. 
1. Accuracy (ACC) 
𝐴𝐶𝐶 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
where TP is the number of true positives, TN is the number of true negatives, 
FP is the number of false positives, and FN is the number of false negatives. 
 















4. AUC is the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve that 
plots the TPR vs FPR at each classification threshold. The AUC (lightly 
shaded) for a given ROC curve is shown below. 
 
 
5. MCC is a measure of the quality of a binary classifier and ranges between -1 
and 1, with 1 representing a perfect classifier, 0 representing a random 
classifier, and -1 indicating complete disagreement between the prediction and 
actual value. 
𝑀𝐶𝐶 =  
(𝑇𝑃 ∙  𝑇𝑁) − (𝐹𝑃 ∙  𝐹𝑁)
√(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃) ∙ (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁) ∙ (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃) ∙ (𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁)
 
 
6. Precision quantifies the number of correct positive classifications made and is 









7. Recall is a metric that describes how many positive cases the model finds 
from among all of the positive cases and is defined as follows: 





We focused our discussion in this research on the MCC since it incorporated the 
number of true positives and true negatives as well as false positives and false negatives 
in its value. 
 Importance Determination 
Determining the most useful features for malicious website detection is a key task 
for building models that are not overfit and can be applied in a practical setting. To do so, 
we needed a method of ranking the importance of the potential features for malicious 
website detection. Fortunately, machine learning techniques such as AB, ET, RF, XGB, 
and GB algorithms can be used to build detection models and have the ability to provide 
feature rankings. Supervised machine learning techniques – including ensemble methods 
[182] and decision trees – have shown promise in prior studies. More importantly, each 
of these models provides a feature importance metric – a number between 0 and 1 that 
indicates how much the feature contributed to the model’s classification decision. This 
importance metric allowed us to determine which features contributed the most to 
malicious website detection and to create a ranking of features. The sum of these feature 
importance metrics equals 1. A feature was considered more important (and higher 
ranked) than another feature if it had a higher importance.  
Specifically, the models that calculate feature importance use decision trees and 




for measuring feature importance and is calculated in a two-step process. First, we 
determine the Gini impurity [185] for a specific feature branch in the decision tree: 




where i(t) is the Gini impurity for the feature branch in the decision tree, t is the branch 
condition for the feature, k is the number of possible output categories (in our case k = 2 
for malicious and not malicious), and p is the probability of each outcome in k given t. 
The total Gini impurity of that feature is created by taking a weighted sum of the 
respective indices per feature branch: 




where G(f) is the total Gini impurity for a feature f, i(t) is the impurity of the respective 
branch, N is the total number of branches, and p(t) is the probability of that condition 
over the total dataset. The lower the Gini impurity, the more useful (important) the 
feature is in the decision tree and the higher it should be placed in the tree. Specific 
details on the implementation used in our study are available in [29]. In Chapters 4–7 we 
created a ranking that enabled us to make comparisons to features used in prior research. 
 
 Scenarios and Feature Transformation 
Datasets used to detect malicious websites commonly contain class imbalances 
(i.e., the size of the malicious dataset and the size of the benign dataset often differ from 
one another). This is true for prior research and was true for our research as well. We 




this affected the performance of our detection models. We used three sampling scenarios: 
1) no-sampling (using the dataset as is); 2) over-sampling (incrementally over-sampling 
the malicious dataset to make the number of benign and malicious websites equal); and 3) 
under-sampling (sampling the benign dataset to lower the number of benign websites to 
equal the number of malicious websites). We performed over-sampling using the 
Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique (SMOTE) [186] from [187], while under-
sampling was random. We applied each of our machine learning algorithms to the three 
sampling scenarios, yielding several models for analysis (multiple models per sampling 
scenario). Class-balancing also was explored by changing the class weight [29] 
parameter of the models. However, this was shown to have little effect on performance 
and involved performing an exhaustive grid-search on the weight parameters. 
In addition to the no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-sampling scenarios, we 
created two more scenarios using feature transformation techniques – feature 
transformation with feature selection (FT w/FS) and feature transformation with PCA 
(FT w/PCA). Feature transformation enabled us to create additional features using pair-
wise arithmetic operations (addition, multiplication, and division). After creating these 
new features, we independently performed additional feature selection and PCA to 
identify relevant features and components, respectively. We performed feature 
transformation with pair-wise feature transformations (addition, multiplication, and 
division) with the help of a Python library, featuretools [188]. The additional 
feature selection included the use of correlation [189], SelectKBest (scoring function chi-
square), recursive feature elimination (RFE), and SelectFromModel [29] to select a 




selected features that were identified by at least three of these four techniques. PCA 
created new features, also known as components, by reducing the features to “n” 
principal components that captured a large portion of variance in the data. We used two 
techniques to accomplish feature transformation – feature transformation with feature 
selection and feature transformation with PCA – applying them exclusively to the no-
sampling scenario. With the addition of these two-feature transformation cases, we had 
several models for analysis (models repeated over the five scenarios, which consisted of 
three sampling scenarios and two feature transformation scenarios). Figure 3-3 below 
shows the scenarios we used in this study. 
 
Fig. 3-3.    Several sampling and feature transformation scenarios  
were used throughout this research 
 
 
In Chapters 4 and 6, we rebuilt these sets of models on two sets of features – those 
identified by our approach and those used in prior research. Doing so allowed us to 
compare the effect of the newly identified features in this research. Chapter 5 is unique 
from Chapters 4 and 6 in its focus on a set of features (URL structure) that have been 
extensively studied. Thus, we did not make a comparison between new features and 
features from prior research since prior research has covered many of the possible URL 
features and the distinction between those that are new and those that are from prior 




 Step 4: Tune and Cross-Validate  
 Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation 
Once we had the performance metrics for each of the models in the respective 
scenarios, we performed cross-validation and hyperparameter tuning for two reasons: 
first, to improve the performance of the models, and second, to demonstrate the 
consistency of the models with and without hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation. 
We used a decision tree classifier as the base estimator and StratifiedKFold [190] for 10-
fold cross-validation. We used ACC, Prec, Rec, and F1 score as potential scoring metrics. 
We performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation on the best model in each of 
the five scenarios (no-sampling, under-sampling, over-sampling, feature transformation 
with feature selection, and feature transformation with PCA). 
 Validation with Another Data Split 
In our study, we trained and tested our models using an 80:20 split of train to test 
data. We used 80% of the dataset to train and used the remaining 20% to test our models. 
This approach is common in prior research. We used the same 20% to evaluate our 
models to ensure consistency. To further demonstrate that our results were not a product 
of our initial 80:20 split of training to testing data, we rebuilt our models in the various 
scenarios and performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation, starting with a 
70:30 split of train to test data. We then compared these results to the tuned and cross-




 Step 5: Combine Features for Improved Detection 
 Combined Features in this Study 
In this step, we built detection models over various scenarios on a set of features 
derived from all categories of the features in our study. We also built models with 
features exclusively from prior research. 
 Additional Detection Models 
We built models using nine different supervised learning models and two models 
from unsupervised learning techniques on two feature sets – those identified in this 
dissertation and those from prior research. We performed feature selection by following 
the same procedure detailed in Section 3.3.2 of this chapter. The supervised learning 
models included KNN, AB, ET, RF, GB, XGB, BC, NNs, and a voting classifier (V) 
[191] built form the RF, ET, and GB. We excluded LR in this study because it 
consistently proved to be one of the worst performing models from the prior steps. We 
gathered feature importance from the AB, ET, RF, GB, and XGB algorithms. The 
unsupervised models included one-class SVMs and autoencoders [192], both of which 
have been used for malicious website detection. 
 Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation 
We performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation as outlined in Step 5. 
However, we also varied the Scikit-Learn [29] class weight parameter, which 
penalized missed classifications for the positive (malicious) or negative (benign) classes 
in the classification. We varied the Scikit-Learn class weight parameter in this step as 




 Step 6: Evaluate on Another Dataset  
 Model Application to a New Dataset (Dataset 2) 
We then applied to a new dataset the best performing RF classifier built thus far 
(the classifier that performed well in our studies thus far and performed well in prior 
research). The new dataset (Dataset 2) consisted of the Alexa Top 1M domains. We 
defined malicious websites as those websites that were in the Alexa Top 1M and that also 
were identified in threat intelligence information provided by Cymon.io [193]. We 
defined benign websites as those from the Alexa Top 1M that were not present in the 
Cymon.io dataset. We directly applied the model trained from Step 5, captured the 
performance metrics, and explored any differences. 
 Retrain with Features Identified in Prior Studies (Section 3.3) 
We also explored the capabilities of the features identified in our first dataset 
(Dataset 1) to another dataset (Dataset 2) by re-training a model based with the features 
identified from Dataset 1 on Dataset 2 and evaluating the detection ability of the new 
model on Dataset 2. We then evaluated the performance and determined whether new 
features derived from the newer dataset (Dataset 2) could be incorporated to improve 
detection.  
 Leverage Two Datasets for Training and Evaluation 
In Step 6, we explored the use of two different datasets for training and 




 Step 7: Explore Detection Performance Over Time 
 Measure the Performance of a Model Trained on Dataset 1 and Evaluated on 
Dataset 3 
We required a well-performing model for evaluating detection performance over 
time. To that end, we first examined the performance of an RF model built on Dataset 1 
and evaluated on Dataset 3. We evaluated how consistently the entries in the dataset were 
classified and how well the model performed.  
 Investigate the Impact of Model Retraining on Performance 
We then investigated the impact of model re-training by re-training an RF model 
on the first snapshot of Dataset 3 and evaluating on the proceeding snapshots in Dataset 
3. The model was trained using three sets of features – the identified features from 
Dataset 1 (the features in Chapter 7), the features used in prior research, and a new set of 
features re-selected on Dataset 3. We then re-trained on each week and evaluated the 
performance on subsequent weeks. Finally, we re-trained the model using all past data 
(instead of a single snapshot) and evaluated the model on the subsequent weeks.  
 Evaluate Website Change Over Time 
The internet is a fast-changing environment and websites change over time. These 
changes can occur in areas that may influence detection models, including the features 
that are used for detection. Hence, we measured the change in the websites over time 
(based on the features used in our detection models). We used four tests –the t-test for 
related samples, the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, the k-sample Anderson-





▪ The related (dependent) t-test [194]-[195] tests whether means of two 






• m is the mean differences of all the paired measurements, 
• n is the sample size, and 
• s is the standard deviation of the differences 
If the t-statistic is greater than a critical value, the null hypothesis of equal 
means can be rejected. 
▪ The two-sample KS test [196]-[197] tests that two samples come from the 
same distribution. The KS statistic (D below) is expressed by: 
𝐷 = | 𝐸1(𝑖) − 𝐸2(𝑖)| 
where E1 and E2 are the empirical distributions for the two samples. We can 
reject the null hypothesis that the two samples come from a common 





α 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005 0.001 
c(α) 1.22 1.36 1.48 1.63 1.73 1.95 
 
where: 
• D is the KS statistic, 
•  is the significance level, 




• n and m are the sizes of the samples. 
▪ The k-sample Anderson-Darling test [198]-[199] tests the null hypothesis 
that the populations for which two or more groups were drawn are 
identical. The Anderson-Darling (A) statistics is described below: 
𝐴 =
𝑛 − 1

















• Ai are the populations we are considering, 
• ni = the total number of data points from Ai, 
• xij is the jth observation in ith group, 
• n = the total number of data points for all ni, 
• L = the number of distinct data points in the combined sample, 
• z* = z1, z2, ... zL are the distinct values in the combined data set 
ordered from smallest to largest, 
• hj = number of values in the combined samples equal to zj, 
• Hj = number of values in the combined samples less than zj plus 
one half the number of values in the combined samples equal to zj, 
• Fij = number of values in the ith group (Ai) which are less than zj 
plus one half the number of values in this group which are equal to 
zj , and 
• k = number of groups. 
The null hypothesis is that the samples were drawn from the same population 




▪ The Kruskal Wallis H test [200]-[201] determines whether medians of two 
or more groups are different. The H statistic is given by: 
𝐻 = [
12







] − 3(𝑛 + 1) 
where: 
• n = sum of sample sizes for all samples, 
• c = number of samples, 
• Tj = sum of ranks in the j
th sample, and 
• nj = size of the j
th sample. 
If the H statistic is greater than a critical value, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the medians are the same. 
All four of these tests allowed us to determine whether two samples or sets of data 
came from a similar distribution and formed the basis for how we determined whether 
websites (and their features) have changed. Their application is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 9. 
 Summary 
In this section we discussed our methodology. We started with a high-level 
description of our approach then discussed the steps taken in this dissertation. The first 
step included selection of three datasets used in the proceeding chapters. We then 
discussed our approach to discover features for malicious website detection through 
extensive feature consideration and through a process of feature selection. The next step 
in our methodology is the creation and evaluation of detection models from distinct types 
of features – webpage content, URL, and HTTP headers, with various learning 




performing tuning and cross-validation of the models. After this investigation, we 
performed studies to measure the detection performance when leveraging all three types 
of features (webpage content, URL, and HTTP headers) in this dissertation. We shifted 
emphasis in the later portion of this dissertation and performed an investigation of the 
effectiveness of the models built thus far and the features identified when applied to 
another dataset. We concluded our methodology with steps for our temporal study of 





Chapter 4: Webpage Content Features Analysis  
 Introduction 
In this chapter, we explore an approach using only webpage content for three 
reasons. First, prior research places little emphasis on finding new features derived from 
webpage content to detect malicious websites, which can lead to potential missed 
detection opportunities. For example, the <iframe> HTML element has been considered 
a means of detecting malicious websites for more than 11 years without re-evaluation. 
Second, security operations centers (SOCs) or incident response teams can gather 
webpage content features with little effort and incorporate them into signatures to detect 
malicious websites. Third, most prior research focused on detecting either phishing 
websites or drive-by downloads. While these results were promising, they required a 
priori knowledge of the target website, which is not a viable solution for a SOC or an 
incident response team. We then evaluated the ability of webpage content features in 
order to detect malicious websites on a diverse dataset (Dataset 1) containing several 
types of malicious websites to gain insight into their performance when a priori 
knowledge is not available. Our contributions are outlined below.  
• We re-evaluated the importance of features for detection of malicious website 
from prior research and provided a ranking of webpage content features to 
detect malicious websites. 
• We created an approach using webpage content to identify 26 features, 17 of 
which were introduced in our study, to detect malicious websites with an 
average ACC, AUC, and MCC of 89.15%, 0.867, and 0.641, respectively, 




• Our approach identified 26 features, with 17 of them introduced in our study, 
whose models produced an average MCC that was 0.005 higher than models 
built with features identified in prior research and did so with 48% fewer 
features. 
• We identified features, both new and from prior research, that showed 
promise for detecting websites involved in phishing attacks, drive-by 
downloads, and C2 activities. 
 Related Research 
Researchers have used features gathered from webpage content – both the HTML 
and the JavaScript on a webpage – to detect malicious websites separately and 
collectively. Provos et al. [59] examined drive-by downloads, commonly enabled by the 
<iframe> HTML element. Zhang et al. [24] looked for the <input> tag accompanied 
by the words “credit card” and “password” as indicators of phishing websites. Xiang et 
al. [46] built a framework to detect phishing websites using features gathered from the 
URL structure and HTML on the webpage. Both [24] and [46] used approaches for 
phishing website detection that relied on the assumption that phishing websites will often 
try to “trick” a user into entering sensitive information.  Whittaker et al. [42] applied 
statistics to use of the password field and to links on the webpage to build a classifier 
with a TPR of 95% against websites involved in phishing attacks. Marchal et al. [91] 
used the links on the webpage, in conjunction with URL features and the Alexa ranking 
of the domain, as a set of features to detect phishing websites and achieved an AUC of 




derived from many aspects of a website to create clusters for phishing website detection 
and achieved 99% accuracy on their dataset of 200 websites. 
Other authors focused solely on gathering features from the JavaScript on the 
webpage. Curtsinger et al. [68] detected JavaScript malware with an AST based approach 
by instrumenting the browser with a “de-obfuscator” to get a better representation of the 
actual JavaScript on the webpage and produced an FPR of 0.0003%. JStill [69] used the 
fact that malicious JavaScript is often obfuscated and used practical examples on 
malicious JavaScript techniques, including data obfuscation, ASCII encoding, and logical 
structure obfuscation and produced an FPR of 1.75% and 0.53%. Researchers [119] used 
JaSt to detect and analyze obfuscated JavaScript, using entirely static analysis that 
yielded an ACC of nearly 99.5% when used with an RF classifier.  
HTML and JavaScript have often been studied independently and have also been 
combined for malicious website detection. In an influential paper, [23] gathered features 
from the <script> and <frame> elements to achieve an FPR of 5.88% and an FNR of 
46.15%. Researchers [45], with Prophiler, extracted both HTML and JavaScript features 
to create a “fast filter” for detecting drive-by downloads and achieved an FPR of 9.88% 
and FNR of 0.77%. Researchers [47] and [165] collected suspicious HTML features 
along with the counts of suspicious JavaScript methods such as eval(), 
charCodeAt(), unescape(), and others that are known to be associated with 
malicious JavaScript. They achieved accuracies of 97.8% and 96.5%, respectively. 
Authors [49] and [66] used the respective counts of suspicious JavaScript methods and 
specific HTML tags in their feature collection to achieve an ACC of 96.39% and an AUC 




 Research Questions 1–4 
We created four research questions to explore the effectiveness of this approach 
and the webpage content features we identified as features for malicious website 
detection. These questions focused on using webpage content features – that is, the 
HTML and JavaScript on the webpage – as the sole source of features for detection of 
whether the website was malicious. 
 Research Question 1 
Our first question aided in determining how well our approach aligned with or 
differed from prior research. Some previous researchers used webpage content to detect 
malicious websites, but did not evaluate features that have not demonstrated potential for 
malicious website detection. We considered 17,746 features in total, gathered from the 
HTML and JavaScript on the webpage. While no definitive list of webpage content 
features currently exists, certain HTML and JavaScript features have been commonly 
reused in prior research. We hypothesized that our approach, which considered 17,746 
features, many of which had never been studied for malicious website detection, would 
identify new features that were important to the detection of malicious websites. 
Research Question 1 is stated as follows: 
RQ1: How do the features identified compare with prior research? 
 Research Question 2 
Our second research question investigated whether the incorporation of these 
features improved malicious website detection. This was done by comparing the MCCs 
for models built with the features identified by our approach to the MCCs of models built 




feature transformation techniques with feature selection and PCA, comparing the 
respective MCCs. Hence, RQ2 is stated as follows: 
RQ2:  Do the additional features identified improve malicious website detection? 
 Research Question 3 
Our third research question focused on the robustness of our approach by 
investigating how our results changed in different sampling scenarios – that is, whether 
our approach yielded consistent results in the cases of no-sampling, over-sampling, and 
under-sampling of our dataset. In security research, class imbalances between the benign 
and malicious datasets are common. We also had an imbalance of malicious and benign 
websites in our dataset. Hence, we state RQ3 as follows: 
RQ3:  Do our results change with no-sampling, under-sampling, and over-
sampling scenarios? 
 Research Question 4 
Our fourth research question enabled us to explore additional validation of our 
results by performing hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation in an attempt to 
improve our results. Hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation could enable us to build 
better detection models. RQ4 is stated as follows:  
RQ4:  Does hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation improve our results? 
 Feature Consideration 
 JavaScript Methods 
From our literature review, we observed that the presence and counts of 
JavaScript methods are often used as a JavaScript feature for malicious website detection. 




webpage. For example, extracting the method count for the method eval on the 
following code snippet would result in a value of 2 – that is, we count two invocations of 
the method eval: 
console.log(eval('3 + 2') === eval('5')); 
JavaScript methods of interest from previous research fall into three loose 
categories – 1) obfuscation methods, 2) suspicious methods, and 3) methods that act on 
the Window or DOM objects. These categories are considered loose because potential 
exists for a method to be found in more than one category. For example, obfuscation 
methods are often considered suspicious, but suspicious methods exist that are not related 
to obfuscation. In addition, methods that act on the DOM and Window objects can also 
be considered suspicious, yet they maintain some uniqueness because they act upon the 
DOM and Window objects. 
4.4.1.1 Obfuscation Methods 
Obfuscation is a technique used by malicious JavaScript writers to hinder analysis 
of their code, thus making it more difficult to analyze it and to detect it as malicious 
JavaScript code. Obfuscated JavaScript is challenging to read, but it contains certain 
characteristics useful for determining whether it is malicious. These obfuscation 
characteristics include use of specific methods such as replace and unescape. The 
snippet of code below from [203] shows normal JavaScript and its obfuscated equivalent. 
▪ No obfuscation: 
alert( 'Hello, world!' ); 
▪ Obfuscation : 




4.4.1.2 Suspicious Methods 
Methods are considered suspicious for many reasons, including their presence in 
specific types of attacks. The code snippet below from [204] uses events to send a user to 
a fake website when they try to go to the previous webpage. 
function addBackClickAd(options) {a 
  if (options['backClickAd'] && options['backClickZone'] && typeof 
window['history']['pushState'] === 'function') { 
    if (options['backClickNoHistoryOnly'] && window['history'].length > 
1) { 
      return false; 
    } 
    // pushes a fake history state with the current doc title 
    window['history']['pushState']({exp: Math['random']()}, 
document['title'], null); 
    var createdAnchor = document['createElement']('a'); 
    createdAnchor['href'] = options['url']; 
    var newURL = 'http://' + createdAnchor['host'] + '/afu.php?zoneid=' + 
options['backClickZone'] + '&var=' + options['zoneId']; 
    setTimeout(function () { 
      window['addEventListener']('popstate', function (W) { 
        window['location']['replace'](newURL); 
      }); 
    }, 0); 
  } 
} 
4.4.1.3 Methods that Act on the Window or DOM Objects 
The DOM is the internal representation of the webpage document and the 
Window object represents the browser window. It is common for malicious JavaScript to 
manipulate or misuse properties of both the DOM and Window objects to facilitate 
attacks. The example below shows malicious JavaScript that manipulates the DOM from 
[205].  
(function () { 
    var qk = document.createElement('iframe');  // creating an 
iframe 
 
    qk.src = 'http://xxx.tld/wp-includes/dtd.php';  // pointing 
it at a webpage 
 
    /* 
    making the iframe only take up a 1px by 1px square 
    in the top left-hand corner of the web page it is injected 
into 




    qk.style.position = 'absolute'; 
    qk.style.border = '0'; 
    qk.style.height = '1px'; 
    qk.style.width = '1px'; 
    qk.style.left = '1px'; 
    qk.style.top = '1px'; 
 
    /* 
    Adding the iframe to the DOM by creating a <div> with an ID 
of "qt" 
    (If the div has not been created already) 
    */     
    if (!document.getElementById('qk')) { 
        document.write('<div id=\'qk\'></div>'); 
        document.getElementById('qk').appendChild(qk); 
    } 
})(); 
Table 4-1 lists commonly studied JavaScript methods involved in obfuscation, 





Table 4-1.  
Certain JavaScript Methods Were Considered Suspicious  
and Have Been Studied in Prior Research 
Commonly Studied JavaScript Methods 
Method Motivation 
createElement 
This method modifies the data object model 
(DOM). 
write This method modifies the DOM, writes a string. 
charCodeAt 
This method is considered suspicious and has been 
used in JavaScript obfuscation.  
Concat 
This method manipulates strings and is associated 
with obfuscation. 
escape 
This method is considered suspicious and has been 
used in obfuscation. 
eval 
This method is considered suspicious and enables 
the execution of a string as code. 
exec 
This method is considered suspicious and can be 
used in obfuscation. 
fromCharCode This method has been associated with obfuscation. 
link 
This global method is considered suspicious and 
has appeared in many types of attacks. 
parseInt 
This method has been associated with malicious 
combinations of methods. 
replace 
This method is commonly used in obfuscation. 
This method has also been shown to be used in 
conjunction with shellcode.  
search 
This global method is considered suspicious and 
has appeared in many types of attacks. 
subString 
This method associated with string manipulation 
and obfuscation. 
unescape 
This method is considered suspicious and has been 
used in obfuscation. This method has also been 
shown to be used in conjunction with shellcode. 
addEventListener 
Event attachments can be considered suspicious 
under certain circumstances. 
setInterval 
The method is involved in executing code after a 
certain time interval and has been used in drive-by 
download attacks. 
setTimeout 
The method is involved in executing code after a 




Although we extracted the counts for the methods in Table 4-1, we also included 
another 384 methods found on Mozilla Developer Network (MDN) [206] and W3Schools 
[207]. MDN and W3 were consulted because they are intended for JavaScript developers 
and contain extensive and up-to-date information on JavaScript. The additional 384 
methods were chosen for our study because they are related to previously studied 
methods, albeit there is little published research about the use of these methods for 
detecting malicious websites. For example, only two methods that act on the DOM have 




our feature set in addition to the two DOM methods, write and createElement, listed 
in Table 4-1. With our approach, we captured methods that are relevant as well as 
methods from previous research, and we explored other methods that may be relevant for 
detecting malicious websites. For a complete list of all JavaScript method counts 
collected in this chapter, please see Appendix B.  
 HTML Characteristics 
Another feature-rich aspect of webpage content is the HTML. When a browser 
loads a webpage, it uses the HTML to determine how to represent the webpage to the 
user. HTML defines the structure of the webpage, including visual characteristics, 
specific elements, and attributes. It consists of elements – also referred to as tags – 
specified by <element_name> and of attributes specified within an element. We refer to 
an attribute within a specific element as an element-attribute pair.  
The HTML code example below represents a webpage that specifies links to two 






   </body> 
</html> 
Although this example is small, it contains several features we can collect: the 
count of <body>, <a>, and <br> elements, as well as details about the href attribute in 
the <a> element (also referred to as the a_href element-attribute pair). Running this 








Total out of domain URLs=2 
Total HTML Tags=5 
Total href attributes=2 
<a href =”http*”>=2 
<a href =”*.com”>=2 
This vector can be interpreted as: “This HTML contains five tags, two href 
attributes, one <body> element, two <a> elements, and one <br> element. Two of the 
links on the webpage point to resources outside of the domain, two of the href attributes 
on the <a> element point to a resource specified over the HTTP protocol, and two href 
attributes point to a .com URL.” Other research typically counts specific elements such 
as <iframe>. We took a more expansive approach, expanding our collection of element 
counts to include many HTML elements. Please see Appendix B for a complete listing of 
elements collected in this chapter. Additionally, we expanded analysis of element-
attribute pairs that specify resources via URLs. URLs specified on a webpage are 
interesting because they can reference a resource and have many properties that translate 
to potential features. These properties can be extracted and used for malicious website 
detection. While we included element-attribute pairs from previous research, we also 
expanded and analyzed webpage URLs and additional element-attribute pairs not 
previously studied. For a complete listing of element-attribute pairs we collected in this 
chapter, please refer to Appendix C. Table C-1 in Appendix C also specifies the attributes 
for additional URL analysis for the respective elements. This is specified in the last 
column of Table C-1. The last feature we collected is the number of small elements of a 
specified HTML type. Previous research captured the presence of small <iframe>s and 




attributes. An element is considered small if it has a height or width of less than or equal 
to two pixels. 
 Feature Collection 
We wrote our collection scripts in Python and used Pyselenium [208] to fetch 
the webpage and retrieve the information. Pyselenium was chosen for its ability to 
parse the HTML and extract values and attributes. We extracted JavaScript method 
counts by searching for a method call on the webpage to speed up extraction for potential 
implementation into a detector. HTML feature extraction was more complex because a 
page can have several instances of a specific element and those elements can contain 
various attributes. Furthermore, not all attributes are guaranteed to be present in each 
element. To account for this, we created a simple algorithm to aide our HTML feature 
extraction. The pseudo-code for HTML feature extraction is shown below. Special 
elements are specific elements where we extract additional attributes such as features 
regarding the resource URLs (for example href), whether the element is “small,” etc. 
elements = ALL_HTML_ELEMENTS 
for elem in elements: 
 count = get_total_element_count(elem) 
 if elem is special_element: 
  special_attributes = get_special_attributes(elem) 
   for special_attribute in special_attributes: 
    extract_attribute(elem, special_attribute) 
 Learning, Feature Selection, and Sampling Techniques in Webpage Content 
Analysis 
 Feature Elimination Process 
We then sought to shrink our feature set of 17,746 webpage content features to a 
smaller, more useful set of no more than 50 features. The number 50 was chosen 




websites in prior research. For example, [45] used 77 features with Prophiler, while [47] 
used 30 features with BINSPECT. We followed the approach outlined in Section 3.3.2, 
determining which features had strong association with the dependent variable, whether 
the website was malicious, and which had no relationship or a weak relationship with the 
dependent variable. We identified and removed features specific to our dataset, as well as 
features that are the same for most of the dataset. Hence, we removed features that had 
the same value 95% or more of the time. This eliminated 17,525 features and left us with 
221 features. We then evaluated the remaining 221 features to identify those that had a 
high multicollinearity. Removing features with high multicollinearity was required in 
order to ensure that we analyzed a set of independent features. We quantified collinearity 
with the VIF [177]. First, we computed the VIF for each feature. We then identified 
features that had a VIF > 5, as used in [179]. Among our list of features with a VIF 
greater than five, we then determined which features had similar VIF values, thereby 
showing that they had correlations similar to those of the other variables and had high 
correlation to each other. We considered a high correlation to be a correlation of greater 
than 0.7, as used in [180]. Among the highly correlated features with similar VIF values, 
we dropped the feature with the higher VIF. This process resulted in 43 features removed, 
leaving us with 178 features.  
Since we had more than 50 features remaining, we continued to remove features 
using the XGB algorithm. XGB is a GB algorithm that also computes feature importance. 
To remove additional features, we first calculated the feature importance for each feature 
in the set of 178. This was done by building a model from a 70:30 split of training to test 




each feature importance as a threshold to the SelectFromModel technique [29], a 
transformer used to select features based on their weights to produce a set of features. 
This produced a set of features for each threshold. We then used each set of features 
associated with each threshold and rebuilt our XGB models to obtain an ACC for each set 
of features. At this point in our analysis, we have a list of sets consisting of a threshold 
“thresh,” number of features “n,” set of features “f,” and an ACC. An example is below. 
… 
Thresh=0.009, n=31, f=[..], Accuracy: 90.58% 
Thresh=0.010, n=26, f=[..], Accuracy: 90.62% 
Thresh=0.010, n=26, f=[..], Accuracy: 90.62% 
Thresh=0.010, n=26, f=[..], Accuracy: 90.62% 
Thresh=0.013, n=23, f=[..], Accuracy: 90.58% 
… 
There are three entries for a threshold of 0.010 because the threshold 0.010 
appeared three times in the list of feature importance values for the 178 features. We then 
iterated through the list of sets with “n” decreasing and identified relative maxima in the 
respective ACC. We found a relative maximum at n = 26 and used the features associated 
with this relative maximum as our final feature set. 
 Machine Learning Models, Sampling, and Feature Transformation 
To ensure that we identified a relevant set of features, we evaluated the 
effectiveness for detecting malicious websites by building eight models using supervised 
machine learning algorithms discussed in Section 3.4.1. 
For all models, we split training and testing data using an 80:20 ratio, a common 
train/test split for data. Our overall dataset is imbalanced, with 34,778 benign websites 
and 5,931 malicious websites. To address this and to ensure that our results were not the 
product of our benign-to-malicious website ratio, we performed the sampling procedure 




For no-sampling, we used 27,822 benign websites and 4,745 malicious websites 
in our training set. Under-sampling resulted in 4,745 malicious websites and 4,745 
benign websites in the under-sampled training set. For over-sampling, we arrived at a 
balanced training set with 27,822 benign websites and 27,822 malicious websites. 
The websites used in the testing dataset remained consistent across all machine 
learning models and sampling approaches for the training data so that we could compare 
model results and identify whether any single sampling technique led to a better model. 
We ensured that there was no overlap between any training and testing data. We also 
built models in feature transformation scenarios as discussed in Section 3.4.3. Figure 3-3 
from Chapter 3 provides a summary of the feature selection and sampling techniques.  
 Results 
 RQ1: How do the Features Identified Compare with Prior Research? 
RQ1 compared the features identified in our approach with those from prior 
research in terms of ability to detect malicious websites. To examine this question, we 
leveraged our four ensemble methods (RF, AB, ET, and BC), all of which captured the 
notion of feature importance. The higher the importance, the more the feature contributed 
toward determining whether the website was malicious. The identified 26 features are 
shown below in Table 4-2, along with their rank and importance, separated by a “:” in the 
no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-sampling scenarios. Shaded rows designate new 
features we identified in our research. Unshaded rows designate features studied in prior 




Table 4-2.  
Feature Selection Identified 26 Webpage Content Features for Detection 
26 Identified Webpage Content Features Ranked  
Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
Total HTML Tags 1: 0.3206 1: 0.2705 1: 0.2239 
Total href attributes 2: 0.1025 2: 0.1190 2: 0.1723 
<link href> OoD 3: 0.0644 3: 0.0943 3: 0.1018 
<p> count 4: 0.0567 5: 0.0601 4: 0.0642 
<a href=”https*”> 5: 0.0554 8: 0.0403 6: 0.0581 
Count of <meta> tag 6: 0.0515 6: 0.0471 8: 0.0340 
<script_async=true> 7: 0.0462 7: 0.045 5: 0.0634 
<link type=”text/css”> 8: 0.0298 9: 0.0327 11: 0.0257 
<script src> OoD 9: 0.0289 14: 0.0141 7: 0.0535 
<link href=”http*”> 10: 0.0271 11: 0.0224 10: 0.0283 
push() 11: 0.0258 4: 0.0627 9: 0.0325 
<link href=”*.css”> 12: 0.0258 12: 0.0205 13: 0.0125 
indexOf() 13: 0.0175 25: 0.0071 16: 0.0119 
<form action=”http*> 14: 0.0168 19: 0.012 12: 0.0136 
<strong> count 15: 0.0151 15: 0.0132 18: 0.0114 
<iframe src=”https*”> 16: 0.015 10: 0.0271 24: 0.0078 
Count of <center> tag 17: 0.0141 16: 0.0131 19: 0.0093 
setTimeout() 18: 0.0136 26: 0.0066 15: 0.0121 
<a href=”*.com”> 19: 0.0133 13: 0.0186 20: 0.0090 
document.write() 20: 0.0112 17: 0.0129 22: 0.0084 
addEventListener() 21: 0.0096 20: 0.011 14: 0.0124 
get() 22: 0.0093 21: 0.0107 26: 0.0023 
<link type=”application/rsd+xml”> 23: 0.0079 22: 0.0103 21: 0.0088 
find() 24: 0.0077 24: 0.0078 25: 0.0035 
<link rel=”shortlink”> 25: 0.0073 23: 0.0085 23: 0.0080 
replace() 26: 0.0069 18: 0.0123 17: 0.0114 
 
 
We repeated this exercise on features from prior research, with their respective 





Table 4-3.  
50 Webpage Content Features from Prior Research Showed 
Inconsistent Rank in Sampling Scenarios 
50 Webpage Content Features from Prior Research Ranked 
Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
Total HTML Tags 1: 0.3190 1: 0.2694 1: 0.2452 
Count of <meta> tag 2: 0.0620 7: 0.0437 7: 0.0507 
<a href> OoD 3: 0.0583 2: 0.0688 2: 0.1071 
Total href attributes 4: 0.0534 6: 0.0509 5: 0.0665 
Count of <div> tag 5: 0.0462 17: 0.0182 11: 0.0292 
Count of <a> tag 6: 0.0457 4: 0.0669 3: 0.0734 
<link href> OoD 7: 0.0437 3: 0.0671 4: 0.0684 
<script src> OoD 8: 0.0408 5: 0.0563 6: 0.0564 
Count of <link> tag 9: 0.0330 13: 0.0234 10: 0.0296 
Total <img src> 10: 0.0307 9: 0.0342 8: 0.0415 
<img src> OoD 11: 0.0252 11: 0.0285 13: 0.0218 
Count of <title> tag 12: 0.0245 15: 0.0196 18: 0.0086 
createElement() 13: 0.0238 8: 0.0395 12: 0.0276 
Count of <img> tag 14: 0.0207 12: 0.0255 9: 0.0351 
<script type= 
”text/javascript”> 15: 0.0198 16: 0.0191 14: 0.0182 
Count of <input> tag 16: 0.0164 20: 0.0094 20: 0.0069 
Count of <iframe> tag 17: 0.0152 14: 0.0223 15: 0.0166 
<form action> OoD 18: 0.0150 10: 0.0341 16: 0.0119 
replace() 19: 0.0136 19: 0.0134 17: 0.0110 
Count of <style> tag 20: 0.0077 26: 0.0058 21: 0.0064 
escape() 21: 0.0075 22: 0.0079 22: 0.0063 
addEventListener() 22: 0.0072 21: 0.0086 19: 0.0077 
setTimeout() 23: 0.0072 24: 0.0064 24: 0.0061 
substring() 24: 0.0071 33: 0.0020 33: 0.0018 
concat() 25: 0.0064 23: 0.0065 34: 0.0013 
document.write() 26: 0.0063 31: 0.0031 32: 0.0025 
fromCharCode() 27: 0.0059 27: 0.0056 25: 0.0059 
<img srcset> OoD 28: 0.0058 25: 0.0063 23: 0.0062 
search() 29: 0.0054 28: 0.0052 26: 0.0054 
charCodeAt() 30: 0.0053 39: 0.0003 43: 0.0003 
<audio src> OoD  31: 0.0051 29: 0.0052 27: 0.0052 
<iframe src> OoD  32: 0.0033 32: 0.0025 28: 0.0043 
parseInt() 33: 0.0030 18: 0.0136 31: 0.0030 
<base href> OoD 34: 0.0021 30: 0.0042 30: 0.0035 
unescape() 35: 0.0021 34: 0.0020 29: 0.0037 
eval() 36: 0.0010 35: 0.0009 38: 0.0005 
Count of <frame> tag 37: 0.0008 43: 0.0003 39 0.0005 
exec() 38: 0.0007 38: 0.0005 35: 0.0007 
Count of <object> tag 39: 0.0006 37: 0.0006 37: 0.0005 
<frame src> OoD 40: 0.0006 42: 0.0003 41: 0.0004 
<embed src> OoD 41: 0.0005 40: 0.0003 40: 0.0004 
hidden <iframe> 42: 0.0004 36: 0.0008 36: 0.0006 
Count of <embed> tag 43: 0.0003 41: 0.0003 42: 0.0003 
<area href> OoD 44: 0.0002 46: 0.0001 46: 0.0001 
<object data> OoD 45: 0.0002 44: 0.0002 45: 0.0002 
setInterval() 46: 0.0001 45: 0.0001 47: 0.0001 
link() 47: 0.0001 48: 0 44: 0.0003 
<source src> OoD 48: 0.0001 47: 0.0001 48: 0.0001 
<video src> OoD 49: 0 49: 0 50: 0 
<source srcset> OoD 50: 0 50: 0 49: 0 
 
 
4.7.1.1 Features Identified in Previous Research  
Table 4-2 displays the 9 of 26 identified features that have been studied in 




• Two of the nine previously studied features centered around the number of 
HTML tags on the webpage. Tag counts were useful for identifying phishing 
websites in prior research. The <meta> tag was specifically used. 
• Three of the nine previously studied features were gathered from the links and 
URLs found on the webpage. Six features are JavaScript methods studied in 
relation to malicious website detection. Links and URLs on the page were of 
particular interest if they pointed to out-of-domain (OoD) resources and were 
of interest since they could specify additional content that may be malicious 
without including malicious contents on the specific webpage. 
• The final four features from prior work were counts of JavaScript methods 
that are considered suspicious or have been associated with JavaScript 
obfuscation. Another was a method that acts on the Window object,  
4.7.1.2 New Features Identified 
Table 4-2 identifies the 17 of 26 identified features that, to the best of our 
knowledge, have not been studied in prior research. They can be grouped and 
summarized in the manner outlined below. 
• Three of the features were counts of tags that have not been studied for 
malicious website detection. Although tags have been studied, these three, to 
our knowledge, have not been selected for study in prior research. 
• Four of the features were counts of additional JavaScript methods that are not 
common in studies to detect malicious websites. 





• The remaining four features were specific values for attributes in several 
HTML tags.  
4.7.1.3 Features Ranking Analysis 
For the features identified by our approach in Table 4-2, the top three features are 
consistent and have the same rank in all scenarios. They are the count of all tags, the 
count of all href attributes, and the number of out-of-domain OoD href attributes in the 
<link> tag, having a total importance of 0.4875, 0.4838, and 0.4980, respectively. The 
features identified by our approach account for 40.61%, 41.97%, and 41.53%, 
respectively, of the total feature importance in the sampling scenarios in Table 4-2. Five 
of the features are counts of tags and account for 0.4016 average feature importance. 
Eight of the features are counts of JavaScript methods and account for 0.109 average 
feature importance. Seven of the features are related to the URLs on the webpage and 
account for 0.3577 average feature importance. The final six features are specific 
attribute values and account for 0.1313 of total feature importance. 
When considering the 50 features from prior research in Table 4-3, in all three 
sampling scenarios, the total HTML tags (the first feature listed in Table 4-3) accounts 
for the most importance (0.3190, 0.2694, and 0.2452, respectively) and the importance 
difference between the first and second ranked feature is larger than the difference 
between the any other two consecutively ranked features. Thirteen of the 50 features are 
associated with tag counts, 17 are specific JavaScript method counts, and 16 are gathered 
from URLs on the webpage, two with specific values of attributes, and four with the 
counts of specific attributes. On average, we found that the most important features 




counts of JavaScript methods on the webpage, and other specific attributes found in tags 
on the webpage accounting for an average total feature importance of 53%, 34%, 10%, 
and 2%, respectively. 
Our approach identified 26 features, nine of which are from prior research, while 
the other 17, to the best of our knowledge, were new. The nine features account for 
roughly 40% of the total feature importance. For the 26 features identified by our 
approach, the top three are consistent across sampling scenarios and account for roughly 
half of the total feature importance. 
 RQ2: Do the Additional Features Identified Improve Malicious Website 
Detection? 
We then investigated the performance of models built in our study in sampling 
and feature transformation scenarios. To do so, we built two sets of models with the 26 
features identified by our approach and with the 50 features from prior research. We 
evaluated performance for the test dataset when using the no-sampling, under-sampling, 
and over-sampling training sets. Table 4-4 provides the FPR and FNR, the ACC, the 
AUC, and MCC for the 26 and 50 features and are separated by a “/.” We focused on 
MCC to drive the discussion because MCC is a balanced metric that considers the four 
quadrants of the confusion matrix and works well even when the dataset is imbalanced. 
Table 4-5 provides the Prec and Rec of the respective models. In addition to sampling 
scenarios, we performed two sets of feature transformations on the 26 features identified 
by our approach and the 50 features gathered from prior research. These results are 






Table 4-4.  
Identified Webpage Content Features Slightly Outperformed Features from Prior Research 
Model Performance (50 Features from Prior Research / 26 Identified Features) in Sampling Scenarios 
Model 
No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 






























































































































































































































































Table 4-5.  
Identified Webpage Content Features Slightly  
Outperformed Features from Prior Research (cont.) 
Model Performance (50 Features from Prior Research / 26 
Identified Features) in Sampling Scenarios 
Model 
No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 











































































































Without sampling, the MCC was slightly higher for four of the eight models (LR, 
AdaBoost, GB, and NN), when considering the 26 features instead of the 50 previously 
studied features (on average, 0.6865 for the 26 features and 0.6812 for the 50 features). 
When over-sampling, the average MCC increased (0.6144 for 26 the features and 0.6015 
for the 50 features) when considering 26 features instead of the previous studied 50 
features. With over-sampling, the MCC was higher for all models except LR when 
considering the 26 features instead of the 50 previously studied features. When under-
sampling, the average MCC increased (to 0.5910 for the 26 features and to 0.5842 for the 
50 features). With under-sampling, the average MCC was higher for all eight models 
except LR, ET, and NN for the 26 features versus the 50 previously studied features. In 
each of our sampling scenarios, we observed overall improvement when building models 
with our 26 identified features compared to the 50 previously studied features. Although 




which are not commonly used for malicious website detection. This suggests that 
additional features, outside of those identified in prior research, should be explored for 
their use in malicious website detection.  
We also performed feature transformation with the process in Section 3.4.3 on the 
26 features to investigate combinations of features that could improve performance and to 
evaluate the effects on the models. The 26 features were transformed into 1,326 feature 
combinations. We then performed feature selection on these feature combinations, using 
four different techniques: correlation, SelectKBest (scoring function chi-square), RFE, 
and SelectFromModel [29]. We kept the feature combinations selected by at least three of 
these techniques, yielding 40 transformed features. We then rebuilt the eight models with 
these 40 transformed features. We repeated this approach with the 50 features from prior 
research, with the results shown in Tables 4-6 and 4-7 under FT w/FS. 
We then determined whether PCA could reduce the 1,326 features to “n” 
components, mixtures, or combinations of variables that captured the maximum variance. 
By using a cumulative scree plot, we identified 150 components that captured 79.9% of 
the variance (see Figure 4-1) from the 26 identified features and rebuilt the models with 
the components. We repeated this approach on the 50 features from prior research, 
identifying 300 components that captured 81.2% of the variance (see Figure 4-2) with the 











Fig. 4-2.     300 components are created from 50 identified  






Table 4-6.  
Model Performance (50 Webpage Content Features from Prior Research / 26 Identified Webpage Content 
Features) with Feature Transformation 
 
 
Table 4-7.  
Model Performance (50 Webpage  
Content Features from Prior Research /  
26 Identified Webpage Content Features)  
with Feature Transformation (cont.) 
Model Performance (50 Webpage Content 
Features from Prior Research / 26 Identified 
Webpage Content Features) with Feature 
Transformation 
Model 
FT w/FS FT w/PCA 












































































Model Performance (50 Webpage Content Features from Prior Research / 26 Identified Webpage Content Features) with 
Feature Transformation 
Model 
FT w/FS FT w/PCA 












































































































































































The MCC improved only in the LR model when comparing the models built with 
the prior 50 features to the models built with the 26 features identified in the feature 
transformation with feature selection case. Additionally, in this case, the average MCC 
decreased from 0.6253 to 0.6201 when using the 26 features instead of the 50 features 
from prior research. Also, when considering the impact of feature transformation with 
feature selection on the 26 features compared to no feature selection, feature 
transformation with feature selection reduced the average MCC from 0.6865 to 0.6201. 
When we applied PCA to the transformed features, the MCC only increased in two of the 
models – LR and AB – when considering the 26 features identified in our research rather 
than the 50 previously studied features, but the average MCC increased from 0.6887 to 
0.6929. When considering the impact of feature transformation with PCA on the 26 
features compared to no feature transformation, feature transformation with PCA 
increased the average MCC from 0.6865 to 0.6929. 
Although the features we identified did not greatly improve malicious website 
detection (there was only an increase of 0.005 in the average MCC overall), the features 
we identified did improve malicious website detection with 48% fewer features in the 
scenarios without feature transformation and in the feature transformation with PCA. 
 RQ3: Do our Results Change with No-sampling, Under-sampling, and Over-
sampling Scenarios? 
RQ3 addressed the sensitivity of our approach and the impact of dataset 
imbalance. Sampling is especially important in malicious website classification because 
researchers (ourselves included) use datasets that are imbalanced. There is neither a 




imbalance between malicious and non-malicious should be used to train and test 
malicious website detection models. Hence, exploring whether sampling affects the 
results is worthwhile. We compared the feature rankings and the overall performance of 
our classifiers. 
In the ranking of the 26 features identified in our research, the top three were 
consistent in the three-sampling scenarios. Although these were only three consistent 
rankings, they accounted for approximately 50% of total feature importance. We did 
however, observe some change in the MCC over the sampling scenarios with MCCs of 
0.6865, 0.6144, and 0.5910, respectively, in the no-sampling, over-sampling and under-
sampling scenarios. In case of the 50 features gathered from prior research, the only 
ranking that was consistent was the first, with the MCCs for the respective sampling 
scenarios being 0.6812, 0.6015, and 0.5842, respectively, for the no-sampling, over-
sampling, and under-sampling cases. 
The answer to RQ3 was mixed. We observed that rankings were not consistent, 
though the rankings of the features with the highest importance demonstrated 
consistency. The MCCs, however, were more consistent across the sampling scenarios. 
 RQ4: Does Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation Improve our 
Results? 
We performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation to explore their effects 
and to provide assurance that results in Tables 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 were comparable to 
the tuned and cross-validated results. In each scenario – no-sampling, over-sampling, 
under-sampling, feature transformation with feature selection, and feature transformation 




proceeded to tune the parameters and cross-validate. We leveraged a decision tree 
classifier as the base estimator and StratifiedKFold [190] for 10-fold cross-validation. 
None of the MCC results from the five models improved, with the average MCC only 
decreasing from 0.7051 to 0.6999, suggesting that using the default parameters in [29] for 
our models in Tables 4-4, 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7 was sufficient.   
We also needed to ensure that our results were not dependent on the 80:20 split of 
train/test data. To do this, we repeated our approach, as well as parameter tuning and 
cross-validation of the best models, but on a 70:30 split of training to test data instead of 
80:20. Tuning and cross-validation did not improve any of the models for the 70:30 split, 
but the average MCC decreased from 0.7043 to 0.6908. Without tuning and cross-
validation, the average MCC was 0.7043 and 0.7051, respectively, with the 70:30 and 
80:20 split. With tuning and cross-validation the average MCC was 0.6908 and 0.6999, 
respectively, with the 70:30 and 80:20 split. The results were similar, suggesting that we 





Table 4-8.  
Cross-Validation and Hyperparameter Tuning Slightly  
Improved Webpage Content Models 
Cross-Validation and Hyperparameter Tuning Webpage Content 
Models 
Model Scenario - Split MCC Scoring Metric 
ET No-sampling - 70:30 0.6880 recall macro 
ET Over-sampling - 70:30 0.6865 accuracy 
ET Under-sampling - 70:30 0.6763 recall macro 
RF FT w/ FS - 70:30 0.6984 balanced accuracy 
ET FT w/ PCA - 70:30 0.6906 balanced accuracy 
RF No-sampling - 80:20 0.7029 precision macro 
RF Over-sampling - 80:20 0.7126 balanced accuracy 
RF Under-sampling - 80:20 0.6808 accuracy 
ET FT w./FS - 80:20 0.6977 balanced accuracy 
ET FT w/ PCA - 80:20 0.7055 balanced accuracy 
 
 
Although we tuned our model hyperparameters and cross-validated, we did not 
see improvement of the average MCC in the 80:20 and 70:30 cases.  
 Conclusion 
This chapter included a comprehensive evaluation of webpage content features to 
demonstrate the potential of using webpage content features alone to detect malicious 
websites and to determine whether new, unstudied webpage content features could 
improve malicious website detection. We analyzed webpage content features from 5,931 
malicious websites and from 34,778 benign websites. Malicious websites were identified 
by Cisco Talos, while benign websites were gathered from the Alexa Top 1M. We 
collected 17,746 webpage content features from these websites and identified 26 for 
further analysis, of which, 17, to the best of our knowledge, were new. We built and 
evaluated eight models and ensured that our results were not greatly impacted by our 




scenarios. We further demonstrated consistency in our results by performing feature 
transformations, rebuilding the models, and comparing results. 
We compared the results from models built with the 26 features identified by our 
approach with results from models built with 50 features gathered from prior research. 
Additionally, we observed that the relative importance of the features decreased gradually 
with rank except for the first, and in some cases the second, ranked feature. The average 
MCC for the 26 features identified from our research was slightly higher than the average 
MCC for the 50 previously studied features, but used roughly half of the features. When 
considering the 26 selected features, feature transformation with feature selection 
decreased the MCC, while feature transformation with PCA increased the average MCC. 
Our results indicated the existence of a broader set of webpage content features that can 
be used for malicious website detection than those features commonly studied by 






Chapter 5:  URL Features Analysis 
 Introduction 
A URL specifies the internet location of a resource – most commonly a website. 
The URL allows for the retrieval of documents, webpages, and other files across the 
internet and can do so with or without the actual IP address. Although website URLs 
have legitimate uses, they also enable many threats on the internet. URLs can point to 
phishing websites, to websites that conduct drive-by downloads, or to C2 websites, for 
example. Prior research has noted that malicious URLs often have a distinct structure 
when compared to benign URLs. Thus, the structure of the URL has been explored for 
malicious website detection and we conduct an additional analysis in this chapter. Our 
contributions are detailed below.  
• We demonstrated the potential of using only URL features as a means to 
detect malicious websites on a dataset consisting of multiple types of threats. 
• Among the 41 features we identified, we introduced five features focused on 
the number of English words of a given length that had not been studied in 
terms of detecting malicious websites. 
• We observed that counts of the letters in the English alphabet account for an 
average of 35% of feature importance across our sampling scenarios. 
• When considering the 41 selected features, feature transformation with feature 
selection and PCA decreased the MCC compared to the no-sampling scenario 




 Related Research 
In this section, we summarize previous research and the use of URL features for 
malicious website detection. URL features have been used in many works and this 
section groups together works that have commonalities. 
Early research by [34]-[37] and [40] leveraged a “bag-of-words” approach that 
separates the URL based on special characters (“=,” “.,” “?” etc.) and examined the 
resulting tokens. In addition to using special characters as delimiters, researchers have 
used the presence or counts of specific special characters as features for malicious 
website detection [24], [40], [43]-[44], [46]-[50], [64], [81], [89], [116]. The “.” character 
is heavily used because it separates domain names including TLDs and subdomains in the 
URL. Another feature, the URL length, is one of the features most prevalently leveraged 
in prior research. Prior researchers noticed that malicious URLs are typically longer (or 
shorter) and hence the url length has been used to detect malicious websites [40], [44], 
[47], [49], [51], [64], [81], [89]. 
Some methods for detecting malicious URLs also take the structure of the URL 
(protocol, host, subdomain, domain, path, query parameters) into consideration and were 
demonstrated in  [40], [42], [47], [81], [86], [91], [117]. Although this approach 
facilitates the extraction of more features, it presents a problem in potential test sets in 
that benign sets, such as ours, are usually the home pages of the domain, while test sets 
for malicious websites may have multiple subdomains, different paths, and varying query 
parameters. Such features would not be applicable to benign websites. Furthermore, to 
create a benign test set of URLs that have paths would require use of a web crawler or 




used in prior research is the presence of an IP address or a port number in the URL and 
has been studied by [24], [42]-[46], [48]-[50], [64], [81], and [116]. 
URL characteristics have been used to detect bots and malicious traffic. Kheir et 
al. [55] detected C2 communications through the clustering of URLs generated by 
malware. Yadav et al. [209] developed a method to detect DNS “fluxing” by examining 
bigrams in algorithmically generated URLs. Researchers [44] used the presence of 
multiple TLDs, which can be expressed as n-grams, in the domain as another feature. 
Huang et al. [160] proposed a method for dynamically extracting patterns from URLs (as 
opposed to n-grams) for malicious URL detection. Daeef et al. [95] used n-grams in 
conjunction with separating URLs into host, path, and query segments. Verma and Das 
[56] also used n-grams and extracted overlapping sequences of consecutive characters in 
the ranges of N = 1 to N = 10 and discussed the speed of their n-gram feature extractor. 
Authors [52] distinguished between algorithmically generated domains (AGDs) and 
human generated domains (HGDs), using url length, vowels, consonants, and digits, 
while [116] used the ratio of the number of specific characters over the total url 
length, among others factors, in their set of 41 features. 
Whether using a “bag-of-words” approach, a structural approach, or a length-and-
character approach, n-grams present in a URL have played a key role in the detection of 
malicious websites. As such, we used n-grams as the main set of features in our malicious 
website detection experiments. We extracted features from previous research and added 
several new features from n-grams based on English words, TLDs, file extensions, and 
well-known ports, with the goal of identifying new URL-based features for malicious 




 Research Questions 
We created three of our research questions with the aim of exploring the 
effectiveness of our approach and at assessing the URL features we identified as features 
for malicious website detection. These three research questions focus on using features 
derived from the URL as the sole source of features for the detection of malicious 
websites. 
 Research Question 1 
Previous research applied several techniques and features to the analysis and 
detection of malicious website URLs. Currently, no definitive list of URL features exists, 
though certain features have been used extensively in prior research. Given that URLs 
have been analyzed in many ways and that diverse features have already been used in 
malicious website detection, we postulated that additional features might be relevant for 
malicious website detection. We hypothesized that our approach, which considered 
28,162 features, many of which had never been studied for malicious website detection, 
would identify new features of importance in the detection of malicious websites. RQ1 is 
stated below. 
RQ1:  How do the features identified compare with prior research? 
 Research Question 3 
This second question (third of our 13 research questions) focused on the 
consistency of our approach by investigating if our results changed across three sampling 
scenarios: no-sampling, under-sampling, and over-sampling. Class imbalances between 




we analyzed whether our model performance changed across three sampling scenarios. 
We stated RQ3 as follows:  
RQ3:  Do our results change with no-sampling, under-sampling, and over-
sampling scenarios? 
 Research Question 4 
With this research question, we explored the use of hyperparameter tuning and 
cross-validation on our results. These techniques have the potential to improve our 
models and aided us in understanding how much our models could be improved (if at all). 
These additional methods gave our results more credence. RQ4 is as follows:  
RQ4: Does hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation improve our results?  
 Feature Consideration 
URLs have several characteristics we can extract. URL features are created by 
examining properties and patterns in the URL strings. In our approach, we leveraged 
features from previous research and expanded our study to include features not 
previously used in previous research. For a full list of URL features used in this study, 
please refer to Appendix A. 
 N-gram Approach 
We took an n-gram approach that looked for specific n-grams in the URL. The n-
gram approach is inspired by the “bag-of-words” approach used by many authors to 
detect phishing URLs and is influenced by the fact that n-grams have been used in 
several ways to successfully detect malicious websites. Our n-grams, however, were 
shaped by the n-grams used in previous research and extended to include additional 




as our source of words. Specifically, we looked for the counts of all words from the 
dictionary with a length of four letters or more. We chose a word length of four letters in 
order to filter out simple connecting words such as “the” or “and.” We extracted the 
specific word, counted the number of times it was present in the URL, and counted the 
number of unique words of a given length that were present in that URL. For example, in 
the URL homedepot.com, we would identify the words home and depot resulting in a 
value of one for word_count_4 and word_count_5.  The next n-grams we extracted were 
the presence of TLDs like .com, .net, or .us, motivated by the fact that multiple 
TLDs have been used in malicious website detection. We used the list of TLD names 
from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers and the list of file 
extensions from [211]. The third set of n-grams we extracted was the presence of file 
extensions. URLs can point to files (.exe, .zip, etc.), with previous researchers 
focusing on whether a URL points to an executable file.  
 Character Distributions 
Character distributions and the number of certain special characters (the “.” and 
the “-,” for example) are known features for malicious website detection. In addition to 
special characters, regular characters such as consonants, vowels, and digits also have 
been used to detect malicious websites. Typically, different ratios of characters are 
grouped together to detect bot URLs and URLs generated by DGAs. We extended these 
approaches by capturing the total number of digits, vowels, consonants, and special 




 Specific Features 
Lastly, we collected those features that are specific to the URL structure. We first 
checked for the presence of an IP address in the URL, since an IP address substituted for 
a hostname is a known technique for obfuscating a malicious URL. In addition to IP 
addresses, we also looked for the presence of port numbers. If we found a port number in 
a URL, we recorded it and checked to see whether it is a well-known port number. Well-
known port numbers include 22 for ssh, 25 for smtp, and 53 for DNS, among others.  
 Learning, Feature Selection, and Sampling Techniques in URL Analysis 
 Feature Selection 
After initial collection of the 28,162 URL features, we analyzed which features 
had a strong association with the dependent variable (i.e., whether the website was 
malicious) and eliminated any redundant features (those that had no relationship or a 
weak relationship with the dependent variable). We removed those features that had the 
same value at least 95% of the time, thereby eliminating 28,121 features and resulting in 
a final set of 41 features.  
 Machine Learning Models, Sampling, and Feature Transformation 
We evaluated the feature set against eight different supervised classifiers 
discussed in Section 3.4.1 and recorded their performance metrics. For all models, we 
split training and testing data using an 80:20 ratio, a common train/test split for data. Our 
overall dataset was imbalanced: we had 39,877 benign websites and 6,894 malicious 
websites. To address this and to ensure that any results were not the product of our 
benign-to-malicious website ratio, we trained the models using different samples of the 




For the no-sampling scenario, we used 31,892 and 7,985 benign websites and 
5,525 and 1,369 malicious websites, respectively, in our training and testing sets. Under-
sampling resulted in 5,525 malicious websites and 5,525 benign websites in the under-
sampled training set. Over-sampling with the SMOTE technique [186] from [187] 
produced a balanced training set with 31,892 benign websites and 31,892 malicious 
websites. We also built models with transformed features created from the process in 
Section 3.4.3. 
The websites used in the testing dataset remained consistent across all models and 
sampling scenarios for the training data so that we could compare model results and 
identify whether a sampling technique led to a better model. We ensured that there was 
no overlap between training and testing datasets.  
 Results 
 RQ1: How do the Features Identified Compare with Prior Research? 
With RQ1, we investigated whether or not our approach identified previously 
studied URL features as important. To do so, we leveraged our four ensemble methods 
(RF, AB, ET, and BC), all of which captured the notion of feature importance – a 
normalized metric between 0 and 1.0 for each respective feature. The top 41 features are 
shown below in Table 5-1, along with their respective rank in the no-sampling, over-
sampling, and under-sampling cases and with their respective header field. The white 
rows indicate features previously studied in prior research for the identification of 
malicious websites, while the shaded rows are features that, to our knowledge, are new. 





Table 5-1.  
The Top Seven URL Features Had Consistent Rank 
41 Identified URL Features Ranked 
URL Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
Total Extensions in URL 1 : 0.1978 1 : 0.1874 2 : 0.1657 
URL Length 2 : 0.1815 2 : 0.1133 1 : 0.2105 
Count of ‘.’ character 3 : 0.0726 3 : 0.0685 3 : 0.0796 
Count of ‘w’ character 4 : 0.0699 4 : 0.0496 4 : 0.0503 
number of consonants in the URL 5 : 0.0520 6 : 0.0386 5 : 0.0475 
number of digits in the URL 6 : 0.0430 5 : 0.0485 6 : 0.0408 
Total TLDs in URL 7 : 0.0343 8 : 0.0335 7 : 0.0398 
Count of ‘z’ character 8 : 0.0298 14 : 0.023 8 : 0.0319 
Count of .com in URL 9 : 0.0235 21 : 0.016 11 : 0.0200 
Count of 4-character words 10 : 0.0221 18 : 0.0201 9 : 0.02919 
Number of vowels in the URL 11 : 0.0197 23 : 0.0146 10 : 0.0249 
Count of ‘i’ character 12 : 0.0156 7 : 0.03385 13 : 0.0186 
Count of ‘b’ character 13 : 0.0132 19 : 0.0186 12 : 0.0193 
Count of ‘y’ character 14 : 0.0131 20 : 0.0168 18 : 0.0112 
Count of ‘l’ character 15 : 0.0128 12 : 0.0273 15 : 0.0127 
Count of ‘m’ character 16 : 0.0120 27 : 0.0082 17 : 0.0117 
Count of ‘o’ character 17 : 0.0119 15 : 0.0223 14 : 0.0137 
Count of ‘t’ character 18 : 0.0114 10 : 0.0278 20 : 0.0110 
Count of ‘p’ character 19 : 0.0113 16 : 0.0208 32 : 0.0060 
Count of ‘n’ character 20 : 0.0111 30 : 0.0060 16 : 0.0125 
Count of ‘x’ character 21 : 0.0109 33 : 0.0043 23 : 0.0107 
Count of ‘f’ character 22 : 0.0108 25 : 0.0112 22 : 0.0109 
Count of ‘r’ character 23 : 0.0106 11 : 0.0277 21 : 0.0110 
Count of ‘h’ character 24 : 0.0098 26 : 0.0107 24 : 0.0098 
Count of ‘g’ character 25 : 0.0094 35 : 0.0038 25 : 0.0091 
Count of ‘e’ character 26 : 0.0084 22 : 0.0158 19 : 0.0110 
Count of .i in URL 27 : 0.0080 38 : 0.0026 26 : 0.0079 
Count of ‘j’ character 28 : 0.0077 40 : 0.0019 41 : 0.0025 
Count of ‘s’ character 29 : 0.0069 9 : 0.02914 31 : 0.0061 
Count of .net in URL 30 : 0.0067 28 : 0.0080 28 : 0.0071 
Count of ‘c’ character 31 : 0.0064 24 : 0.0120 27 : 0.0074 
Count of ‘a’ character 32 : 0.0060 29 : 0.0061 29 : 0.0065 
Count of ‘u’ character 33 : 0.0057 17 : 0.0207 30 : 0.0064 
Count of 5-character words 34 : 0.0056 31 : 0.0060 33 : 0.0058 
Count of ‘d’ character 35 : 0.0055 13 : 0.0236 35 : 0.0053 
Count of 6-character words 36 : 0.0046 32 : 0.0050 34 : 0.0055 
Count of ‘k’ character 37 : 0.0043 34 : 0.0041 36 : 0.0043 
Count of ‘v’ character 38 : 0.0033 37 : 0.0031 39 : 0.0033 
Count of 7-character words 39 : 0.0033 36 : 0.0031 38 : 0.0033 
Count of ‘-’ character 40 : 0.0031 39 : 0.0025 37 : 0.0034 
Count of 8-character words 41 : 0.0025 41 : 0.0018 40 : 0.0030 
 
 
5.6.1.1 Features Identified in Previous Research  
In our list of 41 features, 36 had been used in prior research, while the remainder 
were introduced in our study. The url-length consistently ranks highly and has been 
used by nearly all research that uses any URL features. The number of file 
extensions in the URL also ranked highly. While no research of which we are aware 




points to a specific type of file, so we included this feature as a prior feature. Counts of 
the special characters “.” and “-“ also appear in our list and, like url-length, are very 
commonly studied features. However, we found it surprising that the count of “-“ was 
ranked so low (40, 39, and 37, respectively, in the no-sampling, over-sampling, and 
under-sampling cases), given its frequent use in prior research. Distributions of vowels, 
digits, and consonants have been used to identify C2 websites, in particular, and appeared 
on our list. We also observed that the count of every letter with the exception of “q” 
ranked on our list.  
5.6.1.2 New Features Identified 
Thirty-six of the 41 features were identified in prior research or were closely 
related enough to be considered part of prior research. However, our research identified 
five new features that can facilitate malicious website detection. These five features all 
represent the number of English words of a given length in the URL. Certain words have 
been associated with phishing websites [34], though, to our knowledge, no approaches 
have incorporated the length of words present in the URL. We also observed that all 
letters of the alphabet contributed to the detection of the malicious website except for the 
letter “q.” 
5.6.1.3 Features Ranking Analysis 
We used ensemble methods (RF, AB, ET, and GB) to understand feature 
importance. Table 5-1 presents the 41 features, along with their average respective rank 
and importance with no-sampling, under-sampling, and over-sampling using the four 
ensemble methods [182]. We observed that the first two features were consistently 




much higher than the remaining 36 features. Specifically, url-length and the number 
of file extensions had a combined importance of 0.3793, 0.3008, and 0.376, 
respectively, in the no-, over-, and under-sampling cases for the 41 features. We also 
observed that the feature rank and importance were similar when considering no-
sampling, over-sampling, or under-sampling, with the top six features being the same 
(but in different order) in the various sampling scenarios. These six features accounted 
for 0.6170, 0.5063, and 0.5947, respectively, of cumulative importance. In the previous 
section, we noted that counts of specified characters, with the exception of the letter “q,” 
appeared in our list. When we summed the respective importances of the counts of letters, 
we got cumulative importances of 0.3191, 0.4263, and 0.3044, respectively, in the no-
sampling, over-sampling, and under-sampling cases. 
URL features have been extensively studied in prior research. Thus, we only 
identified five new features, all of which centered around the counts of words of specific 
lengths that were present in the URL. Our approach identified features from prior 
research, reinforcing the importance of character counts for malicious website detection. 
 RQ3: Do our Results Change with No-sampling, Under-sampling, and Over-
sampling scenarios? 
We then investigated model performance for the test dataset when using the no-
sampling, under-sampling, and over-sampling scenarios. Tables 5-2 and 5-3 provide FPR, 
FNR, ACC, AUC, MCC, Prec, and Rec for the three sampling. We focused on the 
average MCC of all models to motivate the discussion of our results. Averaging the MCC 
also provided an overall idea of how well the models performed, taking into account the 





Table 5-2.  
URL Features Produced High Detection Metrics with 41 Identified URL Features in Sampling Scenarios 
Model Performance (41 Identified URL Features) in Sampling Scenarios 
Model 
No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC 
KNN 0.0032 0.2652 0.9584 0.8658 0.8254 0.0735 0.1359 0.9174 0.8953 0.7135 0.0316 0.1789 0.9469 0.8947 0.7878 
LR 0.0144 0.2454 0.9518 0.8701 0.7973 0.0705 0.1169 0.9227 0.9063 0.7330 0.0731 0.1242 0.9194 0.9013 0.7223 
RF 0.0073 0.1994 0.9646 0.8967 0.8527 0.0111 0.1928 0.9623 0.8980 0.8432 0.0496 0.1293 0.9387 0.9106 0.7731 
AB 0.0148 0.2564 0.9499 0.8644 0.7887 0.0476 0.1855 0.9322 0.8834 0.7397 0.0923 0.1227 0.9033 0.8925 0.6846 
GB 0.0124 0.2199 0.9572 0.8839 0.8212 0.0279 0.1885 0.9486 0.8918 0.7921 0.0585 0.1264 0.9316 0.9076 0.7536 
ET 0.0074 0.2023 0.9640 0.8951 0.8503 0.0088 0.1928 0.9643 0.8992 0.8515 0.0501 0.1227 0.9393 0.9136 0.7763 
BC 0.0101 0.2053 0.9613 0.8923 0.8386 0.0103 0.1987 0.9622 0.8955 0.8424 0.0554 0.1315 0.9335 0.9066 0.7575 
NN 0.0247 0.1585 0.9557 0.9084 0.8218 0.0397 0.1651 0.9450 0.8976 0.7745 0.0909 0.1191 0.9050 0.8950 0.6898 
 
 
Table 5-3.  
URL Features Produced High Detection Metrics with 41  
Identified URL Features in Sampling Scenarios (cont.) 
Model Performance (41 Identified URL Features) in Sampling Scenarios 
Model 
No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
Prec Rec Prec Rec Prec Rec 
KNN 0.9748 0.7348 0.6683 0.8641 0.8168 0.8210 
LR 0.8998 0.7545 0.6822 0.8831 0.6724 0.8758 
RF 0.9497 0.8005 0.9254 0.8071 0.7506 0.8707 
AB 0.8961 0.7436 0.7458 0.8144 0.6197 0.8772 
GB 0.9151 0.7801 0.8328 0.8115 0.7191 0.8736 
ET 0.9487 0.7976 0.9404 0.8071 0.7501 0.8772 
Bag 0.9307 0.7947 0.9304 0.8013 0.7290 0.8685 






Without sampling, the average MCC was 0.8245. When over-sampling, the 
average MCC was 0.7862. In the under-sampling case, the average MCC was 0.7431. 
Throughout various sampling scenarios, this method showed promise for malicious 
website detection.  
We also explored the model performance with transformed features created from 
the process in Section 3.4.3. We performed feature-transformation for the 41 features in 
order to determine whether we could improve upon the performance (increase the 
average MCC). We transformed the original 41 features into 3,321 features. We then 
performed feature selection on the 3,321 features with the four different techniques from 
Section 3.4.3, resulting in 33 transformed features. 
We also attempted to determine whether PCA could reduce the transformed 
features to a group of components that captured the maximum variance among the data. 
Using a cumulative scree plot, we found that 110 components captured 80.65% of the 
variance in the dataset for 41 identified features (see Figure 5-1). We used these 110 
components in our subsequent analyses to assess their performance detecting malicious 






Fig. 5-1.    110 components are created from 41 URL features 
 
 
Table 5-4.  
URL Features Produced High Detection Metrics with 41 identified URL  
Features in Feature Transformation Scenarios 
Model Performance (41 Identified URL Features) with Feature Transformation 
Model 
FT w/FS FT w/PCA 
FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC 
KNN 0.0169 0.2220 0.9531 0.8805 0.8044 0.0020 0.3908 0.9411 0.8036 0.7467 
LR 0.0164 0.2885 0.9438 0.8475 0.7617 0.0140 0.2257 0.9550 0.8801 0.8117 
RF 0.0138 0.2301 0.9546 0.8781 0.8097 0.0113 0.3185 0.9438 0.8351 0.7591 
AB 0.0170 0.3112 0.9399 0.8359 0.7433 0.0198 0.2827 0.9417 0.8488 0.7536 
GB 0.0160 0.2498 0.9498 0.8671 0.7888 0.0124 0.2535 0.9523 0.8671 0.7990 
ET 0.0160 0.2264 0.9532 0.8788 0.8044 0.0055 0.3740 0.9406 0.8102 0.7434 
BC 0.0148 0.2243 0.9546 0.8805 0.8101 0.0132 0.2776 0.9482 0.8546 0.7801 
NN 0.0104 0.2243 0.9583 0.8827 0.8254 0.0232 0.1812 0.9537 0.8978 0.8114 
 
 
Table 5-5.  
URL Features Produced High Detection Metrics with 41 Identified  
URL Features in Feature Transformation Scenarios (cont.) 
Model Performance (41 Identified URL Features) with Feature Transformation 
Model 
FT w/ FS FT w/ PCA 
Prec Rec Prec Rec 
KNN 0.8875 0.7779 0.9811 0.6092 
LR 0.8814 0.7114 0.9044 0.7742 
RF 0.9054 0.7699 0.9120 0.6815 
AB 0.8739 0.6888 0.8614 0.7173 
GB 0.8891 0.7501 0.9116 0.7465 
ET 0.8921 0.7735 0.9511 0.6260 
Bag 0.9000 0.7757 0.9040 0.7224 





For feature transformation with feature selection, the MCC was 0.7934. With 
feature transformation with PCA, the average MCC was 0.7756. Both show promise that 
our approach can detect malicious websites however, we found that feature 
transformation with feature selection and PCA both worsened the average MCC when 
compared to the no-sampling case. 
We next used dataset sampling to investigate the consistency of our approach and 
its robustness over class imbalance. The MCCs were 0.8245, 0.7862, and 0.7431 for 41 
features identified in our approach, showing slight variation from the no-sampling 
scenario, where the MCC was 0.8245 , to the under-sampling case, where the MCC was 
0.7431. The MCC for the over-sampling case was 0.7862. Nevertheless, all three 
scenarios still showed promise for malicious website detection.  
We observed slight disparities in model performance across the sampling 
scenarios and observed that the set of the top six most important features were consistent, 
accounting for 0.6170, 0.5063, and 0.5947, respectively, of cumulative importance in the 
no-sampling, under-sampling, and over-sampling scenarios. 
 RQ4: Does Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation Improve our 
Results? 
In this step, we investigated the impact of hyperparameter tuning and cross-
validation on our results. We performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation on 
our dataset and re-evaluated our models with a 70:30 split of train to test data instead of 
the initial 80:20 split. Doing so ensured that our models were not overfit and that they 
had the potential to improve our models. Furthermore, this reinforced that our 




We performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation on the best performing 
models in each scenario – no-sampling, over-sampling, under-sampling, feature 
transformation with feature selection, and feature transformation with PCA. In the 80:20 
case, all five models improved, but the average MCC only increased from 0.8258 to 
0.8343, suggesting consistency of the results in Tables 5-2, 5-3, 5-4, and 5-5 even when 
we tuned the parameters and performed cross-validation. 
In the 70:30 case, tuning and cross-validation improved three of the five models 
for the 70:30 split, but the average MCC only increased from 0.8303 to 0.8399. Without 
tuning and cross-validation, the average MCC was 0.8303 and 0.8258, respectively, with 
the 70:30 and 80:20 splits. With tuning and cross-validation, the average MCC was 
0.8399 and 0.8343, respectively, with the 70:30 and 80:20 splits. The small difference 
between results in the different splits suggested that we were not dependent on the 
train/test split. Results are shown in Table 5-6 below. 
 
Table 5-6.  
Cross-Validation and Hyperparameter Tuning Slightly  
Improved URL Models 
Cross-Validation and Hyperparameter Tuning URL Models 
Model Scenario – Split MCC Scoring Metric 
ET No-sampling - 70:30 0.8655 balanced accuracy 
ET Over-sampling - 70:30 0.8596 balanced accuracy 
KNN Under-sampling - 70:30 0.8236 precision weighted 
NN FT w/ FS - 70:30 0.8382 accuracy 
LR FT w/ PCA - 70:30 0.8124 recall weighted 
RF No-sampling - 80:20 0.8572 recall weighted 
ET Over-sampling - 80:20 0.8567 balanced accuracy 
KNN Under-sampling - 80:20 0.8163 precision weighted 
NN FS w/ FT - 80:20 0.8303 accuracy 
LR FS w/PCA - 80:20 0.8107 precision weighted 
 
 
In Research Question 4 (three of 13), we determined two ways of validating our 




rebuilt and performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation on our eight models on 
a 70:30 split of the data. While we observed improvement after performing 
hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation, the improvement was small. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter included a comprehensive evaluation of URL features for assessing 
whether additional URL features improve malicious website detection. We analyzed 
URL data from 6,894 malicious and 39,877 benign websites. We based our dataset of 
malicious websites on those identified by Cisco Talos and based our dataset of benign 
websites on the Alexa Top 1M. We collected 28,162 URL features from these websites 
and identified 41 for further analysis, including five newly identified features. We applied 
eight models and ensured robustness of our methodology by using three sampling 
scenarios – no-sampling, over-sampling and under-sampling. 
Among the 41 features, the top six were consistent across the sampling scenarios 
and accounted for approximately 55% of the total feature importance. Also, we found the 
count of individual characters to be of importance in malicious website detection, 
accounting for an average importance value of approximately 35% over the three 
sampling scenarios. Lastly, we observed that counting the number of words of a given 
length may be an additional useful feature for malicious website detection. 
 




Chapter 6:  HTTP Features Analysis 
 Introduction 
This chapter includes a comprehensive evaluation of an HTTP header-only 
approach to malicious website detection aimed at assessing whether additional HTTP 
header features can improve malicious website detection. Our contributions in this 
chapter are listed below. 
• We demonstrated the potential of using HTTP header features alone as a 
means of detecting malicious websites. 
• We introduced 11 new HTTP header features not previously considered as 
aiding in the detection of malicious websites. 
• Eight of the 22 features, three of which were newly identified by our 
approach, ranked as the most important features and represented 80% of 
feature importance. 
• The average MCC for the selected 22 features was better than the average 
MCC for the 11 previously studied features across our three sampling 
scenarios. 
• We found that applying PCA to the 22 selected features improved malicious 
website detection.  
 Related Research 
Features gathered over a session have been used to identify malicious websites 
and traffic. Authors [77] gathered features from HTTP requests and responses over a 
session and combined them with non-HTTP features in an attempt to detect malicious 




features with specific metadata gathered from the interaction with a website. These 
approaches obtained detection rates of up to 96%. Researchers [212] used the Content-
Type header as a means of distinguishing between different types of HTTP traffic, while 
[213] used HTTP application level features to distinguish different attack classes in 
traffic to their honeypot. These approaches demonstrate that specific HTTP features show 
potential for identifying malicious activity. However, prior researchers limited 
themselves to a small list of features or required additional non-HTTP features to achieve 
their performance metrics. With Phishmon, researchers [83] considered all HTTP headers 
as potential features, but used lengths of the respective headers.  
Other approaches demonstrated that HTTP traffic generated by malware can be 
used to build signatures or fingerprints for detection. Authors [75]-[76] clustered the 
HTTP communications generated to and from HTTP-based malware on their testbed to 
create signatures. Brezo et al. [79] recorded HTTP traffic over a session and produced a 
list of the influential features for malicious traffic identification that consisted of TCP and 
HTTP features. They found the Content-Length header to be of importance. ARROW, 
by [78], generated signatures from redirect chains captured in HTTP traces. Kheir et al. 
[55] clustered HTTP traffic in order to classify the C2 communications. With BotHound, 
[82] found that malicious communications may have similar User-Agent strings in 
requests. Generating signatures or fingerprints for malicious HTTP communications 
was also used in [80], [162], [212], [214]-[215]. 
 Research Questions 
We created four research questions aimed at exploring the effectiveness of our 




identification. With these four questions, we focused on using HTTP headers as the sole 
source of features for detection of malicious websites. 
 Research Question 1 
With our first question, we compared the features identified in our approach with 
those gathered from prior research. Previous researchers used HTTP headers to detect 
malicious websites, but their use is limited. Furthermore, we did not consider session-
based features, focusing instead on features extracted from the HTTP responses 
headers. While no definitive list of HTTP headers and features to use for malicious 
website detection exists, we created an approach designed to create such a list. 
Additionally, researchers have identified a select few HTTP header features for actual use 
in detecting malicious website detection. We hypothesized, however, that with our study 
of 672 features, many of which had never been explored for purposes of malicious 
website detection, we could identify new important features for the identification of 
malicious websites. To that end, we compared the header features identified by our 
approach with the header features used by previous authors. Research Question 1 is stated 
as follows: 
RQ1:  How do the features identified compare with prior research? 
 Research Question 2 
With RQ2, we investigated whether the incorporation of these new features would 
improve malicious website detection. To accomplish this, we compared the MCCs with 
and without the additional 11 features identified in this work. We also built models with 




feature selection and with PCA, further comparing the respective MCCs. RQ2, then, is 
stated as follows: 
RQ2:  Do the additional features identified improve malicious website detection? 
 Research Question 3 
We focused RQ3 on the consistency of our approach in sampling scenarios. In 
other words, we sought to determine whether our approach yielded consistent results in 
the cases of no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-sampling of our dataset. We, like 
other security researchers, worked with an imbalanced dataset. In this question, we 
analyzed how our models performed in the no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-
sampling cases. RQ3 is stated as follows: 
RQ3: Do our results change with no-sampling, under-sampling, and over-
sampling scenarios? 
 Research Question 4 
We used RQ4 to enable our exploration of additional tuning methods to our 
results. Although we were working with a single dataset, we intended to evaluate and 
include additional methods that would give our results more credence. Our fourth 
research question is stated as follows:  
RQ4: Does hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation improve our results? 
 Feature Consideration 
 Extractable HTTP Features 
Previous researchers have used HTTP traffic to identify and detect malicious 
websites, using two approaches. First, they applied HTTP traffic characterization, which 




or from malware communicating with malicious websites. Although this approach has 
been used in bot detection, it requires additional dependencies and additional setup 
compared to the methodology we used for this research. HTTP traffic characterization 
also presents challenges of combining HTTP trace features with the other features studied 
in this research. 
Previous researchers also employed a second method of exploiting HTTP traffic 
for detecting malicious websites – they used specific HTTP headers as part of a larger set 
of features. Although HTTP headers have been used in feature sets for malicious website 
detection, few researchers have emphasized HTTP headers, and none, to our knowledge, 
have used them outside of a “flow-based” method. We hypothesized that the lack of 
inclusion of HTTP headers in malicious website identification has resulted from the fact 
that HTTP header analysis is messy. First, while headers are specified in the HTTP 
specification, they also can be defined by users. Secondly, since the values in the HTTP 
headers can vary significantly, the process of researching and recording the possible 
values for headers is a tedious one. Lastly, in the process of collecting our HTTP headers, 
we observed that the values and the names of the headers frequently contained 
inconsistencies or misspellings that necessitated a pre-processing step. For example, we 
noticed the presence in our collection of two HTTP headers: Accept-Encoding and 
Accept-encoding. These headers are the same header but would be viewed as unique 
values without an additional pre-processing step because of the capitalization difference. 





 HTTP Feature Collection 
An HTTP header is a key-value pair within an HTTP request or response, 
both of which may contain multiple headers. The example below shows the HTTP 
request headers generated during a web request. Bolded items are the header names 
(keys), while non-bold items are the corresponding values. We use the symbol “…” to 
indicate places where values were truncated due to length. 
Accept                      */* 
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate, br 
Accept-Language en-US,en;q=0.5 









For commonly used headers, please refer to MDN [206]. HTTP responses have 
a similar structure of key-value pairs. In this portion of the study, we performed a GET 
request to the selected websites, recording the headers present in the response. We 
only considered response headers.  
HTTP feature collection took place in August 2018. We used the Python 
requests library [216] to make GET requests to the websites and collected HTTP 
features in the associated response. Upon receiving responses, we parsed and 
recorded the headers and values. The collection included features defined in the HTTP 
specification as well as custom headers defined by specific websites. We then examined 
the HTTP specification to determine whether the headers had a finite group of values. For 
example, the Content-Security-Policy header can have a finite group of directives 
in the header’s value. Based on those directives, we collected additional features that 




features we gathered was defined by key-value pairs, which exist in the directives of 
certain headers. The example below shows a possible Cache-Control header. 
Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000 
The public directive indicated that the response might be held in any cache, and 
the max-age directive was set to 31,536,000 seconds. Our method captured both of these 
features. Overall, data collection resulted in a total of 672 HTTP features.  
 Learning, Feature Selection, and Sampling Techniques in HTTP Header 
Analysis 
 Feature Selection 
After collecting the 672 HTTP header features, we analyzed which of the features 
had strong association with the dependent variable (i.e., whether the website was 
malicious), eliminating any redundant features (i.e., those that had no relationship or a 
weak relationship with the dependent variable). We followed the process in Section 3.4.3. 
First, we removed the 399 features for which all the websites’ HTTP response headers 
had the same value. Next, we removed features specific to our dataset by removing those 
that had the same value at least 95% of the time, thereby eliminating 245 features. We 
then evaluated the remaining 28 features to identify those features that had a high 
multicollinearity. Removing features with high multicollinearity ensured that we 
analyzed a set of independent features. Collinearity can be quantified by the VIF [177]. 
First, we determined the VIF values for each feature. We then iteratively identified 
features that had a VIF > 5, per [179]. Among our list of features with a VIF > 5, we 
determined which of the features had similar VIF values and high correlations to one 




[180]. Among the highly correlated features with similar VIF values, we then removed 
those with the highest VIFs from our feature set, leaving us with final set of 22 features. 
 Machine Learning Models, Sampling, and Feature Transformation 
We created two feature sets, the first of which included the 22 features identified 
by our approach and the second of which consisted of the 11 features identified in our 
approach that had also been studied in prior research. We evaluated the feature sets 
against eight different supervised classifiers discussed in Section 3.4.1, recording their 
performance metrics. For all models, we split training and testing data using an 80:20 
split, which is a common train/test split. Our dataset was imbalanced, with 39,835 benign 
websites and 6,021 malicious websites. To address the imbalance and to ensure that our 
results were not a product of our benign-to-malicious split, we trained the models using 
different samples of the benign and malicious datasets. Specifically, we performed no-
sampling, under-sampling, and over-sampling of the training dataset, which yielded three 
different training datasets that we used to evaluate models.  
For no-sampling, we used 31,853 benign websites and 4,831 malicious websites 
in our training set. For under-sampling, we used the full set of malicious websites in the 
training set and selected a subsample from the benign websites to arrive at a training set 
of 4,831 malicious and benign websites respectively. For over-sampling, we derived a 
balanced training set of 31,853 benign websites and 31,853 malicious websites. The 
websites used in the testing set remained consistent across all models and sampling 
approaches so that we could compare results. Training and testing datasets did not 






 RQ1: How do the Features Identified Compare with Prior Research? 
With RQ1, we investigated whether our approach identified previously studied 
HTTP headers as important. To do so, we leveraged our four ensemble methods (RF, AB, 
ET, and BC), all of which captured the notion of feature importance – a normalized 
metric between 0 and 1.0 for each respective feature. Table 6-1 below displays the top 22 
features, along with their respective rank in the no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-
sampling cases and their respective header fields. That is, the “Feature” column specifies 
the header and, in some cases, specifies the value of that header. For example, content-
encoding gzip specifies that the header content-encoding has a value gzip. The 
shaded rows are the new headers identified by our approach, while the unshaded rows 
indicate the headers gathered from previous scholarship. The ranking and respective 
importance values are separated by a “:” in the data columns. Table 6-2 shows the 






Table 6-1.  
The Top 8 Identified HTTP Header Features Accounted for 81.62% of Importance 
22 Identified HTTP Header Features Ranked 
Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
content-length 1 : 0.3313 2  : 0.2208 1 : 0.2531 
content-encoding gzip 2 : 0.2070 1 : 0.2512 2 : 0.2528 
transfer-encoding chunked 3 : 0.0808 4  : 0.0862 3 : 0.0930 
content-type text/html 4 : 0.0746 6 : 0.0388 8 : 0.0272 
vary accept 5 : 0.0487 3 : 0.0904 4 : 0.0694 
server apache 6 : 0.0408 7 : 0.0375 5 : 0.0400 
cache-control max-age 7 :0.0263 5 : 0.0487 6 : 0.0386 
connection keep-alive 8 : 0.0250 8 : 0.0280 7 : 0.0383 
cache-control no-store 9 :0.0219 12 :0.0187 11 : 0.0204 
pragma no-cache 10 : 0.0213 10 : 0.0213 9 : 0.0271 
server nginx 11 : 0.0202 9 :0.0226 10 :0.0207 
cache-control private 12 : 0.0136 15 : 0.0170 13 : 0.0150 
expect-ct max-age 13 : 0.0135 14 : 0.0171 17 : 0.0104 
x-content-type-options nosniff 14 : 0.0132 19 : 0.0099 22 : 0.0048 
connection close 15 : 0.0129 20 : 0.0093 18 : 0.0093 
cache-control must-revalidate 16 : 0.0122 16 : 0.0118 16 : 0.0118 
via 1.1 17 : 0.0094 11 : 0.0189 14 : 0.0138 
vary age 18 : 0.0089 18 : 0.0102 12 : 0.0150 
cache-control no-cache 19 : 0.0074 17 : 0.0102 19 : 0.0091 
strict-transport-security max-age 20 : 0.0052 13 : 0.0189 20 : 0.0090 
x-xss-protection 21 : 0.0041 22 : 0.0059 15 : 0.0121 
cache-control public 22 : 0.0017 21 : 0.0072 21 : 0.0089 
 
 
Table 6-2.  
The Top 3 HTTP Header Features from Prior Research Were Consistent  
in Sampling Scenarios 
11 HTTP Header Features from Prior Research Ranked 
Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
content-length 1 : 0.4473 1 : 0.3585 1 : 0.3753 
content-encoding gzip 2 : 0.2277 2 : 0.3077 2 : 0.3481 
content-type text/html 3 : 0.1653 3 : 0.0999 3 : 0.0949 
server apache 4 : 0.0485 5 : 0.0561 4 : 0.0522 
cache-control max-age 5 : 0.0242 4 : 0.0621 5 : 0.0375 
server nginx 6 : 0.0236 6 : 0.0368 6 : 0.0245 
cache-control no-cache 7 : 0.0183 8 : 0.0184 8 : 0.0150 
cache-control private 8 : 0.0148 7 : 0.0213 7 : 0.0150 
cache-control no-store 9 : 0.0135 9 : 0.0142 9 : 0.0134 
cache-control must-revalidate 10 : 0.0085 11 : 0.0118 10 : 0.0121 
cache-control public 11 : 0.0083) 10 : 0.0132 11 : 0.0120 
 
 
6.6.1.1 Features Identified in Previous Works  
Researchers [40], [49], [75], [79] used content-length and content-
encoding headers in their research on malicious websites and behavior, with content-
length being a measure of the length in bytes of the content of the HTTP request or 




great variation in this feature and there is no standard maximum content-length for 
responses. Content-encoding specifies the compression scheme used for the 
content of the HTTP requests. Gzip, compress, deflate, identity, and br are all 
different types of encodings, but the identity value indicates no compression of the 
content. Compression or zipping is a well-known technique for preventing security 
scanners from flagging on signatures in the content. Security scanners will raise an alert 
if incoming or outgoing content matches on a known malicious pattern, also referred to as 
a signature. We observed that the gzip encoding is of particular importance as noted in 
Table 6-1 and is studied with other zipped encodings by [40]. We were not surprised by 
its inclusion in the list of HTTP header features that are important for malicious website 
detection. The content-length header and the gzip value of content-encoding 
are ranked highly in all three cases, further validating their importance and inclusion in 
prior and future work. Tao et al. [77] used the content-type header in their HTTP 
feature set gathered over a session. 
Further review of this list showed a large number of cache-control directives 
(six of 22) present in our list. The cache-control header specifies details about the 
caching mechanisms and can be present in HTTP requests and responses. In total, 
the six cache-control directives (max-age, no-store, no-cache, must-
revalidate, and public) hovered around the middle of our rankings, with max-age 
being ranked as high as 5th in the under-sampling case and public and as low as 22nd in 
all three cases. In our literature review, we found that [212] examined the cache-
control header, though it was not heavily used elsewhere. Since six of the top 22 




cache-control header and further found that six specific directives can be used to 
detect malicious websites and should be included in further studies.  
In addition, we found that features specified in the server header can help detect 
malicious websites. In practice, the use of the server header is not recommended, since 
it could leak information about the website to the benefit of attackers. The inclusion of 
the server header in a response does not necessarily show a positive correlation to a 
website being malicious, but our work showed that the server header should be 
collected and that certain details about the server (whether it is an apache and nginx 
server) can help detect malicious websites. This validates the inclusion of the server 
header used in previous work [49] as a detector of malicious websites.  
6.6.1.2 New Features Identified 
The transfer-encoding header with the value chunked is viewed as a simple 
way to evade security scanners and its presence on this list of HTTP header features for 
malicious website identification is justified. This feature has not been studied in previous 
works, but is ranked highly in all sampling scenarios. The specific value of chunked 
indicates that content will arrive in chunks, thus making it harder to signature. To build 
intuition, consider the challenge of a security scanner that must piece together various 
chunks of data in order to make a determination on whether or not the content is 
malicious or hits a security signature. Having chunked data can make this problem more 
challenging. 
The vary header, including a value of accept and the value of the age directive, 
are on our list, the former being highly ranked in all three scenarios with rankings of 5, 3, 




header describes behavior of the HTTP cache and tells the HTTP cache on the client 
which fields should be extracted from the response versus those that can originate from 
the HTTP cache. In our experiment, we found that vary specified the accept and age 
headers in our top 22, though the value of accept was consistently highly ranked. This 
header is also somewhat unique because its fields specify additional headers that should 
be processed differently by the client. 
The via header with a value of 1.1 was also flagged for further investigation, 
though it did not appear in previous works and was not necessarily mapped to a known 
threat. The via header describes proxy behavior in several ways. In our experiment, the 
1.1 indicated the protocol version of HTTP. Although proxies are known to be used in 
malicious activity, the evidence from this experiment was not strong enough to conclude 
that this was the case. Nevertheless, the via header, if equal to 1.1, should be collected 
during future work with a focus on the protocol version, despite the fact that these values 
are not associated with a well-known threat or technique. 
The inclusion of the pragma header in our list was of particular interest. Its value 
of no-cache did not rank very high, but it is a general header for HTTP/1.0 (not the 
current version) and its behavior, when present in responses, is not defined in the 
HTTP specification. To our knowledge, this header and its respective values are not 
associated with any known threat, but we recommend its use and further exploration 
since it represents an unpredictable part of the HTTP specification (undefined behavior 
when included in response headers) and was on our list of 22 features. 
The keep-alive and close values for the connection header indicate 




known threats that we have identified. However, their importance is noted and they 
should be studied further. 
The expect-ct header is another header used for defensive purposes, and max-
age is a specific directive for this header. This header specifies that the browser checks 
the website’s certificate to ensure that it is listed in the public Certificate Transparency 
logs. This header is set by the server requested. Because of the appearance of this header 
in our list, we recommend that it be examined and that the max-age directive be included 
in future feature sets. The presence of the strict-transport-security header 
informs the browser that the website should only be accessed over HTTPs and not over 
HTTP. The presence of the x-xss-protection header tells the browser to stop loading 
the page if the browser detects a cross-site scripting attack. The x-content-type 
header with value of nosniff tells the browser not to attempt to interpret the 
multipurpose internet male extension (MIME) type sent. Older browsers would attempt 
“MIME sniffing,” where the browser would attempt to interpret the content and 
execute/render the contents. Doing so enables attackers to lie about the content type as a 
mechanism for hiding malicious code and objects. With the nosniff value in the x-
content-type header, attackers cannot lie about the content type because the browser 
will not render or execute a content type if it detects a different type than the type 
specified. 
6.6.1.3 Features Ranking Analysis 
We observed that the top two features, both of which were prevalent in prior 
research, had an importance much higher than the remaining 20 features (content-




of 0.21 without sampling) both with and without sampling. We also observed that the 
feature rank and importance were similar when considering over-sampling or under-
sampling. We also observed that the top eight features were the same with and without 
sampling. The cumulative importance of these eight features was 0.83, 0.80 and 0.81 for 
no-sampling, over-sampling and under-sampling, respectively.  
Table 6-2 provides the feature rank and importance for the 11 features gathered 
from prior research. Compared to the 22 features, the first two features had higher 
importance (0.45 instead of 0.33 and 0.23 instead of 0.21) in the case of no-sampling. 
The combined feature importance for the top two features ranged from 0.66 to 0.72 for 
no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-sampling. As for the 22 features on our list, the 
feature rank and importance were similar when considering over-sampling or under-
sampling. We also observed that the top five features were the same with and without 
sampling. The overall importance of these five features was 0.91, 0.88, and 0.91 for no-
sampling, over-sampling, and under-sampling, respectively. 
Overall, we identified 11 features that, to the best of our knowledge, have not 
been used for malicious website detection. The other 11 we identified have been used by 
prior researchers. The new features accounted for roughly a third of overall feature 
importance (32%, 31.55%, and 30.24% in the no-sampling, over-sampling, and under-
sampling scenarios, respectively). 
 RQ2: Do the Additional Features Identified Improve Malicious Website 
Detection? 
We went on to investigate model performance for the test dataset when using the 




expanded feature set of 22 features to the results of using the 11 features previously 
identified from prior research. Tables 6-3 and 6-4 provide the FPRs, FNRs, ACCs, 
AUCs, Precs, Recs, and MCCs. Tables 6-5 and 6-6 show these metrics for the feature 
transformation cases. We focused on the MCC to drive the discussion regarding our 
results. The best result in each column is bolded. A “/” separates the metric for models 






Table 6-3.  
Identified HTTP Header Features Outperformed Features from Prior Research inn Sampling Scenarios 
Model Performance (11 HTTP Header Features from Prior Research / 22 Identified HTTP Header Features) in Sampling Scenarios 
Model 
No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 































































































































































































































































Table 6-4.  
Identified HTTP header Features Outperformed Features  
from Prior Research in Sampling Scenarios (cont.) 
Model Performance (11 HTTP Header Features from Prior Research 
/ 22 Identified HTTP Header Features) in Sampling Scenarios 
Model 
No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 











































































































Without sampling, the MCC was higher for all eight models when considering the 
22 features instead of the 11 previously studied features (on average, 0.615 compared to 
0.57). When over-sampling, the average MCC increased from 0.56 to 0.62 when 
considering the set of 22 features instead of the set of 11 previously studied features. 
With over-sampling, the MCC was higher for all eight models when considering the set 
of 22 features instead of the set of 11 previously studied features. When under-sampling, 
the average MCC increased from 0.545 to 0.61 when considering 22 features instead of 
the previously studied 11 features. With under-sampling, the MCC was higher for all 
eight models other than BC when considering the 22 features instead of the 11 previously 
studied features.  
We performed feature transformation on the 22 features to determine whether 
there were combinations of features that improved performance. We used the feature 




transformed into 946 features. We then performed feature elimination on the 946 features 
using four different techniques from Section 3.4.3 and kept features selected by at least 
three of these techniques, leaving 36 in total.  
We also determined whether PCA could reduce the 946 transformed features to 
some “n” number components while capturing the maximum variance. Using a 
cumulative scree plot, we found that by using 117 components, we were able to capture 
95% of the variance for the 22 features and that by using 56 components, we captured 
95% of the variance. Using these 117 and 56 components, we attempted to see how our 
















Table 6-5.  
Identified HTTP Header Features Outperformed Features from Prior Research  
in Feature Transformation Scenarios 
Model Performance (11 HTTP Header Features from Prior Research / 22 Identified HTTP Header Features) 
with Feature Transformation 
Model 
FT w/FS FT w/PCA 











































































































































































Table 6-6.  
Identified HTTP Header Features Outperformed  
Features from Prior Research in Feature  
Transformation Scenarios (cont.) 
Model Performance (11 HTTP Header Features from Prior 
Research / 22 Identified HTTP Header Features) with Feature 
Transformation 
Model 
FT w/FS FT w/PCA 











































































For feature transformation with feature selection, the MCC was higher for the 
models (other than AB), when considering the set of 22 features instead of the set of 11 




previously studied features, the average MCC improved from 0.53 to 0.56. However, 
when considering the 22 features, FT w/FS reduced the average MCC from 0.615 to 0.56 
when compared to no feature transformation. 
For FT w/PCA, the MCC was higher for all eight models when considering the 22 
features instead of 11 previously studied features. The MCC average also improved from 
0.59 to 0.65. When compared to no feature transformation, the average MCC improved 
from 0.615 to 0.65. 
When considering the effect of feature transformation on our model performance, 
we found that FT w/ FS worsened the average MCC, while FT w/PCA improved the 
average MCC. Thus, we demonstrated that, compared to the case without sampling and 
without feature transformation, feature transformation with PCA improved the results but 
feature transformation with feature selection worsened them. We observed improvement 
in 38 of the 40 models when adding the new features and postulated that additional HTTP 
header features can improve malicious website detection. 
 RQ3: Do our Results Change with No-sampling, Under-sampling, and Over-
sampling Scenarios? 
In posing RQ3, we addressed the sensitivity of our approach and its robustness in 
dataset sampling. Sampling is important in malicious website classification because 
researchers, ourselves included, work with various datasets that may or may not have 
class imbalance. In other words, there may be more malicious than non-malicious 
websites used in the training and test sets or vice versa. Currently, no standard exists for 
whether or not to perform sampling, nor is there a set standard regarding how much of a 




training and testing malicious website detection models. Hence, exploring whether or not 
sampling had an effect was worthwhile. We compared two parts of our results – the 
feature rankings and the overall performance of our classifiers. 
The features rankings were stable, with the top eight from Table 6-2 and the top 
five from Table 6-3 being the same. The MCC was 0.5671, 0.5599, and 0.5457 for the 11 
features in the no-, over-, and under-sampling cases, and was 0.6150, 0.6220, and 0.6076 
for the 22 features in the no-, over-, and under-sampling cases. Thus, we observed that 
result, feature ranking, and importance, were fairly consistent in the different sampling 
scenarios. 
 RQ4: Does Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation Improve our 
Results? 
In this last step, we used RQ4 to investigate how we could add additional 
assurance to our approach and evaluated the effect of tuning our models. After 
researching common techniques, we decided to perform hyperparameter tuning and 
cross-validation on our dataset and to re-evaluate our models with a 70:30 split of train to 
test data instead of the initial 80:20 split. By doing so, we could investigate that our 
models were not overfit, we could potentially improve our models, and we could ensure 
that our observations were not dependent on the initial 80:20 split of data. 
We performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation on the best performing 
models in each of the five scenarios – no-sampling, over-sampling, under-sampling, 
feature transformation with feature selection, and feature transformation with PCA. In the 
80:20 case, all five models improved, but the average MCC only increased from 0.652 to 




In the 70:30 case, tuning and cross-validation improved three of five models for 
the 70:30 split, but the average MCC only increased from 0.653 to 0.655. Without tuning 
and cross-validation, the average MCC was 0.653 and 0.652, respectively, with the 70:30 
and 80:20 splits. With tuning and cross-validation, the average MCC was 0.655 and 
0.657, respectively, with the 70:30 and 80:20 splits. The small difference between results 
in the different splits suggests that we were not dependent on the train/test split. Results 
are shown in Table 6-7. 
 
Table 6-7.  
Cross-Validation and Hyperparameter Tuning Slightly  
Improved HTTP Header Models 
Cross-Validation and Hyperparameter Tuning HTTP Models 
Model Scenario - Split MCC Scoring Metric 
ET No-sampling - 70:30 0.6497 balanced accuracy 
KNN Over-sampling - 70:30 0.6784 precision weighted 
RF Under-sampling - 70:30 0.6414 precision weighted 
RF FT w/ FS - 70:30 0.6301 precision micro 
BC FT w/PCA - 70:30 0.6773 Recall 
BC No-sampling - 80:20 0.6764 f1 weighted 
KNN Over-sampling - 80:20 0.6722 precision weighted 
NN Under-sampling - 80:20 0.6400 Recall 
BC FT w/FS - 80:20 0.6249 f1 weighted 
BC FT w/PCA - 80:20 0.6713 Recall 
 
 
In this fourth research question, we determined two ways of validating our results. 
First, we performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation. Secondly, we rebuilt 
and performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation on our eight models on a 
70:30 split of the data. We observed that while hyperparameter tuning and cross-
validation improved our results, the improvements were not large. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter detailed our comprehensive evaluation of HTTP header features to 
assess whether additional HTTP header features could improve malicious website 




benign websites. We used a dataset of malicious websites identified by Cisco Talos and 
used a set of benign websites from the Alexa Top 1M (Dataset 1). We collected 672 
HTTP header features from these websites, identifying 22 for further analysis, including 
11 that were newly identified. We applied eight models, ensuring the robustness of our 
methodology by performing no-sampling, over-sampling and under-sampling. 
Of the 22 features studied, we found eight to be consistently ranked as the most 
important features, representing 80% of feature importance. Of those eight important 
features, three were features identified by our approach. The average MCCs for the 
selected 22 features were consistently better than for the 11 previously studied features. 
When considering the 22 selected features, FT w/PCA increased the MCC. Our results 
indicated the existence of a broader set of HTTP header features that are applicable for 
malicious website detection, beyond those that have been commonly studied by prior 






Chapter 7: Combined Web Request Features Analysis 
 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present a comprehensive evaluation of discovery of features 
for malicious website detection with webpage content, URL, and HTTP header features 
instead of a priori selection of features. We do so by collecting features from a 
response to a web request. Our dataset (Dataset 1) consists of benign websites from 
the Alexa Top Domains [112] provided by [176]. The malicious websites consist of 
phishing webpages, drive-by downloads, and other malicious websites including 
command and control (C2) URLs provided by the Cisco Talos Intelligence Group [177]. 
We apply a series of feature selection techniques to discover features suitable for 
detection of malicious websites. We investigate their detection performance using 
unsupervised and supervised learning algorithms in various sampling and feature 
transformation scenarios. We compare the detection performance of the discovered 
features to the detection performance provided by features from prior research. Overall, 
we find: 
• The discovery approach identifies features used in prior research, and new 
features and feature combinations; 
• The discovery approach produces features that yield similar (and slightly 
better on average without model tuning and slightly worse with model tuning) 
performance to features from previously published but requires fewer features 




• The discovery approach identifies features that produce better meta-features 
via feature transformation further demonstrating benefits over selecting 
features a priori.  
We make the following contributions: 
• We demonstrated the potential for discovering features for malicious website 
detection by achieving a best-classifier ACC, AUC, MCC, Prec, and Rec of 
98.38%, 0.9464, 0.9174, 0.9555, 0.8982, respectively, with tuning and overall 
averages of 96.62%, 0.9251, 0.8432, 0.8560, and 0.8723, respectively, across 
several machine learning models built with default parameters; and 
• We showed that new features must be discovered and evaluated for their ability 
to detect malicious websites by demonstrating that supervised models built 
from discovered features, 12 of which were newly identified and 22 of which 
had been used in prior research, outperformed models built with features from 
prior research by an average MCC of 0.0208 with 66% fewer features when 
using default parameters. 
 Related Research 
Machine learning has been applied in many cybersecurity studies and has shown 
potential to detect various threats and malicious websites. Three threats are commonly 
detected in prior research – phishing webpages, drive-by downloads, and C2 
infrastructure. 
Ma [35] used the URL structure and host-based properties gathered from other 
sources (IP denylists, WHOIS, domain name properties, and geographic properties) with 




features and adding the use of online learning [217] to detect malicious URLs. 
CANTINA [24] relied primarily on features from the webpage content and created 
heuristics, evaluating the framework based upon 100 legitimate URLs from a prior study 
[123] and 100 URLs from PhishTank [113]. CANTINA+ [46] improved upon this 
approach by adding features and training and by testing models built from various 
machine learning methods. The authors relied on subject matter expertise to select 
features and used search engine features derived from search results. Whittaker et al.[42] 
used an LR classifier and used millions of URLs for evaluation. Marchal et al. [91] took 
an approach similar to that of the CANTINA+ authors, gathering 212 features, 
differentiating between languages on the webpage, and analyzing the URL structure more 
than CANTINA and CANTINA+ authors had. Their method used a GB [94] algorithm. 
Phishmon [83] leveraged HTTP header features for their phishing detection mechanism 
and Li et al. [218] used feature transformation to perform better phishing detection. 
JSAND creators Cova et al. [65] identified malicious JavaScript with 10 features 
associated with drive-by downloads. Their approach relied on instrumenting a browser, 
executing the code, and recording the events. Rieck et al. [67] used Cujo to perform static 
and dynamic analysis of JavaScript. The static analysis relied on lexical tokens and the 
dynamic analysis relied on known attack patterns. The sequences from static and 
dynamic analysis were transformed into Q-grams – a sequence of “q” words within the 
code execution – that were then used to train an SVM. Curtsinger et al. [68] used Zozzle 
to perform static analysis by first de-obfuscating the JavaScript and creating features 
from two parts – the context in which it appeared (try/catch block, etc.), and some text. 




used to train a naïve Bayesian classifier on 919 malicious entries and 7,976 benign 
samples and achieved a false positive rate of 0.0003% on 1.2 million files. Revolver was 
used to examine the AST created from the JavaScript, to create sequences of nodes, and 
to compare the similarity to known malicious sequences. Researchers [45] used Prophiler 
to detect drive-by downloads with features commonly used in phishing detection 
(webpage content). They trained their model on 787 samples of drive-by downloads with 
HTML elements, static JavaScript features, URL features, and features from DNS. Zhang 
et al. [78] used Arrow to detect drive-by downloads with HTTP traces pulled from logs 
instead of from the JavaScript. JavaScript analysis was the source of features used in 
studies to detect drive-by downloads, though researchers also have used other features 
commonly associated with phishing detection. 
Authors in [75]-[76] performed clustering on high-level features (total number of 
HTTP requests, number of GET/POST requests, response lengths, etc.) and on 
lower-level features such as specific headers, and creating HTTP traffic clusters to derive 
signatures for C2 (bot) URLs. Researchers [80] used ExecScent which focused on 
clustering requests and built templates for detection from HTTP traffic clusters, and 
derived signatures from the URL path length, query component, user-agent string, and 
other headers. These features and similar features have been used in other studies as well, 
with [55] using them to compare distances of clusters of HTTP requests by extracting 
the URL path, URL parameters, and URL method (GET, POST, etc.). Zarras et al. [82] 
used header chains (sequences of HTTP headers) for their detection method, creating 
signatures from clustering. Researchers [219] also aimed to detect bots and gathered 




Yadav et al. [209] sought to detect DGAs [53] by examining features purely from domain 
names.  
Although researchers aimed to detect differing threats, some were able to detect 
multiple threats with various types of features. For example, [47] used features to detect 
phishing webpages and drive-by downloads, while [49] selected various feature types – 
webpage content, flow-based features, URL features, etc. – and leveraged [220] as their 
dataset. 
 Research Questions 5–7 
 Research Question 5 
 Prior studies have relied on preconceived notions of relevant (a priori) features – 
URL length, <iframe>s, etc., for detection. This reliance has demonstrated success 
however attacks change over time [221], as do the technologies used by attackers and as 
well as developers of benign websites. There is a need to re-evaluate the features used to 
detect malicious websites. For example, HTML5 [222], released in 2014, introduces new 
tags (elements). Hence, features that were new to HTML5 could not have been included in 
research prior to 2014. Additionally, there are techniques such as feature selection [50] that 
can be employed to discover features which may be more applicable to the detection of 
malicious websites. RQ5, stated as follows: 
RQ5: Is feature discovery feasible for malicious website detection? 
 Research Question 6 
Even if feature discovery is feasible, there is no guarantee that it is better than 
selecting features a priori. To date, there is little insight into how discovered features’ 




how discovered features performed compared to those gathered from prior research, is 
stated as follows: 
RQ6: How do discovered features’ detection ability compare to those from prior 
research? 
 Research Question 7 
Once we’ve established the feasibility of discovered features and compared their 
detection ability to the detection ability of a priori features from prior research, we then 
investigated operational constraints. A constraint within an operational scenario is that a 
network is exposed to various threats simultaneously. Denylists (among other tools) are 
used to prevent communication with the malicious website. Some prior researchers 
worked successfully to identify specific threats: [91] focused on phishing, [67] focused 
on drive-by downloads, and [75]-[76] focused on detecting C2 infrastructure. In this 
study, we gain insight into whether features could be used to detect a group of threats, 
regardless of their nature.  
Success in an operational scenario also depends on the availability and choice of 
features used. For example, phishing is typically best detected from HTML on a 
webpage, drive-by downloads are best detected by the JavaScript, and C2 infrastructure is 
best detected by the URL structure or HTTP headers. When a user (or service) retrieves a 
malicious website, there may not be information about the type of threat or the relevant 
features for detecting the malicious website. Furthermore, a website could be a phishing 
website, could result in a drive-by download, and could serve as C2 infrastructure. 
Additionally, some features that are useful for detection may not be available in a timely 




show promise for detection, but we cannot guarantee that these features are available 
when determining whether to block communication with a website. This chapter 
leveraged features derived from the web response, which was derived directly from the 
website. 
It is unclear whether discovering features can be applicable to an operational 
environment. Hence, we arrived at RQ7, stated as follows: 
 
RQ7: Can a discovery approach be applied to several threats when only features 
from a web response are available? 
 Methodology 
Figure 7-1 provides an overview of the seven-step analytical process we used in 






Fig. 7-1 A process for discovery and evaluation of features for malicious website detection 
 
 
 Dataset Selection 
 Our dataset (Dataset 1) consists of two portions – benign entries from the 39,877 
Alexa top domains, and 6,894 malicious entries provided by Cisco Talos Intelligence 
Group [15]. The Alexa top domains have been used in several studies including [43]. The 






































download, and C2). Both datasets are provided by external organizations and are not hand-
selected or created for the purpose of this study.  
Because we obtained the dataset of malicious websites from a third party, we 
exerted no influence over its size. To select a size for the benign dataset, we first 
surveyed prior research. Dataset sizes varied widely in prior scholarship. Researchers 
[68] used 919 malicious entries and 7,976 benign samples in their training and they 
evaluated their method on 1.2 million files. On the other hand, authors [91] used 1,213 
malicious samples and 5,000 benign samples in their training and used 1,553 entries in 
their testing set. For this research, we made the decision to select 39,877 entries for our 
benign dataset. Both small and large datasets have their own respective advantages, with 
smaller datasets allowing for focus and deeper analysis of a few samples, and larger 
datasets potentially being more representative. In order to account for the dataset 
imbalance, we performed sampling which is discussed in Section 7.4.4. 
 Features for Malicious Website Detection 
This chapter leveraged features from Chapters 4-6. Please refer to Chapters 4-6 
Sections 4.4, 5.4, and 6.4 for complete details. 
 Feature Collection, Selection, and Transformation 
7.4.3.1 Feature Collection 
We performed feature collection in August of 2018, recording the content and the 
HTTP headers from GET requests and discarding entries for which the GET requests 
failed. We retrieved 34,742 entries from among the top 39,877 domain names in the 
Alexa Top 1M and retrieved 4,441 entries from among the 6,894 Cisco Talos entries. 




address, or the web URL no longer being valid (more prevalent in the malicious dataset). 
We collected 46,580 features in total – 28,162 derived from the URL, 17,746 derived 
from the webpage content, and 672 derived from the HTTP response headers.  
7.4.3.2 Feature Selection 
We split our dataset into two portions – a training set (80% of total data), and a 
testing set (20% of total data). The training set is used for feature selection and model 
building, and the testing set is placed aside for evaluation. To perform feature selection 
we used the feature selection process with XgBoost described in Section 3.3.2 and the 
initial steps yielded a list of sets each containing three elements - a threshold ‘thresh,’ 
number of features ‘n,’ set of features ‘f,’ and an accuracy. Our goal was to achieve the 
best performance with few features. Thus, we iterated through the sets consisting of 
threshold, number of features, and accuracy (with ‘n’ decreasing) and looked for a 
relative maximum in accuracy. The presence of a relative maximum in accuracy, as ‘n’ 
decreases, is how we determined which set of features to use for detection. We find a 
relative maximum accuracy at n=36 features as shown below. 
Thresh=0.001, n=105, Accuracy: 97.78% 
… 
Thresh=0.006, n=43, Accuracy: 97.72% 
Thresh=0.007, n=36, Accuracy: 97.75% 
Thresh=0.009, n=26, Accuracy: 97.69% 
We calculated the correlation [223] of the features and observed that two features 
had high correlation to other features in the list. We removed the features with high 
correlation and arrived at 34 features. These 34 features are the discovered features. We 





7.4.3.3 Feature Transformation 
Although we have 34 discovered and 99 a priori features to build our detection 
models, we also compared their effectiveness by comparing the detection abilities of 
features they can produce. As such, we performed feature transformation on the 34 
discovered and 99 a priori features to form additional features and evaluate their ability 
to detect malicious websites. We performed two types of feature transformation scenarios 
– feature transformation with feature selection (FT w/FS) and feature transformation with 
principal component analysis (FT w/PCA) from Section 3.4.3 in order to build a better 
understanding of how the discovered features detection ability compares to that of the a 
priori. Both involved first transforming the 34 discovered and 99 a priori features into 
new features which we referred to as the transformed features. Since feature 
transformation produced many features, we then performed feature selection with 
additional selection techniques and dimensionality reduction with PCA respectively to 
generate a smaller set of features (components in the case of PCA) to build our detection 
models. 
Once we transformed the 34 and 99 features, we then performed feature selection 
on the transformed features using four different techniques: Correlation as used in [189], 
Select K Best (scoring function chi-square), Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE), and 
Select From Model in the feature transformation with feature selection case. The choice 
of these techniques is motivated by prior research and current data science techniques. 
We input transformed features created from the addition, multiplication, and division 
transformations into each of these four techniques which produced four sets of features. 




as relevant. For the feature transformation with PCA case, we performed PCA on the 
transformed features to create ‘n’ components, mixtures, or combinations of variables 
that capture the maximum variance, which are then used to build detection models. By 
using a cumulative scree plot, we identified components that capture maximum variance 
between the features within the data. 
 Sampling 
Our dataset has imbalance, 6,894 malicious websites to 39,877 benign websites, 
which could influence the detection performance of models built in this study. To account 
for this potential impact, we created three sampling scenarios for the training data from 
which we will build supervised learning models no-sampling – training data are used as 
is; over-sampling – malicious websites are over-sampled with the SMOTE technique 
[186] provided by [187] to equal the number of benign websites; and under-sampling – 
benign websites are randomly under-sampled to equal the number of malicious websites. 
 
 Unsupervised and Supervised Learning 
We leveraged unsupervised and supervised learning to build malicious website 
detection models. We captured the ACC, AUC, MCC, Prec, and Rec for each model. We 
focused our discussion on the MCC. 
Unsupervised learning in the form of clustering and anomaly detection is 
commonly used to detect malicious websites and traffic and has been used in prior 
research as in [65] and [75]-[76]. Clustering is more applicable to distinguishing and 
discovering different classes within the data. For example, [80] used clustering to 
distinguish HTTP traffic among different families of malware. Since we have only two 




approach where benign websites are the normal case and the malicious websites are 
anomalous. We built unsupervised models with default parameters using Autoencoders 
[192] and a One Class SVM  from the 34 discovered features, 99 a priori features, 
transformed features using the FT w/FS technique, and transformed features using the FT 
w/PCA technique. 
We also leveraged nine supervised learning algorithms to detect malicious 
websites because supervised learning is more common: nearest neighbor [111], ensemble 
methods [182], and NNs [183]. The choice of building nine models was motivated by two 
factors. First, we wanted to explore performance of various models built with the 
discovered and a priori features to gain a more thorough understanding of the features’ 
detection ability. Second, we found that [47] leveraged seven different supervised 
algorithms which were combined with a voting [191] algorithm. Of our nine models, five 
are ensemble methods and provide a measure of feature importance [185] based on the 
Gini Impurity: AB [101], ET [97], RF [98],GB, and XGB. Feature importance enabled us 
to examine which features contribute the most to the classification decision and allows us 
to create a ranking of the most importance features for detection. We also built a Voting 
classifier (V) [191] created from the RF, ET, and GB classifiers.  The other three models 
did not provide a measure of feature importance however provided additional insight into 
how the selected features perform across well-known machine learning algorithms and 
enable a more thorough comparison of the two sets of features. They were the BC [184], 
an ensemble method, KNN, a nearest neighbor method, and NNs. When building the 
models, we chose to use the default parameters provided by [29] for the respective 




7.5.2 through 7.5.4  was done on the models built with default parameters. We did 
however, perform hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation where we varied the model 
hyperparameters and adjusted the training and testing data with Kfold [190] validation. 
Doing so attempted to improve our models and provided better insight into their 
performance of the features by lessening the reliance on the initial 80:20 training to test 
split of data. 
 Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation 
In our last step, we performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation on our 
supervised models to improve our models and validate our results built from default 
parameters. We chose the best performing model from each scenario – no-sampling, 
over-sampling, under-sampling, FT w/FS, and FT w/PCA and tuned the hyperparameters 
and performed cross-validation. We used StratifiedKFold [190] for 10-fold cross-
validation [26] and explored several scoring metrics (accuracy, precision, recall) provided 
by [29] when performing Grid Search [224] in our attempt to maximize our performance. 
 For added assurance that our results were not a result of our initial 80:20 train to 
test split, we repeated our training, sampling, and feature transformation approach with a 
70:30 split of training to testing data and again performed hyperparameter tuning and 
cross-validation. We also performed hyperparameter tuning and 5-fold cross-validation 
on the Voting classifier. 
 Results 
 Unsupervised Results 
In the unsupervised case, we observed an average ACC, AUC, MCC, Prec, and 




features and observed an average ACC, AUC, MCC, Prec, and Rec of 88.39%, 0.7556, 
0.4699, 0.6237, and 0.8264, respectively, with a priori features. Full results are shown in 
Figures 7-2 and 7-3. 
 
 




Fig. 7-3. One-class SVMs perform well with feature transformation with feature selection  
and perform poorly with feature transformation with PCA 
 
The unsupervised models did not perform well, though we saw improvement (on 
average) when using the discovered features versus the a priori – an average increase in 
MCC of 0.0793. The detection results were not great; hence, we focused most of our 




































 Feature Selection Importance 
Rankings of the 34 discovered features are shown in Table 7-1 in the no-
sampling, over-sampling, and under-sampling scenarios. Shaded rows mark the new 





Table 7-1.  
Feature Selection Identified 22 Features Used in Prior  
Research and 12 that Were New 
34 Discovered Features Ranked 
Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
Total HTML Tags 1 : 0.1311 1 : 0.1318 1 : 0.1138 
URL Length 2 : 0.1285 2 : 0.0845 2 : 0.0926 
Total Extensions in URL 3 : 0.1137 3 : 0.0717 4 : 0.0622 
Count of ‘w’ character 4 : 0.0734 5 : 0.0575 5 : 0.0563 
Count of ‘.’ character 5: 0.0494 7 : 0.0410 9 : 0.0401 
content-encoding gzip 6: 0.0383 6 : 0.0489 8 : 0.0443 
<a href> relative 7 : 0.0379 21 : 0.0179 13 : 0.0269 
Count of <meta> tag 8 : 0.0322 4 : 0.0590 7 : 0.0499 
<a href> OoD 9 : 0.0301 17 : 0.0212 6 : 0.0499 
server apache 10 : 0.0242 20 : 0.0182 16 : 0.0227 
Count of ‘z’ character 11 : 0.0236 25 : 0.0145 21 : 0.0138 
<link type=”text/css”> 12 : 0.0235 9 : 0.0348 10 : 0.0383 
<img src=”http*”> 13 : 0.0215 24 : 0.0149 32 : 0.0073 
Count of ‘i’ character 14 : 0.0196 15 : 0.0265 22 : 0.0137 
Count of <p> tag 15 : 0.0190 18 : 0.0193 14 : 0.0255 
push()  16 : 0.0178 14 : 0.0273 15 : 0.0236 
Count of ‘l’ character 17 : 0.0168 11 : 0.0318 34 : 0.0070 
url extension is .com 18 : 0.0158 22 : 0.0162 23 : 0.0137 
Count of ‘y’ character 19 : 0.0155 34 : 0.0033 30 : 0.0079 
vary user-agent 20 : 0.0154 27 : 0.0121 27 : 0.0109 
Total href attributes 21 : 0.0146 10 : 0.0339 3 : 0.0739 
<a href=”https*”> 22 : 0.0140 30 : 0.0086 11 : 0.0337 
<link href> OoD 23 : 0.0136 8 : 0.0371 12 : 0.0278 
cache-control max-age 24 : 0.0130 13 : 0.0276 18 : 0.0187 
Count of ‘p’ character 25 : 0.0124 32 : 0.0053 26 : 0.0114 
<form action=”http*”> 26 : 0.0121 26 : 0.0132 33 : 0.0071 
Count of <a> tag 27 : 0.0115 16 : 0.0250 19 : 0.0186 
transfer-encoding chunked 28 : 0.0113 12 : 0.0286 17 : 0.0224 
Count of ‘f’ character 29 : 0.0102 29 : 0.0092 28 : 0.0099 
<script async=”true”> 30 : 0.0090 23 : 0.0160 20 : 0.0160 
via 1.1 31 : 0.0089 28 : 0.0120 24 : 0.0129 
<a href=”http*”> 32 : 0.0087 33 : 0.0042 31 : 0.0077 
Count of <center> tag 33 : 0.0069 19 : 0.0187 25 : 0.0114 
<iframe src=”*..html”> 34 : 0.0063 31 : 0.0083 29 : 0.0081 
 
 
The total number of HTML tags and the URL lengths were consistent across the 
sampling scenarios and accounted for an average 22.7% of total feature importance. Half 
of the features (17 of 34) were from the webpage content and accounted for 43% of total 
feature importance, and, of the webpage content features, only one feature – counts of the 
push() method – was a JavaScript feature. Eleven of the 34 features were URL features 
that accounted for 44% of total feature importance, with the remaining six features being 




features with the highest average importance were URL features (URL length, total 
extensions in the URL, the count of “w” characters, and the count of “.” characters), 
accounting for approximately 31% of total feature importance. Nine of the features were 
HTML features that represented resources via the src or href attributes or other 
attributes that can specify resources. They accounted for 17% of total feature importance. 
Twelve of the 34 features, accounting for 17% of total feature importance, have not been 
studied for their role in malicious website detection.  
The total number of HTML tags was the most important feature and was part of a 
webpage’s content complexity [225]. More content requires additional analysis of 
whether the webpage is malicious and provides added opportunities for placing malicious 
content inside the webpage. For example, a webpage consisting only of text will not 
cause a drive-by download, whereas a page with various links, JavaScript, and other 
resources such as <iframe>s, may enable a drive-by download. The next feature 
identified – URL length – is one that has been frequently used in prior works. This 
feature was not surprising since attackers use “tiny” as well as longer URLs [226].  
URL features, especially the counts of the respective characters in the URL, were 
observed to be helpful for detecting malicious websites. The count of “w” characters, 
along with counts of “z,” “I,” “l,” “y,” and “p” characters, all appeared on our list. There 
were no specific known associations between these characters and malicious URLs, 
though all of the characters, with the exception of “i” and “l,” are infrequently used in the 
English language. The characters “z,” “y,” “p,” and “w” occur 0.27%, 1.77%, 3.16% and 
1.28% of the time, respectively [227]. The characters “i” and “l,” however, have been 




counts, including ratios, distance vectors, and similarity, have been studied to detect bots 
and C2 URLs [52] when used in conjunction with unsupervised learning techniques such 
as clustering or anomaly detection. Lastly, character counts and related metrics were 
necessary for further study of URLs generated by DGAs. Hence, character counts (and 
features derived from them) were relevant.  
The first HTTP header features we observed have been used in specific attacks 
and included features that describe how data is packaged in a response and how long 
data should be kept by a client. The gzip content-encoding header extracted from 
the HTTP response has legitimate uses, but it can be used to evade network scanners 
[228]. Chunked responses, which also appeared on the list, are similar in that they are 
specified in a response header, they have legitimate purposes, and they can be used by 
attackers [228]. The cache-control header, studied by [49], and max-age directive 
can be used by attackers to require a cache to hold a malicious response for a long 
period, thereby enabling a cache-poisoning attack [229].  
Other HTTP headers appeared on the list and were the server header with a 
value of apache. Apache servers have had many well-known security issues with some 
enabling backdoors (control) for attackers [230]–[234]. The via [206] header is added by 
proxies that have legitimate uses, but also are well-known to be used by attackers [234]- 
[235]. The vary header can be used by requests or responses. When used by 
responses with a value of user-agent, it specifies whether responses will be 
cached based on the user-agent string. This feature is well-known for being 




We also observed many webpage content features related to links and URLs on 
the webpage. The total number of relative links or resources (as opposed to absolute 
links) that point to resources within the page (or relative to the page) is one of the higher 
ranked features, is an extension of features used in [47], and is known to be used by 
attackers. It is also a measure of content-complexity [225]. Using relative links has the 
advantage of decreasing the chances of detection for attackers. For example, if the 
webpage is fetched and successfully loaded, it has gotten past some network-level 
defenses or other security solutions [237]. Furthermore, relative URLs are known to be 
leveraged by attackers. Recently, attackers have used relative URLs [237] to bypass 
Microsoft’s ATP for phishing detection. Additionally, the number of OoD links on the 
page (URLs that are out of the current domain) ranked as a feature. The more links on a 
webpage, the more opportunities for potential malicious URLs, only one of which must 
be effective to cause an infection. We also found that the structure of the URLs on the 
webpage were present in our features. For example, we observed that the protocol (http 
vs https) for certain resource references (such as image, links) helped with detection, 
though they were not highly ranked. The <iframe> is well-known for its ability to detect 
drive-by downloads [59] and we observed that .html files in the <iframe> src 
attribute made the list. 
The next webpage content features deal with specific tags (elements on the 
webpage). The <meta> tag is known to be associated with malicious redirects [238]. 
Two other tags that appeared were counts of <p> and <center> tags. Both are 
formatting tags that specify how text should be rendered. Although they have no known 




care that attackers take in formatting their text, information that would be of interest for 
phishing detection. The other feature, <link type>, identifies references to .css 
resources. Although this has legitimate uses, CSS files have also been used for attacks 
[239]. 
We observed that one JavaScript feature  – counts of the push() method – made 
our list. JavaScript methods can identify obfuscated JavaScript, but the push() method 
is not highly related to malicious JavaScript. Although it made our list, it did not rank 
highly and it should be noted that although this study performed static analysis, dynamic 
analysis has been shown to be better suited for malicious code detection. In fact, most 
prior research required de-obfuscation before analysis of code, as in [65] and [68]). 
Although we found just one count of a JavaScript method, the async=true attribute on 
the <script> tag is a potential attack vector (it instructs the browser to continue 
rendering third party libraries in the JavaScript). 
We then performed feature ranking of the 99 a priori features. Webpage content 
features accounted for 40% of total feature importance, while URL features accounted for 
48% of total feature importance, and HTTP features accounted for 12% of total feature 
importance. Whereas the top two features in Table 7-1 were consistent, none of the top 
features in Table 7-2 were consistent. Also, we observed that some a priori features had 
little to no importance in our study. Full rankings for the 99 a priori features in sampling 





Table 7-2.  
The Importance of 99 Features from Prior Research Was  
Inconsistent Across Sampling Scenarios 
99 Features from Prior Research Ranked 
Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
Total HTML Tags 1 : 0.1159 6 : 0.0382 1 : 0.1358 
Total Extensions in URL 2 : 0.0957 3 : 0.0520 5 : 0.0493 
URL Length 3 : 0.0926 4 : 0.0499 3 : 0.0520 
Count of ‘w’ character 4 : 0.0585 5 : 0.0493 4 : 0.0499 
Count of ‘.’ Character 5 : 0.0460 9 : 0.0229 11 : 0.0215 
<a href> OoD 6 : 0.0291 15 : 0.0189 6 : 0.0382 
Total href attributes 7 : 0.0283 10 : 0.0219 2 : 0.0559 
server apache 8 : 0.0261 11 : 0.0215 10 : 0.0219 
content-encoding gzip 9 : 0.0255 2 : 0.0559 7 : 0.0372 
Count of <link> tag 10 : 0.0241 19 : 0.0175 12 : 0.0196 
Count of <meta> tag 11 : 0.0221 7 : 0.0372 8 : 0.0229 
Total TLDs in URL 12 : 0.0207 33 : 0.0090 20 : 0.0172 
content-language text/html 13 : 0.0195 18 : 0.0183 13 : 0.0194 
Count of ‘z’ character 14 : 0.0190 23 : 0.0151 19 : 0.0175 
<link href> OoD 15 : 0.0153 20 : 0.0172 22 : 0.0165 
Count of <a> tag 16 : 0.0144 12 : 0.0196 9 : 0.0229 
Count of 4-character words 17 : 0.0142 27 : 0.0125 23 : 0.0151 
Count of ‘y’ character 18 : 0.0141 49 : 0.0046 56 : 0.0034 
url extension is .com 19 : 0.0135 41 : 0.0055 26 : 0.0133 
Total <img src> 20 : 0.0134 16 : 0.0187 15 : 0.0189 
content-length 21 : 0.0134 36 : 0.0082 17 : 0.0187 
<form action> OoD 22 : 0.0133 22 : 0.0165 21 : 0.0168 
Count of <div> tag 23 : 0.0130 25 : 0.0134 14 : 0.0191 
cache-control max-age 24 : 0.0128 21 : 0.0168 16 : 0.0187 
Count of ‘i’ character 25 : 0.0128 8 : 0.0229 24 : 0.0147 
Count of ‘l’ character 26 : 0.0122 14 : 0.0191 49 : 0.0046 
Count of <style> tag 27 : 0.0113 58 : 0.0031 34 : 0.0090 
<script src> OoD 28 : 0.0090 46 : 0.0049 18 : 0.0183 
Count of ‘p’ character 29 : 0.0090 26 : 0.0133 27 : 0.0125 
Count of <title> tag 30 : 0.0087 1 : 0.1358 41 : 0.0055 
Count of ‘f’ character 31 : 0.0084 30 : 0.0104 31 : 0.0101 
<script type=text/javascript> 32 : 0.0077 37 : 0.0073 28 : 0.0120 
Count of ‘d’ character 33 : 0.0076 17 : 0.0187 35 : 0.0085 
Count of ‘s’ character 34 : 0.0074 28 : 0.0120 32 : 0.0092 
Count of 5-character words 35 : 0.0072 38 : 0.0066 62 : 0.0021 
Count of ‘o’ character 36 : 0.0068 29 : 0.0114 44 : 0.0050 
cache-control no-store 37 : 0.0063 57 : 0.0034 29 : 0.0114 
url extension is .i 38 : 0.0063 40 : 0.0063 46 : 0.0049 
replace()  39 : 0.0063 34 : 0.0090 40 : 0.0063 
Count of ‘u’ character 40 : 0.0060 43 : 0.0051 30 : 0.0104 
Count of <img> tag 41 : 0.0059 61 : 0.0027 36 : 0.0082 
<img srcset> OoD 42 : 0.0059 39 : 0.0065 45 : 0.0050 
Count of ‘b’ character 43 : 0.0058 32 : 0.0092 60 : 0.0028 
Count of ‘e’ character 44 : 0.0057 45 : 0.0050 58 : 0.0031 
addEventListener()  45 : 0.0054 44 : 0.0050 33 : 0.0090 
<base href> OoD 46 : 0.0042 76 : 0.0004 74 : 0.0006 
Count of ‘t’ character 47 : 0.0042 59 : 0.0030 48 : 0.0049 
Count of <iframe> tag 48 : 0.0041 63 : 0.0021 55 : 0.0037 
Count of ‘x’ character 49 : 0.0040 70 : 0.0010 72 : 0.0007 
Count of ‘c’ character 50 : 0.0039 47 : 0.0049 47 : 0.0049 
Count of ‘r’ character 51 : 0.0037 51 : 0.0045 65 : 0.0014 
Count of ‘m’ character 52 : 0.0037 55 : 0.0037 52 : 0.0045 
Count of ‘h’ character 53 : 0.0036 35 : 0.0085 66 : 0.0013 
Count of ‘a’ character 54 : 0.0032 13 : 0.0194 61 : 0.0027 
server nginx 55 : 0.0031 54 : 0.0039 38 : 0.0066 
createElement () 56 : 0.0031 24 : 0.0147 25 : 0.0134 
Count of ‘n’ character 57 : 0.0029 52 : 0.0045 50 : 0.0045 
cache-control no-cache 58 : 0.0029 56 : 0.0034 57 : 0.0034 
Count of 6-character words 59 : 0.0028 31 : 0.0101 63 : 0.0021 




99 Features from Prior Research Ranked 
Feature No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 
Count of <input> tag 61 : 0.0023 65 : 0.0014 43 : 0.0051 
Count of ‘k’ character 62 : 0.0022 66 : 0.0013 67 : 0.0012 
Count of ‘g’ character 63 : 0.0021 50 : 0.0045 37 : 0.0073 
<img src> OoD 64 : 0.0019 62 : 0.0021 42 : 0.0053 
Count of ‘-’ character 65 : 0.0019 42 : 0.0053 39 : 0.0065 
Count of ‘v’ character 66 : 0.0016 69 : 0.0010 59 : 0.0030 
write()  67 : 0.0015 74 : 0.0006 69 : 0.0010 
cache-control must-revalidate 68 : 0.0014 48 : 0.0049 54 : 0.0039 
Count of ‘j’ character 69 : 0.0013 71 : 0.0009 68 : 0.0011 
Count of 8-character words 70 : 0.0012 72 : 0.0007 73 : 0.0007 
cache-control private 71 : 0.0012 53 : 0.0041 53 : 0.0041 
substring() 72 : 0.0011 80 : 0.0002 70 : 0.0010 
url extension is .net 73 : 0.0011 67 : 0.0012 71 : 0.0009 
<iframe src> OoD 74 : 0.0010 60 : 0.0028 51 : 0.0045 
escape()  75 : 0.0005 79 : 0.0002 75 : 0.0005 
cache-control public 76 : 0.0004 68 : 0.0011 78 : 0.0003 
setTimeout()  77 : 0.0004 84 : 0.0001 81 : 0.0002 
parseInt()  78 : 0.0003 78 : 0.0003 77 : 0.0004 
concat()  79 : 0.0003 73 : 0.0007 85 : 0.0001 
Count of <frame> tag 80 : 0.0002 83 : 0.0002 80 : 0.0002 
<frame src> OoD 81 : 0.0002 81 : 0.0002 79 : 0.0002 
unescape()  82 : 0.0002 82 : 0.0002 76 : 0.0004 
exec() 83 : 0.0002 75 : 0.0005 84 : 0.0001 
fromCharCode()  84 : 0.0001 88 : 0.0001 83 : 0.0002 
Count of <object> tag 85 : 0.0001 89 : 0.0001 87 : 0.0001 
<area href> OoD 86 : 0.0001 77 : 0.0004 89 : 0.0001 
<embed src> OoD 87 : 0.0001 85 : 0.0001 82 : 0.0002 
eval()  88 : 0.0001 87 : 0.0001 91 : 0 
search()  89 : 0.0001 91 : 0 93 : 0 
Count of <embed> tag 90 : 0 90 : 0 90 : 0 
charCodeAt ()   91 : 0 95 : 0 86 : 0.0001 
<object data> OoD 92 : 0 92 : 0 88 : 0.0001 
hidden <iframe> 93 : 0 86 : 0.0001 92 : 0 
setInterval()  94 : 0 94 : 0 96 : 0 
<source src> OoD 95 : 0 93 : 0 94 : 0 
<source srcset> OoD 96 : 0 97 : 0 95 : 0 
link()  97 : 0 98 : 0 97 : 0 
<audio src> OoD 98 : 0 96 : 0 98 : 0 
<video src> OoD 99 : 0 99 : 0 99 : 0 
 
 
 Sampling Scenarios 
In the no-sampling scenario, we observed that two out of the nine models improve 
when using discovered features versus a priori features. The average accuracy, AUC, 
MCC, Precision, and Recall changed by -0.03%, 0.0045, -0.001, -0.013 and 0.01, when 
using discovered versus a priori features respectively. In the no-sampling scenario the 
discovered feature set performs nearly as well as the a priori feature set albeit with 66% 






Fig. 7-4. Discovered features performed approximately  
as well as the prior features in the no-sampling scenario 
 
 
In the over- and under-sampling scenarios, we observed that three and two out of 
the nine models improved with discovered features versus a priori features, respectively. 
The average accuracy, AUC, MCC, Precision, and Recall changed by -0.2%, 0.006, -
0.007, -0.027, 0.016, in the over-sampling scenario and -0.37%, -0.0008, -0.01, -0.019, 
0.0049 in the under-sampling scenario with discovered features. Hence, we observed 
similar behavior as in the no-sampling scenario. Results are shown in Figure 7-5 and 
Figure 7-6, with full results shown in Appendix D. 
 
 
Fig. 7-5. Discovered features performed approximately  















































Fig. 7-6. Discovered features performed approximately  
as well as the a priori features in the under-sampling scenario 
 
 
 Feature Transformation 
We now discuss the results of using features created through transformation of the 
features and the components created by performing FT w/FS and FT w/PCA on these 
features. For the transformed features (2,278 features were created from the 34 
discovered features, and 19,503 from the 99 a priori features) we observed a change in 
accuracy in AUC, MCC, Precision, and Recall of 0.23%, 0.0113, 0.0129, -0.0006, 
0.0231, respectively, and all nine models improved when using features created from 
discovered features versus a priori features – 88% fewer created features.. The effect of 
the feature transformation with feature selection is shown in Figure 7-7 and full results 

















Fig. 7-7. Discovered features out-performed the a priori  
features in the feature transformation with feature selection 
 
 
The discovered features also appeared to produce better components from PCA 
and did so with fewer features. One hundred and twenty-five components were created 
from the 34 discovered features with PCA, compared to 750 components created from the 
99 a priori features. With components from discovered features compared to the 
components created from a priori features, we observed a change in ACC, AUC, MCC, 
Prec, and Rec of 7.65%, 0.0743, 0.1099, 0.0789, 0.0658, respectively, and eight of the 
nine models demonstrated overall improvement compared to using models built with the 
components from the a priori features. The effect of the feature transformation with PCA 
is shown in Figure 7-8, with full results shown in Appendix D. 
 
 
Fig. 7-8. Discovered features out-performed a priori features  



































 Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation 
 We tuned the best performing model in each scenario built from an 80:20 split of 
train to test data (no sampling, over-sampling, under-sampling, FT w/FS, and FT 
w/PCA). In this section, we compare the results of the tuned models to their respective 
non-tuned counterparts. With tuning, only one of the models built with the 34 discovered 
features achieved a higher MCC, and the average MCC of the tuned models was 0.004 
less than the average MCC of the non-tuned models. When performing hyperparameter 
tuning and cross-validation on the models built from 99 a priori features, we observed 
that the average MCC improved by 0.007 compared to the non-tuned models and all five 
of the best performing models improved. 
 For further assurance that our results were not a product of our initial 80:20 
split, we repeated our approach with a 70:30 split of training to testing data. We observed 
that the average MCC increased by 0.011 when tuning, and four of the five best 
performing models improved when tuning models built with the 34 discovered features 
compared to their non-tuned counterparts. When performing hyperparameter tuning and 
cross-validation on the models built from 99 a priori features, we observed that the 
average MCC improved by 0.011, and all five of the best performing models improved. 
Full results are available in Table 7-3 which show the model used, scenario, MCC, and 
scoring metric used during tuning achieve the respective MCC. Results from the a priori 






Table 7-3.  
Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation  
Slightly Improved Detection Performance for  
Discovered and A Priori Features 
Cross-Validation and Tuning for A Priori / Discovered 
Model Scenario - Split MCC Scoring Metric 
BC 
RF 






































































We then performed hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation of the voting 
classifier. Full results for each scenario are shown in Table 7-4. 
 
Table 7-4.  
Hyperparameter Tuning and Cross-Validation Slightly  
Improved Detection Performance for Discovered and  
A Priori Features 
MCC of Tuned Voting Classifier in Different Scenarios 
Scenario No Over Under FT w/ FS FT w/ PCA 
70/30 Discovered 0.9144 0.9066 0.8231 0.8966 0.2406 
70/30 Prior 0.9281 0.9192 0.8375 0.8911 -0.4314 
80/20 Discovered 0.9174 0.9071 0.8177 0.8973 -0.0275 
80/20 Prior 0.9264 0.9226 0.8295 0.8884 -0.3831 
 
 
Hyperparameter tuning and cross-validation showed that the default parameters 
for all models, except the voting classifier, performed similarly to the tuned classifiers. 




We observed that while the discovered features performed better with default parameters, 
they performed slightly worse during hyperparameter tuning. 
 RQ5: Is Feature Discovery Feasible for Malicious Website Detection? 
In RQ5 we examined the detection ability of discovered features. With the 
discovered features we can obtain a best classifier performance of an MCC 0.7043 using 
unsupervised learning techniques, and 0.9174 using supervised learning techniques. The 
unsupervised results were not promising however unsupervised techniques are not as 
common for detecting malicious websites (except for C2 traffic). The supervised results 
suggested that a discovery approach can be used however, for further insight into their 
feasibility, we need to compare our approach and results with prior research that uses the 
notion of a priori features.  
Ma in [35] leveraged URL and host-based (DNS queries, WHOIS properties, and 
geographic information) and incorporated online learning in [36]-[37] and an SVM 
classifier to identify malicious URLs. Ma used strictly URL and host-based features. We 
both investigated different training scenarios however Ma focused on training an SVM 
several times with online learning while we focused on sampling, feature transformation, 
and evaluated nine different algorithms. Additionally, we both accepted our malicious 
dataset from external parties though their dataset consisted of millions of URLs while 
ours included ~47000 entries. Given the design of our experiments we also quantified 
best-case performance differently – Ma with error rate (best-case 2.6%) while we focused 
on MCC (best-case 0.9174) due to our dataset imbalance. Whittaker [42] also took an 
online approach and trained and evaluated an LR classifier on millions of webpages (with 




between precision and recall with their best performance being a precision and recall over 
0.95 respectively. Prophiler [45] also focused on classifying a large number of malicious 
webpages with an evaluation dataset of almost 19 million webpages and achieved a false 
positive and false negative rate of 9.88% and 0.77% with HTML, JavaScript, URL, and 
host features. They used naïve Bayes, random forest, logistic regression, and other 
decision tree algorithms. 
CANTINA+[46], like us, extracted webpage features and investigated several 
learning algorithms -support vector machines, logistic regression, Bayesian networks, J48 
decision tree, random forest, and adaboost. Unlike us and like Ma, they relied on external 
sources (for example Page Rank) for features which differed from our approach of only 
using web response features. Their study included two phishing sets of 1,595 and 624 
webpages respectively. They achieved a true positive and false positive rate of 4.24% and 
1.948% respectively. 
Marchal [91] detected phishing with a GB (provided by Scikit Learn) classifier 
with high performance metrics (an AUC up to 0.999 compared to our AUC of 0.9464) 
and differentiated themselves by detecting phishing webpages in different languages. 
They selected 212 features (including the URL and webpage content) for detection, many 
of which overlap with other prior works. Their dataset consisted of 150,000 legitimate 
phishing URLS and 3,366 phishing URLs. Like our study, they performed cross-
validation. 
Phishmon [83] achieved an accuracy of 95.4% (compared to our accuracy of 
98.38%) with a false positive rate of 1.3% on a dataset of 17,508 legitimate and 4,807 




incorporated all HTTP headers in conjunction with webpage content features for 
detection. They used four different classifiers (classification and regression trees, k 
nearest neighbor, adaboost, and random forest) and provided a notion of feature 
importance. 
BINSPECT [47] who has a similar approach (aside from feature discovery) to our 
own used several machine learning classifiers (J48, random tree, random forest, naïve 
bayes, bayesian networks, support vector machine, and logistic regression) and some of 
our discovered features overlap with their features. However, our study discovered all our 
features and did not require external sources such as search engine results. We also 
differed in that our dataset contained C2 URLs while theirs did not. Our accuracies were 
similar – their accuracy is 97.81% compared to our accuracy of 98.38%. In addition, we 
observed that 22 of the 34 features discovered have been used in prior research. 
Additionally, most of the features in the discovered list have some known association 
with attacks or malicious techniques. Cova [65] leveraged a priori features that can 
identify malicious or suspicious JavaScript and anomaly detection to create JSAND. 
They evaluated their approach on 823 samples from four different data sources and 
achieved a false negative rate of 0.2%. Xu [49] took the closet approach to our own 
regarding the features for detection. However, they also included other features like 
network traffic summaries, which required additional overhead, and they performed 
feature selection from their a priori features for detection. Their approach evaluated four 
different classification algorithms - naïve Bayes, logistic regression, support vector 
machines, and J48 and achieved a best-case 99.986% accuracy and they noted the five 




Basnet [50] used correlation-based feature selection and wrapper feature selection 
to find relevant features among 177 URL, webpage content, and search engine features 
along with a naïve Bayes, logistic regression, and random forest classifier. They observed 
wrapper-based feature selection techniques could improve false negative rates by 44.5% 
while we found that feature selection generally decreased classifier performance. Li 
[218], like our study, performed feature transformation during their detection of 
malicious URLs and did so on seven domain-based, 21 host-based, six reputation-based, 
and 28 lexical features. Their goal was to demonstrate the benefit of feature 
transformation when used with different algorithms and noted that feature engineering 
improved detection rates from 68% to 86%, 58% to 81% and 63% to 82% for KNN, 
SVM, and NNs classifiers respectively. Their best accuracy was measured at 97.80%. 
There are similarities are well as differences between our approach and results 
from those of prior research. First, we note that our results are comparable (and often 
better) than those from prior research however true comparison is difficult. Marchal [91]  
and Xu [49] have achieved highly accurate results with a priori features however this was 
done on phishing alone in the case of Marchal, and with additional features like network 
traffic statistics as in the case of Xu. Marchal and Xu provided better results than any 
prior research we have encountered. Second, we observed that features derived from a 
web response are simpler to gather. Page rank, WHOIS information, network traffic 
statistics all require additional instrumentation and overhead. Based on our detection 
metrics as well as on comparisons to prior research, we postulate that feature discovery is 




 RQ6: How do Discovered Features’ Detection Ability Compare to Those 
from Prior Research? 
With RQ6, we compared the ability of the a priori features from prior research to 
the ability of those found via our discovery approach. In the sampling scenarios, we saw 
little change in detection performance when using discovered features versus a priori 
features. However, we did obtain similar detection metrics with fewer features. With 
feature transformation, the discovered features outperformed the a priori features. Hence, 
we postulated that discovered features can be used to create better transformed features 
for detection and also require fewer features for detection. During tuning of the models, 
we noted that the a priori features slightly outperformed the discovered features. Thus, 
we answered RQ6 in a mixed fashion. The discovered features performed nearly as well 
as the a priori features, with slight differences depending on the scenario, but they did so 
with fewer features.  
 RQ7: Can a Discovery Approach be Applied to Several Threats when Only 
Features from a Web Response are Available? 
With RQ7, we explored whether the discovery approach can be applied to a set of 
several threats with a limited number of features (those that can be gathered from the 
response to web request). We designed our experiment to simulate the real-world 
constraints by using a dataset consisting of several threats and by leveraging techniques 
from prior research. Our limited insight into these threats (we did not hand select them 
nor were they homogenous) also simulated real-world constraints. In addition, we 
included C2 URLs in our dataset, an element that is often not absent from other studies 




further into the performance metrics. Overall, our ACC, AUC, and MCC performed well 
and were comparable to (and sometimes exceeded) the accuracy of other approaches. 
However, our findings do suggest that this approach alone is not enough. To further 
examine whether this approach can be a supplement to other detection capabilities, we 
examined the FPR of our models since a large number of false positives [240] poses a 
challenge for practical detection solutions. The FPR of our best performing model in the 
no-sampling scenario was 0.3% (the tuned voting classifier) and our worst performing 
classifier in the no-sampling case (AB) had an FPR of 1.326% which bodes well for 
inclusion into a practical solution. Furthermore, the features extracted in this approach 
can be extracted from a web request response and can be added to other security 
solutions. As a result, we postulated that a discovery approach, while not sufficient in 
isolation, can be used as a supplement to other detection techniques. 
 Conclusions 
We performed a comprehensive evaluation of discovering features for malicious 
website detection. We built two unsupervised learning models and nine supervised 
detection models over various sampling and feature transformation scenarios. Based on 
our study, we postulated that discovering features (versus selecting features a priori) was 
feasible and performed nearly as well as the features from prior research, but did so with 





Chapter 8: Evaluation on an Additional Dataset  
 Introduction 
Feature-based malicious website detection has shown promise in prior research as 
well in our studies (see Chapters 4–7). Thus far, our experiments gathered a dataset 
(Dataset 1) and split it into two portions – a training portion and a testing portion. We 
were able to achieve high performance metrics in Chapter 7, with MCCs of up to 0.9281 
but we performed our study on a single dataset that was created from a single point in 
time. Although this approach is common, it leads to a lack of insight into how the models 
built (and their features) would perform on additional datasets that may have been 
gathered at another point in time. In an operational scenario, a detection model must work 
on different datasets regardless of time of collection or dataset source. Using a single 
dataset for training and testing provided limited intuition regarding the feasibility of 
training models using features and applying it to an operational scenario.  
In this chapter, we explore the application of the models and features identified in 
Chapters 4–7 to a different dataset. This new dataset (Dataset 2) differs from the dataset 
used in Chapters 4–7 in three ways: 1) the benign portion consists of more entries, 2) the 
malicious dataset is derived from another source, and 3) the dataset was collected at a 
different point in time. The first dataset, referred to as Dataset 1 and used in Chapters 4–
7, consisted of domains gathered from the top 39,877 websites in the Alexa Top 1M and 
6,894 websites provided by Cisco Talos. We collected Dataset 1 in August of 2018. The 
second dataset, referred to as Dataset 2, consisted of websites from the Alexa Top 1M 
collected four months later in December of 2018. We segmented this dataset into two 




dataset, we grouped those websites in the Alexa Top 1M that appeared in threat 
intelligence information from Cymon.io [193]. We created the benign dataset from 
websites in the Alexa Topo 1M that did not appear in the Cymon.io threat intelligence 
information. Throughout this chapter, we report the various experiments performed on 
Dataset 2 with the goal of better understanding how the models and features discovered 
in Chapters 4–7 would perform on an additional dataset. In this portion of the study, we 
made the following contributions: 
• We demonstrated that the 34 features identified in Chapter 7 served as a 
foundation for detection, but required adjustments in order to be effective; 
• We compared features for detection over two datasets gathered from different 
sources at different points in time; and 
• We identified two additional features that greatly improved detection on 
another dataset. 
 Related Research 
Ma et al. [35] used two different benign sources (Yahoo! and DMOZ) and two 
different malicious sources (PhishTank and Spamscatter). From the benign and malicious 
datasets, the authors created four datasets in which the benign and malicious dataset 
combinations were Yahoo-PhishTank, Yahoo-Spamscatter, DMOZ-PhishTank, and 
DMOZ-Spamscatter. They trained an LR classifier on each set and evaluated the model 
on each set. They received low error rates (0.9%, 1.24%, 1%, and 3.01%) when training 
and testing on the same dataset, but observed error rates of up to 44% when training and 
evaluating on a different dataset. They repeated this approach of training and evaluating 




accomplished a similar goal in their evaluation. They trained their models on two known 
datasets: 1) “known-good,” consisting of webpages from Google, Yahoo, and Alexa with 
malicious websites removed; and 2) “known-bad,” consisting of URLs from datasets used 
in prior research (spam trap, SQL injection, malware forum, and wepawet). Although 
they did not focus on evaluating a separate dataset, they identified 137 URLs as 
malicious (on the separate dataset), with 15 being false positives. Le et al. [63] trained 
their detection mechanism on a group of malicious websites and evaluated them on 
another set of benign websites and malicious websites. Blum et al. [38] trained their 
models on University of Alabama phishing websites and evaluated them on other feeds 
from Cyveillance, observing error rates as high as 30% when the training sets and testing 
set were from different sources. Researchers [160] also provided a training and testing 
dataset from different sources.  
He et al. [43] built their dataset with the combination of websites from multiple 
sources – Alexa, 3Sharp, and Phishtank – but they evaluated their detector on two 
datasets. They derived the datasets from the same source, but collected them at different 
points in time. They observed that their detector performed well, with a TPR of 97% and 
FPR of 4%. CANTINA+ authors [46] conducted several experiments on phishing 
webpages, including collecting two datasets of phishing websites from the same source, 
achieving a TPR of 93.47% and FPR of 0.608%.  
Prior researchers have reported mixed results. Some have observed similar 
performance when applying their methods to other datasets (either gathered from a 
different source or collected at a different point in time), while others have seen 




decreased when researchers trained and tested on datasets composed of different threats 
([35], for example), while researchers tended to report consistent performance when 
focused on detecting one type of threat. Secondly, we observed that researchers were 
more likely to show consistent performance when data collections occurred closer in time 
(authors [45] with Prophiler, for example). Based on these observations, we analyzed our 
detection performance on an additional dataset. 
 Research Questions 
In this section we list the research questions addressed in Chapter 8 
 Research Question 8 
With this research question, we explored the ability to apply models built from 
data derived from one dataset to models built from data derived from another dataset. To 
that end, we examined the performance of the best-performing RF model (built from 34 
features as detailed in Chapter 7 and trained on Dataset 1) when evaluated on Dataset 2. 
We stated RQ8 as follows:  
RQ8:  How robust are malicious website detection models when applied to a new 
dataset? 
 Research Question 9 
We crafted this research question to guide our investigation into the effectiveness 
of the features identified in Chapter 7 and their ability to detect malicious websites on a 
new dataset. We used a series of feature selection techniques to identify the features 
noted in Chapter 7, some of which had been used in prior research, while others had not. 
We re-trained models on our new dataset, but limited our features to the 34 identified in 




from our previous work and determined whether they could be applied to additional 
datasets. RQ9 is stated as follows: 
RQ9:  How do the features identified perform on a new dataset? 
 Research Question 10 
Although we evaluated the features identified in Chapter 7 and the robustness of 
the model built in Chapter 7, here we investigated how we could leverage on a new 
dataset other aspects of the experiment results reported in Chapters 4–7. We aimed to 
identify which aspects, if any, from our prior experiments could be leveraged on this new 
dataset. RQ10 is stated as follows: 
RQ10:  What aspects from prior experiments can we apply to a new dataset? 
 Feature Consideration, Dataset, Analysis Approach 
 Feature Consideration 
In Chapter 7, we captured the performance of our detection models constructed 
with 34 features that we identified through feature selection and with 99 features gathered 
from prior research. In this chapter, we focus on the 34 features identified in Chapter 7 
(referred to as the “identified features”), but expand our analysis to the 99 features 
gathered from prior research and reported in Chapter 7 (referred to as the “prior 
features”), as well as to 288 additional features (referred to as the “features after the first 
feature-selection step”). As reported in Chapter 7, we obtained these 288 features by 
dropping from our dataset those features that were consistent at least 95% of the time and 
by dropping from our dataset those features with high VIF values before application of 





In the study portion reported in this chapter, we continued to make use of Dataset 
1, though we focused our evaluations on a Dataset 2 consisting of the Alexa Top 1M 
websites. We selected as malicious websites those from the Alexa Top 1M that were 
found in threat intelligence data provided by Cymon.io [193]. For benign websites, we 
chose those that appeared in the Alexa Top 1M but did not appear in the Cymon.io threat 
intelligence information. For clarity, we refer to the dataset used in Chapters 4–7 as 
Dataset 1 and to the new dataset of Alexa/Cymon.io websites as Dataset 2. 
 Analysis Approach 
To explore additional (and larger) datasets, it was necessary for us to perform 
analysis more efficiently than we had performed the analysis in previous portions of our 
inquiry. Thus, we narrowed our focus to an RF classifier, which had proven to be the 
among best performing classifiers in our prior studies and performed well in related 
research as well. Additionally, we leveraged the class weight parameter available in 
the SciKit library, which can be an alternative to over-sampling and under-sampling.  
 Results 
 RQ8: How Robust are Malicious Website Detection Models when Applied to 
a New Dataset? 
We began our investigation by applying to Dataset 2 the RF model built in the no-
sampling scenario with the 34 features in Table 7-1.  
8.5.1.1 Evaluation on Previous Models 
First, we evaluated the performance on the new dataset of our best-performing 




identified in Chapter 7. Table 8-1 below shows the performance of the RF model on 
Dataset 2, the new dataset of Alexa Top 1M with Cymon.io [193] threat intelligence data 
as ground truth. 
 
Table 8-1.  
Applying the Best Random Forest Classifier Built in Chapter 7  
from Dataset 1 to Dataset 2 Yielded Poor Detection Results 
Detecting Malicious Websites in Dataset 2 with a Model Built with Dataset 1 
FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
0.5599 0.4846 0.4432 0.4778 -0.0179 0.0384 0.5154 
 
 
As shown in Table 8-1, results demonstrated poor metrics and an inability to 
classify the new dataset. This observation was similar to that made by Ma et al. [35], who 
observed high errors when training and testing datasets from different sources. This 
observation prompted further investigation into the datasets and potential causes. 
However, from the results in Table 8-1, we observed that we could not directly apply the 
model derived from Dataset 1 to Dataset 2. 
8.5.1.2 Feature Correlation Investigation 
To investigate potential causes for the poor performance of our model, we began 
to examine Dataset 2 and compare it to Dataset 1. We first analyzed the correlation of 
each variable to the target variable (whether the website is malicious) in order to 
determine whether there were differences between the respective correlations for the 
features in Dataset 1 and Dataset 2. We did this on three different sets: the 34 features 
identified by our research and reported in Chapter 7; the 99 features gathered from prior 
research and reported in Chapter 7; and the 288 features remaining after removing 
features that were consistent at least 95% of the time and that had high VIF values before 




feature sets, we gained insight into whether there were additional features that had high 
correlation with the target variable, in case they were applicable to Dataset 1 but not to 
Dataset 2 or vice versa. Tables 8-2 and 8-3 show the correlation values for the 34 features 
and the 99 features on Dataset 1 and Dataset 2. Table D-1 in Appendix D shows the 
correlation values for the 288 features on Dataset 1 and Dataset 2. 
 
Table 8-2.  
The 34 Features Identified for Detection in  
Chapter 7 Had Different Correlation Values  
for Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 
Correlation with Maliciousness for Identified on Datasets 1 and 2 
Feature Dataset 1 Dataset 2 
URL Length 0.5245 0.0188 
Count of ‘.’ character 0.5078 0.0159 
Total Extensions in URL 0.4672 0.0006 
content-encoding gzip 0.4350 0.0027 
Count of ‘w’ character 0.3821 0.0022 
Count of ‘z’ character 0.3129 0.0074 
Count of ‘y’ character 0.2854 0.0103 
transfer-encoding chunked 0.2797 0.0102 
Count of ‘i’ character 0.2566 0.0096 
Total HTML Tags 0.2370 0.0007 
<script async=”true”> 0.2170 0.0100 
Total href attributes 0.1946 0.0001 
cache-control max-age 0.1934 0.0108 
Count of ‘l’ character 0.1934 0.0101 
Count of <a> tag 0.1867 0.0009 
<link href> relative 0.1857 0.0009 
<link href> OoD 0.1822 0.0173 
<a href> OoD 0.1748 0.0019 
<link type=”text/css”> 0.1704 0.0148 
Count of ‘f’ character 0.1655 0.0057 
Count of ‘p’ character 0.1493 0.0055 
<a href=”https*”> 0.1490 0.0041 
<iframe src=”*..html”> 0.1221 0.0046 
url extension is .com 0.1415 0.0205 
via 1.1 0.1085 0.0135 
Count of <p> tag 0.1048 0.0032 
Count of <meta> tag 0.1008 0.0103 
<a href=”http*”> 0.0995 0.0062 
<form action=”http*”> 0.0832 0.0045 
server apache 0.0745 0.0043 
<img src=“http*”> 0.0708 0.0095 
push() 0.0471 0.0008 
Count of <center> tag 0.0335 0.0035 







Table 8-3.  
The 99 Features from Prior Research Had Different Correlation Values  






Table D-1 in Appendix D shows that the count of “-“ characters had high 
correlation with the target variable. From Tables 8-2 and 8-3, we observe that the features 
that have high correlation with the target variable in Dataset 1 no longer have a high 
correlation with the target variable in Dataset 2. This suggests there are differences 
between these datasets and this is one potential cause for the poor performance. We did 
notice however, that counts of the “-“ had high correlation (0.3660) in Table D-1 
(Appendix D). This observation is noted for the remainder of this experiment. 
8.5.1.3 T-SNE Analysis 
Given the poor results in Table 8-1, we also analyzed the distribution of features. 
We analyzed the distribution of the 34 features used to build the model, the 99 features 
gathered from prior research, and the set of 288 features remaining after removal of 
consistent features and high-VIF features. We applied t-distributed stochastics neighbor 
embedding (t-SNE) [241] (a non-linear, dimensionality-reduction technique that helps 
visualize high-dimensional data) on the 34 features and on each individual feature 
category. We used t-SNE, an exploratory analysis technique, to visually compare the 
features from both sets. We took a sample of 5,000 websites from both datasets in each 






Fig. 8-1.    T-SNE analysis performed on the features identified in Chapter 7 from a sample of 5,000 
websites from Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 showed no clusters for malicious websites 
 
 
We then separately performed t-SNE on the webpage content, URL, and HTTP 
header features. Results are shown in Figure 8-2, Figure 8-3, and Figure 8-4 below. 
 
 
Fig. 8-2.    T-SNE analysis performed on the webpage content features collected  
in Chapter 4 from a sample of 5,000 websites from Dataset 1 and Dataset 2  






Fig. 8-3.    T-SNE analysis performed on the URL features collected  
in Chapter 5 from a sample of 5,000 websites from Dataset 1 and  




Fig. 8-4.    T-SNE analysis performed on the HTTP header features collected  
in Chapter 6 from a sample of 5,000 websites from Dataset 1 and Dataset 2  
showed no clusters for malicious websites 
 
 
We did not observe any clusters for the malicious websites in Figures 8-1 and 8-2, 




present from Dataset 2. Additionally, we observed that URL features (see Chapter 5) 
produced higher accuracies compared to the other features. We also observed a small 
cluster in Dataset 1 (see Figure 8-4). These are additional potential explanations for the 
failure of the model from Chapter 7 to detect malicious websites in Dataset 2.  
8.5.1.4 Statistical Tests on Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 
We then performed further statistical tests to probe the differences between 
Dataset 1 and Dataset 2. First, we performed a two-sample KS test [197] to determine 
whether the 34 features from Datasets 1 and 2 were from the same distribution. The test 





Table 8-4.  
The KS Statistics for the Identified Features  
from Chapter 7 for Dataset 1 and Dataset 2  
Demonstrated that the Identified Features Were  
Not from the Same Distribution 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic for the Features Identified in 
Chapter 7 
Feature statistic p-value 
URL Length 0.1622 0 
<link type=”text/css”> 0.1455 0 
server apache 0.1176 0 
<a href> relative 0.116 0 
Count of <a> tag 0.1148 0 
Total HTML Tags 0.1118 0 
<a href> OoD 0.1102 0 
<iframe src=”*..html”> 0.1079 0 
push() 0.1054 0 
<img src=”http*”> 0.1012 0 
<script async=”true”> 0.0967 1.37E-305 
Total HTML Tags 0.0942 1.87E-289 
<a href=”https*”> 0.089 1.84E-258 
Count of <meta> tag 0.0859 5.84E-241 
Count of <p> tag 0.0845 4.83E-233 
<link href> OoD 0.084 2.10E-230 
Count of ‘l’ character 0.0792 8.19E-205 
Count of ‘i’ character 0.0611 3.33E-122 
<a href=”http*”> 0.0525 1.76E-90 
via 1.1 0.0421 2.18E-58 
<form action=”http*”> 0.0372 1.58E-45 
content-encoding gzip 0.0324 8.81E-35 
vary user-agent 0.0316 3.82E-33 
Count of ‘p’ character 0.0273 8.39E-25 
Count of ‘w’ character 0.0242 1.26E-19 
cache-control max-age 0.0242 1.58E-19 
Count of ‘z’ character 0.0235 1.82E-18 
url extension is .com 0.0217 8.33E-16 
Total Extensions in URL 0.0204 5.52E-14 
transfer-encoding chunked 0.0169 8.30E-10 
Count of ‘.’ character 0.0161 6.88E-09 
Count of ‘y’ character 0.0065 0.0802 
Count of ‘f’ character 0.0065 0.0839 
Count of <center> tag 0.0047 0.3592 
 
 
The KS statistic, sometimes referred to as the D value, is the max distance 
between the two samples (the supremum). The null hypothesis stated that there was no 










α 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005 0.001 
c(α) 1.22 1.36 1.48 1.63 1.73 1.95 
 
 
Generally speaking, one can reject the null hypothesis  < 0.05, which makes D = 
0.007643 for our sample sizes m = 817,130 and n = 39,183. For all of the features except 
for the counts of the characters “y” and “f” and the count of the <center> element, we 
can reject the null hypothesis. Additionally, we observed small p-values except for the 
count of <center> elements, which is further evidence that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis for this feature. This served as further evidence that Datasets 1 and 2 were not 
from the same population. 
We then investigated the association between categorial features (those present in 
the HTTP header features) by calculating Pearson’s chi square of association [242] and 
Cramer’s phi [243] on the features from Datasets 1 and 2. Results are shown in Table 8-5. 
 
Table 8-5.  
Pearson's Chi Square and Cramer's Phi Showed that the Categorical  
Features Had Different Levels of Association with Maliciousness for  
Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 
Association between respective features and maliciousness for HTTP columns for Dataset 1 / 2 
Features Pearson Chi-square Cramer's phi p-value 
cache-control set max-age 1466.8135 / 102.8165 0.1935 / 0.0109 0 / 0 
content-encoding gzip 7416.1314 / 6.7207 0.4351 / 0.0028 0 / 0.0095 
server apache 217.9999 /16.2768 0.0746 / 0.0043 0 / 0.0001 
transfer-encoding chunked 3066.5364 / 92.4559 0.2798 / 0.0103 0 / 0 
vary user-agent 20.1741 / 60.374 0.0227 / 0.0083 0 / 0 
via 1.1 461.5291 / 159.1664 0.1085 / 0.0135 0 / 0 
 
 
In Table 8-5, we first noticed large differences in Pearson’s chi-squared value 
calculated on Dataset 1 compared to those calculated on Dataset 2, which suggested that 




also observed a difference in Cramer’s phi (with 1 indicating total association and 0 
indicating no association) between the respective datasets; specifically, the respective 
features for training and testing had a higher association in Dataset 1 than Dataset 2. This 
illustrated another difference between our two datasets. The p-value was low, indicating a 
significant result. 
We observed that our best performing model from Chapter 7 was unable to 
accurately detect malicious websites in our new dataset. Upon further investigation, 
however, we observed various differences in the respective datasets that helped to explain 
this observation. However, for RQ8, we observed that we could not apply our best model 
to another dataset with success. 
 RQ9: How do the Features Identified Perform on a New Dataset? 
Dataset 2 (the Alexa Top 1M with Cymon.io data) differed from Dataset 1 (the 
Alexa with Cisco Talos data) in several ways. First, Dataset 2 was much larger than 
Dataset 1 (approximately one million websites and approximately 47k websites, 
respectively). Secondly, the malicious websites from Dataset 2 were gathered from threat 
intelligence instead of from a security vendor. Thirdly, the two datasets were collected at 
different points in time. Thus, they were ultimately different datasets. In RQ8, we 
observed that we could not directly apply a detection model built in Chapter 7 to the 
Dataset 2. However, we still needed to investigate whether the features identified in 
Chapter 7 could successfully build detection models on this new dataset. With this 
research question, then, we explored how well the features from our prior models 




8.5.2.1 Retraining for Malicious Website Detection 
We first explored building detection models on our second dataset, but with 
features identified in Chapter 7. We split our data into training and testing data and used 
the 34 features identified in Chapter 7, the 99 features gathered from prior research, and 
the 288 features achieved by dropping from our dataset those features that were 
consistent at least 95% of the time and by dropping from our dataset those features with 
high VIF values. Results are shown in Table 8-6 below. 
 
Table 8-6.  
Retraining on the New Dataset 2 Slightly Improved Detection Ability,  
But Was Not Sufficient 
Performance when Training a Random Forest Classifier on Dataset 2 with Features from Dataset 1 
Features FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
34 Identified in Ch7 0.0001 0.9905 0.9587 0.5046 0.0827 0.7741 0.0094 
99 from Prior Research 0.0007 0.9704 0.9582 0.5143 0.1315 0.6419 0.0295 
288 After First Feature Selection Step 0.0038 0.9117 0.9584 0.5422 0.1968 0.4972 0.0883 
 
 
We saw slightly better results for the 34 features than for the random forest 
classifier in Table 8-1, with Table 8-6 showing an increase in MCC as we went from 34 
features, to 99 features, and then to 288 features. However, we observed that we could 
not simply re-train our model on that new dataset “as is” and that considering additional 
features could be warranted. 
8.5.2.2 Investigating Additional Features  
In prior experiments, we noted the ability of the 34 features to detect malicious 
websites, though in the previous step we observed that the 34 features did not perform 
well even when we re-trained our models on the new dataset (though re-training did show 
improvement over using the model from Chapter 7 “as is”). It was possible, then, that 




During our exploration, we identified two features that might show promise – the 
number of special URL characters and the number of “-“ characters. To gain further 
assurance regarding the promise of those two features, we first measured the correlation 
(Pearson’s correlation coefficient) of the respective feature with the target variable 
(whether the website was malicious). Full results are show in Table 8-7 below.  
 
Table 8-7.  
Pearson's Correlation Between Features  
and Maliciousness in Dataset 2 Suggested  
Ability of Two New Features for Detection 
Correlation Values for Features in Dataset 2 
Features Correlation 
Count of ‘-’ character 0.3660 
Number of Special Chars in URL 0.2456 
Count of 4-character words 0.0314 
Total TLDs in URL 0.0303 
URL extension is “.c” 0.0277 
Count of ‘a’ character 0.0262 
URL TLD “co” Count 0.0257 
<link href=”https*”> 0.0252 
<link rel=https://api.w.org/*> 0.0248 
<link type=”application/rsd+xml”> 0.0245 
<link rel=”EditURI”> 0.0245 




<link rel=”shortlink”> 0.0243 
<link rel=”canonical”> 0.024 
<meta http-equiv=”content-type”> 0.0234 
<meta http-equiv=”Content-Type“> 0.0234 
<link rel=”dns-prefetch”> 0.0219 
server nginx 0.0219 
URL extension ”.com” 0.0205 
URL TLD “com” 0.0205 






In Table 8-7, we observed that the correlation value between these two new 
features was considerably higher than the rest of the features we had identified thus far. 
This suggested that we might want to consider using them. 
8.5.2.3 Varying Ratios of Training to Testing Data  
Since we had identified additional features that might improve our detection 
capability, we now rebuilt our RF model with these two features. Additionally, we varied 
the train-to-test ratio (see Table 8-8 below). We tuned the model parameters with an F1 
scoring metric. 
 
Table 8-8.  
Incorporating Two Additional Features Greatly Improved  
Detection Ability 
Performance when Retraining a Random Forest Classifier on Dataset 2 with 
Identified +2 Features with Various Training: Testing Ratios 
Training : 
Testing FPR FNR Acc AUC MCC Prec Rec 
70% : 30% 0.0772 0.2151 0.9174 0.8549 0.4591 0.3067 0.7868 
60% : 40% 0.0774 0.2127 0.9169 0.8537 0.4574 0.3058 0.7848 
50% : 50% 0.0774 0.2116 0.9146 0.8521 0.4512 0.2991 0.7839 
40% : 60% 0.0778 0.2105 0.9170 0.8554 0.4589 0.3061 0.7883 
30% : 70% 0.0620 0.2724 0.9145 0.8518 0.4508 0.3052 0.7894 
20% : 80% 0.0783 0.2128 0.9160 0.8544 0.4562 0.3036 0.7871 
10% : 90% 0.0791 0.2121 0.9153 0.8543 0.4544 0.3012 0.7878 
 
 
After incorporating the two additional features, we saw a large performance 
increase that was consistent across Dataset 2. From this observation, we postulated that 
the features from Chapter 7 remained relevant, though some slight modifications would 
need to be made in order to improve malicious website detection. 
8.5.2.4 Identifying Training to Testing Ratio 
We had observed that the addition of the two features – the number of special 
characters and the number of “-“ characters – improved malicious website detection. We 




ratio. As a result, we further investigated how much training data was actually needed to 
build the models thus far. Results are shown below in Table 8-9. We tuned the model 
parameters and also performed grid search on the class weight parameter of the 
Scikit-Learn [29]. In Table 8-9 below, we report that we received consistent results 
even when we used just 3% of the data for training. 
 
Table 8-9.  
Detection Performance When Incorporating Two Additional Features Remained Consistent with 3% of 
Data Used for Training 
Performance when Retraining and Tuning a Random Forest Classifier on Dataset 2 with Identified +2 Features with 
Lower Training Ratios 
Train: 
Test Split FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
Grid Search of 
Class Weight 
0.05:0.95 0.0796 0.2160 0.9146 0.8521 0.4512 0.2991 0.7839 No 
0.03:0.97 0.0797 0.2165 0.9145 0.8518 0.4508 0.2989 0.7834 No 
0.03:0.97 0.0747 0.2312 0.9187 0.8470 0.4548 0.3087 0.7687 Yes 
 
 
In RQ9, we observed how well the features identified in Chapter 7 performed on a 
new dataset. Alone, and even with re-training, the 34 features did not demonstrate the 
ability to detect malicious websites. Upon further investigation, however, we identified 
two additional features that greatly complemented the detection ability of the 34 
identified features. As such, we observed that we could reuse the features from our 
previous studies, though we also needed to investigate potential additions.  
 RQ10: What Aspects from Prior Experiments Can We Apply to Our New 
Dataset? 
In RQ8, we observed that our best performing models from Chapter 7 did not 
perform well on the new dataset. However, we did observe differences in the respective 
training and evaluation datasets. With RQ10, we investigated the impact of using aspects 




8.5.3.1 Training Dataset Evaluation 
For the first step, we trained the models with both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 and 
evaluated the models using Dataset 2. Results appear in Table 8-10 below. 
 
Table 8-10. 
Incorporating Dataset 2 Into Training Did Not Improve Detection Ability  
on Dataset 2 When Using Identified Features 
Performance when Training a Random Forest Classifier with Identified on Dataset 1 and 2 and 
Evaluating on Dataset 2 with 34 Identified Features 
Fraction of Dataset 1: 
Fraction of Dataset 2 FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
0.8 Dataset 1: 0.01 Dataset2 0.6536 0.3917 0.3572 0.4773 -0.0189 0.0387 0.6082 
0.8 Dataset 1: 0.05 Dataset2 0.7293 0.3129 0.2879 0.4788 -0.0189 0.0392 0.6870 
0.8 Dataset 1: 0.1 Dataset2 0.7094 0.3350 0.3060 0.4777 -0.0195 0.0390 0.6649 
0.8 Dataset 1: 0.2 Dataset2 0.7221 0.3196 0.2946 0.4791 -0.0185 0.0392 0.6803 
0.8 Dataset 1: 0.3 Dataset2 0.7366 0.2991 0.2815 0.4820 -0.0162 0.0395 0.7008 
0.8 Dataset 1: 0.4 Dataset2 0.7138 0.3204 0.3024 0.4828 -0.0151 0.0396 0.6795 
0.8 Dataset 1: 0.5 Dataset2 0.6357 0.4109 0.3735 0.4766 -0.0193 0.0386 0.5890 
 
In Table 8-10, we see that models trained with Datasets 1 and 2 were unsuccessful 
at detecting malicious websites in Dataset 2. Therefore, we investigated whether we 
could incorporate new data into the training of our models to detect threats from Dataset 
1 as well as Dataset 2. We did this on the set of 34 features as well as on the set of 99 
features gathered from prior research. We also varied the train to test split by training on 
20%, 30%,..,70% and evaluating on 80%, 70%,..,30% respectively. 
 
Table 8-11.  
Training Models with Both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 Slightly Improved Detection  
on Both Datasets When Using Identified Features 
Performance with Identified Features When Training Using Dataset 1 and 2 and Testing on Dataset 1 and 2 
Train / Test Split FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
20:80 0.0014 0.9211 0.9574 0.5387 0.2292 0.7199 0.0788 
30:70 0.0013 0.9183 0.9576 0.5401 0.2368 0.73967 0.0816 
40:60 0.0013 0.9162 0.9576 0.5411 0.2403 0.74231 0.0837 
50:50 0.0013 0.9121 0.9580 0.5432 0.2468 0.74524 0.0878 
60:40 0.0014 0.9114 0.9583 0.5435 0.2461 0.7360 0.0885 






Table 8-12.  
Training Models with Both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 Slightly Improved  
Detection on Both Datasets When Using Features from Prior Research 
Performance when Training a Random Forest Classifier with Prior Features Using Dataset 
1 and 2 and Testing on Dataset 1 and 2 
Train / Test Split FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
20:80 0.0008 0.9190 0.9578 0.5401 0.2489 0.8153 0.0809 
30:70 0.0008 0.9160 0.9579 0.5415 0.2537 0.8172 0.0839 
40:60 0.0009 0.9082 0.9580 0.5454 0.2647 0.8131 0.0917 
50:50 0.0010 0.9072 0.9579 0.5458 0.2645 0.8047 0.0927 
60:40 0.0012 0.9002 0.9582 0.5492 0.2717 0.7908 0.0997 
70:30 0.0012 0.9010 0.9582 0.5488 0.2709 0.7917 0.0989 
 
We observed that with training, we could slightly improve our detection ability 
when training and evaluating on both datasets. However, we noted a very high FNR, 
which implied that this technique, despite producing a high accuracy, was not feasible. 
We further investigated the impact of over-sampling with two separate techniques: 
SMOTE [186] (provided by [187]) and adaptive synthetic sampling (ADASYN) [244].   
 
Table 8-13.  
Over-Sampling Slightly Decreased Detection Performance When  
Training Models with Both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 and Evaluating  
on Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 with Identified Features 
Performance when Training a Random Forest Classifier with Over-sampling on Dataset 1 
and 2 with Identified Features and Evaluating on Dataset 1 and 2 
Over-sampling method FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
SMOTE 0.0048 0.9074 0.9547 0.5438 0.1947 0.4730 0.0925 
ADASYN 0.0037 0.9120 0.9556 0.54212 0.2018 0.5247 0.0879 
 
 
Table 8-14.  
Over-Sampling Slightly Decreased Detection Performance When Training  
Models with Both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 and Evaluating on Dataset 1  
and Dataset 2 with Prior Features 
Performance when Training a Random Forest Classifier with Over-sampling on Dataset 1 and 2 
with Prior Features and Evaluating on Dataset 1 and 2 
Over-sampling method FPR FNR ACC AUC MCC Prec Rec 
SMOTE 0.0066 0.8229 0.9566 0.5852 0.2976 0.5573 0.1770 
ADASYN 0.0081 0.8013 0.9556 0.5952 0.3079 0.\5344 0.1986 
 
We observed slight average improvement as well as high FNRs when using the 





We first observed that even our best model performed poorly when applied “as-
is” to another dataset. However, there were differences in the dataset, particularly in the 
URL features that were identified by t-SNE plots. This result was not surprising, given 
that prior authors had often received high error rates when evaluating their models on 
different datasets without any re-training. Additionally, we found that there were several 
differences in the respective features’ correlation and association to maliciousness 
between the datasets. We also observed that the features from the respective datasets did 
not come from the same distribution.  
Secondly, we found that the 34 features we identified in Chapter 7 and the 
features gathered from prior research demonstrated potential for detection on a new 
dataset, however new features needed to be incorporated to make the detection models 
successful. Specifically, we explored the potential of other features via correlation, which 
motivated their incorporation into a detection mechanism. Once we incorporated these 
features, we saw large improvement in our detection ability.  
Thirdly, we observed that even when we used both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 for 
training, we were still unable to detect malicious websites in Dataset 2. However, the 
models trained from Datasets 1 and 2 were better able to detect malicious websites from 
Datasets 1 and 2, but missed a substantial portion of websites, as demonstrated by the 
high FNR. 
 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we detailed our investigation through three research questions that 




observed that a model trained on another dataset could not be applied “as-is” to another 
dataset with guaranteed success. This result reflected findings of prior authors, who had 
often received high error rates when evaluating their models on different datasets without 
any retraining.  
Secondly, we found that the 34 features identified in Chapter 7 demonstrated 
slight potential on a new dataset and served as a good foundation for features, though 
modifications were required. Specifically, these features could be reused, but other 
features needed to be incorporated based on the dataset. Once we incorporated two new 
features derived from Dataset 2, we observed improvement in our detection ability.  
Thirdly, we observed that even when we used both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 for 
training, we still were unable to detect malicious websites in Dataset 2. While the models 
trained from Datasets 1 and 2 showed slight improvement, we still missed a substantial 





Chapter 9: A Temporal Evaluation of Feature-Based Malicious Website Detection  
 Introduction 
Web security is a fast-moving field. Attackers and defenders are constantly 
creating new techniques to confront each other [221] and detecting malicious websites, 
used by attackers for phishing, drive-by downloads, and C2, is a challenge. The 
adversarial environment of web security and relationship between offensive and 
defensive practitioners motivates research and industry to continuously explore new 
techniques and tools. Defenders in research and industry have used features and machine 
learning to detect malicious websites yielding promising results. However, several studies 
including [42], [50], [64], [75], and [159] have observed that detection models do not 
remain robust over time. Other studies like [91] have shown success when training and 
testing on data gathered across different points in time. There is a lack of clarity 
regarding the ability of detection models to remain robust over time. Given that attacks 
change over time, there is an inherent assumption that detection models, especially those 
built with either supervised or unsupervised learning on current or past data, will 
eventually become inaccurate. This assumption however, has been minimally explored.  
In this chapter, we perform a temporal evaluation of feature-based malicious 
website detection. We study 106,766 websites from the Alexa Top 1M [112] provided by 
[176] over a period of 12 weeks. We use Google Safe Browsing [132] to label the 
websites as malicious or benign. We build detection models with the random forest 
algorithm and three sets of features gathered from a response to web request – 34 
identified in Chapter 7 from a dataset (Dataset 1) provided by Cisco Talos Intelligence 




this study (Dataset 3). We analyze the impact of re-training and measure the change in 
websites and detection performance over time. Overall, we observe that 1) detection 
models slowly degrade over time with an exponential decay however improve to a power 
decay with re-training, and 2) websites (as defined by their features) change more as time 
grows. 
We make the following contributions: 
• We present, to our knowledge, the first study of feature-based malicious 
website detection that focuses on detection performance and change over 
time; 
• We demonstrate that while retraining detection models improves performance 
and can result in a slower performance degradation, performance still 
decreases over time; and 
• We present a new method of analyzing and measuring change in website 
datasets which enables further statistical analysis. 
 Related Research 
Related research in studying websites over time falls into two categories - 
research focused on if and how the internet and webpages change over time, and research 
into malicious website detection that includes temporal aspects (a model trained at one 
point in time and applied on data from a later point in time). 
Researchers in the first group focused on examining the dynamic nature of the 
web. Websites change with some studies having quantified and measured this change. 
Web crawlers, which iterate webpages and the internet, are useful in studying website 




their dataset were subject to change (based on the MD5sum). The MD5sum determines 
whether a sequence of bytes (in the form of a webpage [168]) changes. Features like the 
webpage length and HTTP response code can also be used to determine change. For 
example, [168] monitored changes in the website. Researchers [173] and [174] leveraged 
additional features including word level and DOM-related features to characterize 
website changes and HTML element persistence. HTTP status codes have been combined 
with approaches from [170] and are used to determine the similarity of webpages to each 
other, as in [169]. In [170] Fetterly expanded on [171] and observed that 40% of 
webpages in their dataset changed within a week. Authors [172] aimed to infer change 
rates of webpages on the web. Researchers in [175] proposed criteria and a new metric to 
measure website change though this metric was not presented in the context of malicious 
website detection. 
While studying detection performance over time has not been the primary focus in 
malicious website detection research, a few works have evaluated their detection methods 
on the same dataset at a later point in time. Zarras et al. [82] evaluated Bothound on data 
collected over time. On the first evaluation, their technique identified 718 domains as 
malicious, 74.7% of which were found in denylists. On the second dataset, collected one 
week later, they found that an additional 59 identified domains (for a total of 82.9%) 
were now on denylists. Their approach specifically identified malicious domains 
generated by malware. Basnet et al. [64] observed over a 900% increase in the error rate 
(from 0.42% to 3.82%) when training and testing on dataset separated by three months 
and investigated different training frequencies. They concluded that models must be re-




Other studies have not shown much performance decrease when training and 
testing models on data collected at different times however, in such studies, the 
difference between training and evaluation is closer than in the studies that show a larger 
performance decrease. Prophiler [45] achieved an FPR of 9.88% and an FNR of 0.77%, 
but did so on a validation dataset collected immediately following the training dataset. 
Some researchers have incorporated temporal aspects by evaluating live feeds of data. 
Ma et al. in [36]-[37] ingested live feeds of data from a Webmail provider containing 
samples of spam and phishing URLs, and leveraged online learning to investigate 
different training regimens. They showed the benefits of continuous training and 
observed a decrease in the cumulative error rate from approximately 2% to 1% over a 
100-day period. CANTINA+ [46] observed a 92.25% true positive and a 1.375% false 
positive rate when training on a dataset and evaluating on another dataset two weeks 
later. Whittaker et al [42] were able to achieve a phishing detection true positive rate of 
91.85% and a false negative rate of 0.01% when training on three months of data and 
evaluating on another dataset two weeks later. Marchal et al. [91] achieved highly 
accurate results (an AUC of 0.999) on phishing webpage detection and trained and tested 
on datasets gathered one month apart. 
In this chapter we focus on observing and measuring malicious website detection 
performance and change over time. Like others including [36]-[37], [42], [46], [64],  and 
[91] we perform analysis of detection models that were trained and evaluated on datasets 
gathered at different times. Also like [36]-[37] and [64], we investigate different training 
frequencies. The differentiators in our study are that we 1) make the performance change 




change with measurable rationale, and 3) limit our analysis to the same dataset gathered 
over time. 
 Research Questions 
 Research Question 11 
This research question focuses on the investigation of the performance of 
detection models over time. In Chapter 7, we were able to build several detection models, 
with our best performing model achieving an MCC of 0.9174 with features we identified 
through feature selection. However, we had little insight into how these models would 
perform over time and did not have insight into their consistency when applied on a new 
dataset. In the portion of our research outlined in Chapter 8, we demonstrated that re-
training and adjusting models was needed when applying models built from one dataset 
to another. Specifically, models trained on one dataset could not necessarily be applied to 
another. Prior researchers have observed different results. Some have seen performance 
decrease as in [64] when their training and testing sets were collected at different times 
and some, like [91], have been able to achieve high detection metrics when separating 
their training and testing set by a few weeks. Insight into if and how detection models 
change over time may influence if and when a researcher or practioner decides to re-
evaluate or re-train their detection models. The differences of results presented in prior 
research and the knowledge gained from studying performance over time leads us to the 
next research question. RQ11, then, is stated as follows: 




 Research Question 12 
To understand whether detection models can remain robust over time (and to 
determine the potential reasons they remain robust or fail to do so), we first must 
understand whether websites change over time. Based on prior research, we hypothesized 
that websites change over time and that malicious website detection models will 
eventually become irrelevant and no longer be able to distinguish between benign and 
malicious websites, though we had not yet established this in our research. To do so, we 
determined whether the features that compose a website (and are used for detection) 
change over time. Gaining insight into feature change (and whether they are capable of 
detecting malicious websites or were related to features that have demonstrated the ability 
to detect malicious websites) was a necessary step for constructing models that remain 
relevant over time. RQ12 is stated as follows: 
RQ12:  Do websites change over time? 
 Research Question 13 
We extended RQ12 further in our final research question by evaluating website 
change more thoroughly by examining feature change over time. Specifically, we 
gathered several data points regarding the number of features that changed when we 
compared the time between data collections. Access to 12 weeks of data enabled us to 
perform various comparisons (comparing the snapshot of week one to week two, week 
one to week three, and week one to week four, then comparing the snapshot of week two 
to week three, week two to week four, etc.). RQ13 is stated as follows: 





Our approach is comprised of three steps. In the first step we collected our dataset 
(Dataset 3) over a period of 12 weeks that was derived from the Alexa Top 1M and 
Google Safe Browsing. In the second step we selected feature sets to build detection 
models – 34 features identified in Chapter 7, 99 features from prior research (also used in 
Chapter 7), and a set of features re-selected from Dataset 3. In the final step we build and 
evaluate detection models across snapshots and compare the websites (and their features) 
from the respective snapshots to each other. The process is depicted in Figure 9-1 below.  
 
Fig. 9-1.    Three step approach for temporal evaluation of feature-based malicious website detection 
(Images courtesy of Pixabay [22].) 
Query Alexa 1M 
12 Weeks 
02/02/2020 
𝑊1 = 𝐹ሼ𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒1: 𝑁,  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒2: 𝑀, … ሽ 
𝑊2 = 𝐹ሼ𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒1: 𝑁,  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒2: 𝑀, … ሽ 
𝑊3 = 𝐹ሼ𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒1: 𝑁,  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒2: 𝑀, … ሽ 
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 Dataset Collection 
We derived the dataset from the websites that were consistently present in the 
Alexa Top 1M over a period of 12 weeks. The choice of a period of 12 weeks was 
derived from prior studies. Fetterly collected webpages over a 10- and 11-week period in 
[169] and [170], respectively. Basnet [64] observed a 900% increase in error rate when 
using training and testing datasets separated by three months. Beginning on February 2nd, 
2020, we performed a query via Censys for the Alexa Top 1M. Over the following week, 
we gathered features from the websites by performing an HTTP GET request to each 
website. On each of the following weeks for a total of 12 weeks, we re-performed the 
query for up-to-date Alexa Top 1M data and re-performed our gathering of data from the 
respective websites. We limited our analysis to websites that were present in the Alexa 
Top 1M during all 12 weeks. Hence, our final dataset consisted of snapshots of 106,766 
websites that remained consistent over the 12-week period. Table 9-1 shows the number 





Table 9-1.  
A Fraction of the Websites in the Alexa 
Top 1M Were Consistent Over Time 
Number of Consistent Websites in Alexa Top 1M 













Ground truth data (the designation of which websites were malicious and which 
were benign) consisted of data gathered from Google Safe Browsing. We labeled this 
dataset (106,776 websites labeled with Google Safe Browsing) as Dataset 3.  
 Feature Set Selection 
We narrowed our focus to the 34 features identified in Chapter 7 and to the 99 
features gathered from prior research and also used in Chapter 7. The 34 features have 
been identified in our studies (Chapter 7) as being able to detect malicious websites with 
an MCC of up to 0.9281 on a prior dataset. The 99 features have been vetted throughout 
prior research. Additionally, we re-performed the feature selection process from Chapter 
7 on the new dataset in order to arrive at a third set of features for analysis in case the 34 
features and 99 features were not effective on this new dataset. We used Esprima [245] 
to parse the content of the HTTP response. 
 Analysis Approach 
Our analysis was divided into three sections corresponding to the three proposed 






Step 1: Investigate model performance over time 
• Evaluate prior model performance 
o Train an RF [98] model using Dataset 1 (from Chapters 4–7), using 
the 34 features identified in Chapter 7 and the 99 features gathered 
from prior research; 
o Evaluate the performance of the RF model trained on Dataset 1 
relative to the respective snapshots (collection of benign and 
malicious websites) of Dataset 3 – the 106,766 websites, that are 
consistent across the 12 weeks – and record the result; 
o Identify the following: 
▪ The number of website detection outcomes that are consistent 
throughout the 12 weeks, 
▪ The number of website detection results that changed 
classification, and 
▪ The accuracy of the detection results based on the ground truth 
data; 
• Retrain and evaluate a new RF model 
o Retrain an RF detection model on the first snapshot of Dataset 3 
(the Alexa Top 1M that are consistent over the 12 weeks beginning 
February 2, 2020) with Google Safe Browsing as ground truth; 
o Evaluate the performance of the model trained on the first snapshot 




performance including whether detection performance increases, 
decreases, or remains constant over time; 
o Retrain an RF model on each snapshot of Dataset 3 (and evaluate it 
on the later snapshots) to determine the following: 
▪ Whether performance increases or decreases, and 
▪ How the performance compares to the model trained on the 
first snapshot of data and evaluated based on the proceeding 
snapshots;  
o Retrain an RF model on all previous snapshots of Dataset 3 and 
evaluate on all proceeding snapshots to determine: 
▪ Whether performance increases or decreases, and 
▪ How the performance of the model trained on the first snapshot 
of data and evaluated on the proceeding snapshots compares to 
the performance of the model trained on all previous snapshots 
and evaluated on the proceeding snapshots. 
Step 2: Determine whether websites (composed of features) change over time 
We hypothesized that we would see some change in performance over time and 
we performed this step to gain insight into potential reasons. For this step, we evaluated 
each feature in isolation to determine whether it changed. We defined a website as a set 
of key-value pairs where the key is the feature and the value is the respective 
quantification of that feature. As such we defined a website as the following: 




where W is the website, F is a set of key-value pairs, feature1, feature2, …featuret are the 
features, and N, M, and Z are integers (the respective values of each feature).  
With this definition of a website, we derived a histogram from the values of a 
specific feature in a snapshot. Figure 9-2 below provides a contrived example (not based 
on real data and only used for demonstrative purposes) of a feature in a specific snapshot 
– the number of HTML tags - which is a feature we collected in this study. This is one 
example and we applied this approach to the other features in each weekly snapshot.  
 
 
Fig. 9-2.   Distribution of the number of HTML tags 
 
We derived a histogram from the collection of measurements for each feature in 
each snapshot. The x axis represents the value of the feature and the y axis represents 
how many websites have the specific of that feature. The histogram in Figure 9-2 can be 
read as; two websites have a zero for the value of the “Number of HTML Tags” feature, 
three websites have a value of one for the number of HTML tags,…, and three websites 
have a value of 11 for the number of HTML tags. This histogram was created for each 
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used to determine which features changed and which did not change from snapshot to 
snapshot. We leveraged one strategy incorporated by industry and four statistical tests. 
First, we investigated the pairwise correlation between each feature in the respective 
snapshots, a strategy frequently employed by industry for determining whether a model 
should be re-trained. Next, we used four statistical tests – the t-test for related samples 
[194]-[195], the two-sample KS test [196]-[197], the k-sample Anderson-Darling test 
[198]-[199] (where k =2), and the Kruskal Wallis H test [200]-[201]. The related t-test for 
the null hypothesis determined whether the two related or repeated samples had identical 
average values, relied on dependent observations, and assumed normality. However, 
since our sample size is large (greater than 31) we rely on the Central Limit Theorem 
[246] should any data be non-normal. Furthermore, [247] validates the reliance on the 
Central Limit Theorem for large (and potentially non-normal) datasets. The two-sample 
KS tested that two independent samples were drawn from the same distribution and 
required independent observations. The k-sample Anderson-Darling [198]-[199] tested 
that k-samples were drawn from the same population and required independent 
observations. The Kruskal Wallis H test [200]-[201] tested whether the population 
median of all the groups was equal (the test is a non-parametric version of ANOVA 
[248]) and also required independent observations. We considered two possibilities of the 
samples in our dataset – the samples are dependent (or related) and the samples are 
independent. An argument can be made for both cases. In the case of dependent 
observations, the most appropriate test was the related t-test, since the samples could be 
considered related (the same websites collected over time). However, given the dynamic 




adopted the view that websites collected at different times could be considered 
independent, or not related. Hence, we also used the other three tests – the two-sample 
KS test [196]-[197], the k-sample Anderson-Darling [198]-[199], and the Kruskal Wallis 
H test [200]-[201] – and observed the outcomes. 
 Results 
 RQ11: How does Detection Performance Change Over Time? 
For this research question, we applied to Dataset 3 the RF model built from 
Dataset 1 with 34 features identified in Chapter 7 and the RF model built from Dataset 1 
with 99 features gathered from prior research. Tables 9-2 and 9-3 below present a 
summary of the number of websites that were consistent and the number of websites that 
changed. 
 
Table 9-2.  
The Detection Model Built from  
Dataset 1 with 34 Features  
Remained Consistent on Dataset 3 
Website Prediction Based on Mode Trained on 
Dataset 1 and 34 Identified Features 
Consistency Status Number Percent 
Consistent Benign 89257 83.6 
Consistent Malicious 438 0.4 
Failed Collection 7794 7.3 
Changes 9277 8.7 
 
 
Table 9-3.  
The Detection Model Built from  
Dataset 1 with 99 Features  
Remained Consistent on Dataset 3 
Website Prediction Based on Mode Trained on 
Dataset 1 and 99 Prior Features 
Consistency Status Number Percent 
Consistent Benign 89204 83.5 
Consistent Malicious 491 0.5 
Failed Collection 7794 7.3 






Tables 9-2 and 9-3 show the metrics of classification consistency from the models 
built from the 34 features and 99 features from Dataset 1 and applied to Dataset 3. In both 
cases approximately 84% of the websites were consistently classified as benign; 0.4% of 
the websites were consistently classified as malicious; 7% had at least one failure during 
collection; and 9% changed their classification over the 12 weeks. Although we had 85% 
of the websites with no collection failures (the connection timed out, the connection was 
blocked, etc) that were consistent with respect to their classification by the models built 
in Chapter 7, we did not yet know how well those the respective models performed (if 
they were accurate). To determine this, we captured performance metrics and used 





Table 9-4.  
The Model Trained on Dataset 1 with 34 Features  
Performed Consistently Poorly When Applied to Dataset 3 
Performance of Random Forest Classifier Trained On 34 
Identified Features on Dataset 1 Applied to Dataset 3 Over Time 
Week FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
2/2/2020 0.0044 0.9822 0.5066 0.0311 0.0989 0.0177 
2/9/2020 0.0045 0.9829 0.5062 0.0289 0.0934 0.0170 
2/16/2020 0.0045 0.9833 0.5060 0.0279 0.0907 0.0166 
2/23/2020 0.0046 0.9830 0.5061 0.0281 0.0909 0.0169 
3/1/2020 0.0045 0.9829 0.5062 0.0291 0.0938 0.0170 
3/8/2020 0.0045 0.9833 0.5060 0.0281 0.0918 0.0166 
3/15/2020 0.0045 0.9829 0.5062 0.0288 0.0928 0.0170 
3/22/2020 0.0045 0.9826 0.5063 0.0295 0.0949 0.0173 
3/29/2020 0.0046 0.9831 0.5060 0.0279 0.0907 0.0168 
4/5/2020 0.0046 0.9823 0.5065 0.0299 0.0952 0.0176 
4/12/2020 0.0047 0.9831 0.5060 0.0276 0.0896 0.0168 
4/19/2020 0.0046 0.9838 0.5057 0.0267 0.0884 0.0161 
 
 
Table 9-5.  
The Model Trained on Dataset 1 with 99 Features  
Performed Consistently Poorly When Applied to Dataset 3 
Performance of Random Forest Classifier Trained On 99 Prior 
Features on Dataset 1 Applied to Dataset 3 Over Time 
Week FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
2/2/2020 0.0035 0.9837 0.5063 0.0326 0.1108 0.0162 
2/9/2020 0.0036 0.9841 0.5061 0.0313 0.1067 0.0158 
2/16/2020 0.0036 0.9840 0.5061 0.0316 0.1076 0.0159 
2/23/2020 0.0036 0.9837 0.5062 0.0322 0.1090 0.0162 
3/1/2020 0.0035 0.9840 0.5061 0.0317 0.1081 0.0159 
3/8/2020 0.0035 0.9845 0.5059 0.0310 0.1069 0.0154 
3/15/2020 0.0035 0.9845 0.5059 0.0307 0.1055 0.0154 
3/22/2020 0.0036 0.9842 0.5060 0.0313 0.1073 0.0157 
3/29/2020 0.0036 0.9846 0.5058 0.0298 0.1030 0.0153 
4/5/2020 0.0036 0.9838 0.5062 0.0318 0.1079 0.0161 
4/12/2020 0.0037 0.9846 0.5058 0.0297 0.1025 0.0153 
4/19/2020 0.0036 0.9849 0.5056 0.0292 0.1018 0.0150 
 
 
In both cases, the models built on the 34 identified features and 99 prior features 
performed only slightly better than random on each snapshot. (We saw an MCC of 
0.0311 for the model built with the 34 features, and an MCC of 0.0326 for the model 
built with the 99 features.) We went on to investigate the performance of models over 
time, our primary goal being to gauge how long models would remain accurate for 
detection before becoming out-of-date. To that end, we trained an RF detection model on 
the first week of collection and evaluated its performance on the remaining 11 weeks of 




accuracy. For re-training, we used the 34 identified features from Chapter 7 derived from 
Dataset 1, the 99 features gathered from prior research, and 41 re-selected features from 
Dataset 3. We performed re-selection on Dataset 3 in case there was another set of 
features that better suited Dataset 3, following the same process outlined in Chapter 7 for 
feature selection. Figure 9-3 below shows the performance of the models trained on the 
first week of collection and applied to the 11 subsequent weeks. We focused on the MCC 
and FNR. The FPR is not shown because it only changed slightly and was very low 
(approximately equal to or less than 0.01% over all measurements). Full results can be 
found in Appendix D. 
 
 
Fig. 9-3.   Performance consistently decreased when training on the first snapshot of Dataset 3 and 
evaluating on future snapshots 
 
 
In all three cases, we observed a decrease in MCC over the 12 weeks; over the 
same period, we observed an increase in the FNR with all three sets of features. We also 
observed that the model built from 99 features performed slightly better over time than 
































respect to performance degradation over time. We observed that the model built from re-
selected features outperformed the model built from 34 features from Chapter 7, but it 
underperformed when compared to the model built from the 99 features gathered from 
prior research. Additionally, we observed that the performance (MCC) of models built 
from all three feature sets decreased with an exponential decay N = N0e
-λt which we 
determined by performing linear and non-linear regressions on the sequence of data 
finding the regression with the smallest error. On the linear regressions, we observed R2 
values 0.9803, 0.9918 and 0.9961, for the 34, 99, and re-selected features with p-values 
of 5.43E-9, 1.04E-10, and 3.56E-12, respectively. 
We then examined whether and how re-training could improve the ability to 
distinguish between benign and malicious websites. To do so, we re-trained on each week 
and evaluated on all subsequent weeks. The results were similar when re-training on the 
different snapshots. See Figure 9-4 for the results of re-training on the sixth week. Full 
results appear in Appendix D. 
 
 

































When re-training on the sixth snapshot (taken March 8th, 2020), we observed a 
performance increase when applying the re-trained models (with 34, 99, and re-selected 
features, respectively) to the following weeks, followed by a decrease similar to the 
model performance from Figure 9-3. After re-training, we also observed that the 
performance for all three feature sets decreased according to a power rule N = N0t
-n based 
on the result of performing non-linear and linear regressions. On the linear regressions, 
we observed R2 values 0.9499, 0.9719 and 0.9825, for the 34, 99, and re-selected features 
with p-values of 9.5E-4, 2.9E-4, and 1.1E-4, respectively. Additionally, the MCC and 
FNRs of models trained on the snapshot taken the week of March 8th, 2020 and evaluated 
on the data from weeks 6, 7, …11, was approximately equal to the MCC and FNR of the 




Fig. 9-5.   Model performance improved and remained more robust when training on several snapshots  


































We then evaluated the impact of using all of the previous weeks as training data 
instead of using just the previous week. Results are shown in Figure 9-5, with full results 
appearing in Appendix D. When doing so, we noted improvement in the performance 
(MCC and FNR). We observed a decrease in performance on the subsequent weeks, 
though the decrease was slower than that for the models that were trained on a single 
snapshot of data. Again, the model built from 99 features performed the best and the re-
selected features outperformed the 34 features identified in Chapter 7, though the 
difference between the three was smaller (see Figure 9-5 versus Figures 9-4 and 9-3). 
Figure 9-5 displays the observed power decrease for the 34 features and the re-selected 
features and there is an observed exponential decrease for the 99 features. On the linear 
regressions, we observed R2 values 0.9869, 0.9919 and 0.9914, for the 34, 99, and re-
selected features with p-values of 6.38E-5, 2.41E-5, and 2.75E-5, respectively.  Thus, we 
observed that the model’s ability to distinguish between malicious and benign websites 
decreased over time, specifically, with a rise in FNR. 
With RQ11, we investigated the performance of detection models over time. To 
do so, we first examined the models built from Dataset 1 (see Chapter 7). We found 
consistency in the number of benign and malicious websites, with approximately 92% of 
the websites maintaining the same classification over time (based on our RF model built 
on Dataset 1 with 34 identified features and with 99 features gathered from prior 
research). Although our model was consistent, it performed poorly. Thus, the model built 
from Dataset 1 was not able to distinguish between malicious and benign websites. The 




roughly random and therefore did not provide insight into detection ability over time and 
was not useful for this study. 
In order to create a model that performed well, we re-trained three RF models 
with different feature sets on the first snapshot of data from Dataset 3 (the Alexa Top 1M 
domains that were consistent over 12 weeks, with the Google Safe Browsing as the 
ground truth). That is, we re-trained on the first snapshot of data (gathered February 2nd, 
2020) and evaluated the performance on the subsequent weeks. When doing so, we 
observed an MCC of 0.8960 and an FNR of 0.1906, followed by a performance decrease 
(a decrease in the MCC) and an increase in the FNR for each subsequent week when 
using the 34 identified features. The FNR on the last snapshot (taken April 19th, 2020) 
was 48.46% for the model built from 34 identified features. This result was similar to 
results for the models built with 99 features and with re-selected features. The decrease in 
performance was exponential over time without re-training, but by the sixth week of 
evaluation, we observed FNRs of approximately 30% for the 34 and 41 re-selected 
features, and of approximately 20% for the 99 features gathered from prior research. 
These results (and additional results from the other feature sets) indicated that while 
detection models may be sufficient for the short term, they cannot be guaranteed to work 
for an extended period of time. This observation aligned with general intuition about the 
dynamic nature of the internet in an adversarial environment of threat detection. 
However, the large performance decrease was due to the increasing FNR. The FPR 
stayed lowed during each iteration (we recorded a max FPR of 0.0032%, 0%, 0.0085%, 




for potential incorporation into detectors since triaging false positives is a major problem 
for security teams [240]. 
Re-training frequently (in this case, every week) improved performance 
temporarily, but still resulted in a performance decrease over time with all three feature 
sets. However, re-training on all prior snapshots resulted in better performing models that 
remained more robust (their performance decreased more slowly). Additionally, re-
training slowed the performance degradation from e-t to t-n in five of the six re-training 
scenarios based on finding the respective regression with the lowest error. As a result, we 
postulated that detection models decrease in performance over time, need re-training, and 
benefit from re-training on various instance of past data. 
 RQ12: Do Websites Change Over Time? 
In this next step, we determined whether websites changed over time by 
examining whether the features that composed those websites changed. To do so, we first 
examined the pairwise correlations between the respective features to determine any 
changes. We examined the pairwise correlations between every feature in the respective 
snapshots (6,160 feature pairs in total) and did so for each feature studied in this chapter. 
For example, we calculated the correlation between the “Number of HTML tags” feature 
and the number of <a> tags and did this for each of the twelve snapshots. To determine if 
there were any changes in the pairwise correlations, we looked for outliers as defined by 
the IQR (Inter Quartile Range) among the sequence of 12 measurements for each 
pairwise correlation. When doing so on all possible feature pairs, we identified 41 feature 
pairs (out of 6,160 possible feature pairs) of which each had a single outlier 




total measurements and the other 6,119 feature pairs had no outlier measurements. Thus, 
our analysis did not reveal much change in pairwise correlations between the respective 
snapshots. We next applied four statistical tests to features in the respective snapshots to 
determine if the feature changed. We did this in a pairwise manner (from the February 2nd 
snapshot to the February 9th snapshot, from the February 2nd snapshot to the February 16th 
snapshot, etc.). Results are shown in Figure 9-6 with a significance level of 10%, chosen 
because we manually inspected the data and observed many p-values just over 0.05 and 
chose 0.10 (10%) in order to capture these features. We ignored URL features since they 
do not change. 
 
 
Fig. 9-6.    More features changed as the time period lengthened 
 
All four tests showed that the number of changing features increased as the time 
period lengthened. Although the values were different for all tests, there was an upward 























Time Period (First Snapshot - Second Snapshot)








KS and Kruskal Wallis H test [200]-[201], we observed a greater change for the time 
period of February 2nd through March 22nd than for the time period of February 2nd 
through March 29th . All of the data points compared the features collected on February 
2nd to the end date separated by a “-.” 
In addition to measuring the number of features that changed over the respective 
time periods, we also examined the feature importance associated with the respective 
features that changed. Figure 9-7 shows the total importance of the features that changed 
within the three feature sets between February 2nd and April 19th. 
 
Fig. 9-7.    The features that change represented more than 1/3 of total feature importance 
 
 
Of the features that changed over the time period measured, approximately 38%–
40% of the total feature importance was contained in these features across the three 
feature sets. Thus, the features that changed were influential in determining whether or 
not a website was malicious in that they captured non-trivial amount of feature 
importance. Additionally, approximately 24%-37% of the features in the respective 
datasets were URL features (which do not change over time). Figure 9-8 shows the 























Fig. 9-8.    More than 20% of total feature importance was derived from URL features 
 
 
After identifying the total importance from the features that changed over time, 
we then examined how much total importance changed over each week. This was 
calculated by examining the features that changed during each time period and summing 




























Fig. 9-9.    Feature importance changed more as the time gap became larger when using the  
related sample t-test 
 
Results from this test showed less than a 0.02 change in feature importance from 
February 2nd, 2020 to March 8th, 2020 over the three feature sets within the first few 
weeks. We then examined the feature importance that changed when we considered as 































Fig. 9-10.     When using several tests, feature importance changed more as the time gap increased 
 
 
The results shown in Figure 9-10 are similar to the results shown in Figure 9-9 in 
that the first few weeks showed little importance change followed by larger importance 
change in the last weeks. Thus, we observed that the features that compose websites do 
change and that those features accounted for roughly 40% of the total feature importance 
in the respective feature sets, confirming that websites do change over time. 
With RQ12, we investigated whether websites changed over time. We focused the 
analysis on the features that compose a website and on those used for discriminating 
between malicious and benign websites. All four statistical tests demonstrated that the 
number of features that change over time increased. Additionally, we found that the 
features that change over time accounted for a non-trivial amount of feature importance 
in our detection model. Thus, we postulated that websites, as defined by their features 



































 RQ13: If Websites Change Over Time, How Much do They Change Over 
Time? 
To answer RQ13, we used techniques and tests similar to those used in RQ12, but 
we measured the results as a function of the number of weeks that had passed. In other 
words, instead of comparing each week to the first week, as we did when answering 
RQ12, we compared each week to each of the other weeks. For example, we performed 
analysis on the data and changes between the weeks of March 2nd and March 9th, the 
weeks of March 2nd and March 16th, the weeks of March 2nd and March 23rd, etc. As a 
result, we obtained a series of measurements as a function of the number of weeks. We 
obtained 11 measures where the week difference was 1 week, 10 measurements where 
the week difference was 2 weeks, 9 measurements where the week difference was 3 
weeks, etc. 
First, we examined the average number of features that changed over time as a 






Fig. 9-11.    The average number of features that changed over time increased with the lengthening  
of the time period 
 
 
As with the findings from RQ12, Figure 9-11 showed the constant upward trend 
we observed in the number of features that changed over time. Box plots of the respective 




Fig. 9-12.    Box plot for the number of features  

















































Fig. 9-13.    Box plot for the number of features  




Fig. 9-14.    Box plot for the number of features  
that changed over time, per k-sample Anderson-Darling 
 
 
Fig. 9-15.     Box plot for the number of features that  
changed over time, per the Kruskal Wallis H test 
 
 
We observed overlap in the box plots for the number of features that changed 
when the time difference was one week and two weeks. Although we made this 




was one or two weeks did not appear to have improved detection results since there was 
no overlap in the box plots for the performance as a function of the time difference (with 
the exception of a few outlier measurements). Results are shown in Figures 9-16, 9-17, 
and 9-18 below for the 34, re-selected, and 99 features, respectively.  
 
 
Fig. 9-16.    Capturing several measurements as a function of time  
further demonstrated performance decrease when using 34 features  




Fig. 9-17.    Capturing several measurements as a function of time  
further demonstrated performance decrease when using re-selected  







Fig. 9-18.    Capturing several measurements as a function of time  
further demonstrated performance decrease when using 99 prior  
features for malicious website detection 
 
We investigated the number of features that changed by analyzing all possible 
pairs. Findings further supported the conclusion that features changed over time and that 
the change followed an upward trend while performance followed a downward trend. 
With RQ13, we verified our initial observations from RQ12 by performing an 
additional analysis and calculating the results when comparing the features over every 
possible combination of snapshots to gauge how much websites changed over time and if 
the change was consistent. We knew that websites are updated over time, but to our 
knowledge, this is the first study that attempted to evaluate how websites change with 
regard to malicious website detection. We observed that the longer the time period 
between model training and model use, the worse the performance of the original model 
and the more features changed. This finding supported our observation from RQ11 
regarding the need to frequently re-train. As features begin to change, models will 
become stale and experience changing performance metrics. We observed a decrease. 




larger as the timeframe increases, a finding that highlights the need to re-train detection 
models. 
 Conclusion 
This chapter included a temporal evaluation of feature-based malicious website 
detection. In this chapter, we detailed our investigation into whether detection models 
remained effective over a period of time and the different strategies we used for re-
training. Additionally, we provided insight into whether and how websites changed over 
time and demonstrated that as websites change (in the form of their features), the 





Chapter 10: Limitations 
This dissertation included several studies on feature-based malicious website 
detection. However, it was not without limitations. In this chapter we discuss the 
limitations present throughout this research. 
 Dataset Selection 
The first limitation originated from dataset selection. In related security research, 
authors used different techniques to create datasets of benign and malicious websites. 
Some authors implemented web crawlers or used randomly selected URLs or similar 
methods to identify and collect websites to supplement or define their datasets [35]-[37], 
[40], [42]-[44], [46], [49]-[50], [81], [91], [95]. Others used established or well-known 
datasets as part of their datasets [24], [47]-[48], [86], [89], [116]-[117]. Both approaches 
to defining and curating datasets of benign and malicious websites include inherent 
subjectivity. We based our datasets (Dataset 1 used in Chapters 4-7, Dataset 2 used in 
Chapter 8, and Dataset 3 used in Chapter 9) from external sources – the Alexa top 1M, 
Cisco Talos Intelligence Group, Cymon.io, and Google Safe Browsing in an attempt to be 
objective and lessen our influence in our studies.  
In our studies in Chapters 4-7, we assumed that popularity and high Alexa rank 
were benign traits, though this may not always be true. To investigate our assumption, we 
verified with threat intelligence feeds from Cymon.io [193], a tool that accumulates threat 
intelligence. In 2018, we observed that approximately 5% of the websites in our benign 
list appeared in the Cymon.io database. While the appearance in, or absence from, the 
Cymon.io database does not confirm the benign or malicious nature of the website, given 




assumption of popularity as a trait of benign websites was reasonable. This observation 
suggests that at most 5% of our benign data was mislabeled. Also, our dataset in Chapters 
4-7 represented a specific point in time. Internet security and the web are ever-changing 
environments, providing no guarantee that our findings will remain true should this 
experiment be repeated on a different dataset. This limitation is difficult to avoid in 
dynamic environments like the internet. We did however address this limitation with our 
study in Chapters 8 and 9.  
For purposes of our study, a website was considered “malicious” if it was 
associated with any attacks including phishing, drive-by downloads, or C2 infrastructure. 
“Malicious” does not have a precise, standardized definition in a cybersecurity context, 
so definitions may vary. Therefore, we run the risk of disagreeing with other researchers 
who may define “malicious” differently.  
 Feature Challenges 
There are some limitations present in the features themselves. Webpage content 
provides a rich environment for feature collection, a fact that we took full advantage of in 
conducting our research. However, the extent to which HTML and JavaScript can be 
studied is vast, and some methods from previous research present challenges when 
attempting to combine many different analysis techniques. For example, HTML can 
contain many URLs. Although we analyzed properties of these URLs in our collection, 
URL analysis itself is vast, encompassing several detection means that were not 
compatible with our approach. The JavaScript on the webpage posed the same challenge. 
Our approach was static and therefore did not include the several dynamic approaches to 




challenging as a result of the many different features that can be collected and as a result 
of the many different analysis techniques. 
The gathering of JavaScript features posed another limitation. We gathered our 
JavaScript features statically, which has been done in prior research, but because 
malicious JavaScript is often obfuscated, it presents a challenge to analysis. Potential 
mitigations include adding a de-obfuscator or instrumenting the collection environment to 
record the specific JavaScript methods executed. This requires additional overhead and 
potentially runs the risk of executing malicious script while attempting to perform feature 
collection.  
Additionally, our set of URLs consisted of English URLs, a choice that greatly 
influenced the lexical features we extracted in our research. Should our dataset have 
contained URLs with non-English characters, we would have needed to modify our 
feature set and collection mechanism to account for this. URL features are very flexible 
since URLs consist simply of strings of characters. As a result, they can be analyzed in 
many ways. Given this flexibility, there was a risk that our approach – examining n-
grams on the URL – may not have been the optimal approach for analyzing URLs. Given 
the existence of many different analysis techniques, it is challenging to identify the single 
best analysis technique. 
The selection of HTTP header features also limited us. HTTP header analysis 
requires substantial data cleaning and validation due to the prevalence of custom headers, 
misspellings, and so on. For our exploration into HTTP header features and their 
applicability to detect malicious websites, we focused on collecting and cleaning headers 




did not collect session-based features or those features arising from HTTP requests and 
responses over a period of time. In addition, we used HTTP features in isolation, rather 
than in combination with other website features. 
 Comparison with Other Works 
Benchmarking our work to related research was a challenge. Prior researchers 
used different datasets, features, and performance metrics, collected their data at different 
times, or focused on different aspects, such as the speed of website classification or other 
metrics. This points to a broader problem in the field of cybersecurity – a lack of 
repeatability – that hinders validation and comparison. 
 Additional Limitations 
The last limitations came from our last two chapters where we explored additional 
datasets and performed a temporal evaluation of malicious website detection. The main 
limitation but also key finding in Chapter 8 was that the ability to apply feature-based 
detection to malicious websites was dependent upon the datasets themselves. After we 
demonstrated that we could not apply a model built with one dataset to another, we then 
observed differences with correlations and association between the features studied on 
the respective datasets. If we had used two similar datasets, our results most likely would 
have demonstrated better detection. Although this was a challenge, this observation also 
is key to assessing the real-world application of this method.  
For Chapter 9, we chose a dataset source (the Alexa 1M) that is leveraged in 
various studies, and ensured consistency by only studying websites that appear in the 
Alexa Top 1M in each of the 12 weeks. Although our dataset has objective rationale, 




period of 12 weeks or approximately 90 days. From prior research we observed that 
detection performance decreases after 1-3 months and this is the basis for the 12-week 
period of this study. Studies on website change have also spanned approximately three 
months. Although the 12-week duration was based on prior research, it too was 
somewhat subjective. 
Another limitation with Chapter 9 resulted from the notion of measuring website 
changes over time. Because little work has been completed in the field with respect to 
malicious website detection change over time, we found no agreed-upon method for 
analysis. Furthermore, few statistical tests are designed for measuring website change. 
We chose four tests that appeared to be the most appropriate and their results were 
similar, though the lack of a universally agreed-upon method and test for measuring 
website change posed a challenge. 
Lastly, the dynamic nature of the internet created a limitation for our research in 
Chapter 9. Some websites change quickly, while others change more gradually. We use a 
week-to-week analysis which is based on an observation from prior research that 
websites are likely to change within a week, however acknowledge the subjectivity of 
this frequency. We began each weekly collection on a specific date, but since the 
collection of data for hundreds of thousands of websites cannot happen instantly, actual 







Chapter 11: Conclusions 
 Dissertation Summary 
Researchers have extensively used website features to detect malicious websites. 
With this research, we performed a comprehensive evaluation of feature-based malicious 
website detection. First, we reviewed prior research that established features that are 
relevant for malicious website detection, leveraged detection methods (heuristics, 
machine learning, etc.), presented potential validation methods, provided practical 
implementations, discussed relevant performance metrics, and evaluated website change 
over time. In Chapter 3, we presented our methodology and the 13 research questions that 
drove it. In Chapters 4–6, we presented independent studies on malicious website 
detection using three separate classes of features, validating prior research as well as 
presenting new findings. In Chapter 7 we leveraged the findings and features from 
Chapters 4–6, going on to evaluate the discovery of features through feature selection 
versus using those from gathered prior research. In Chapter 8 we reported our application 
of detection models built on one dataset to another dataset, while in Chapter 9 we detailed 
our temporal study on feature-based malicious website detection. 
We established that feature-based malicious website detection remains relevant 
for detection of several types of threats and that re-evaluation of the assumptions from 
prior research (including the features used for detection) yields benefits. Our research 
showed improvement when using discovered features versus features gathered from prior 
research. This improvement was demonstrated with models built from various machine 
learning algorithms over various scenarios. Furthermore, we demonstrated that feature 




for malicious website detection. The study in each chapter that demonstrated the benefit 
of building detection models with new features was performed with a dataset consisting 
of several threats. Furthermore, the features that were used for detection are available in a 
web browsing environment. Thus, we recommend the addition and exploration of new 
features in future research. 
In our last two chapters, we evaluated feature-based malicious website detection 
on two additional datasets. By doing so, we showed that detection models were reliant on 
the dataset on which they trained, however, the features that we identified could be 
applied to new datasets with minor adjustments. Our study of the temporal aspects of 
malicious website detection provided evidence that malicious website detection models 
degrade over time. Re-training can improve model performance and can slow 
performance degradation. From the results in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9, we postulate that 
adjusting models with new features (as done in Chapter 8) and retraining as new data 
becomes available (Chapter 9) will improve malicious website detection. Lastly, we 
presented a method of quantifying how websites (as defined by their features) change 
over time and quantified the change we observed. 
 Future Work 
There are two potential areas of future work that could follow this dissertation.  
One possibility is the specification, creation, and maintenance of a central dataset 
for malicious website detection experiments. Several datasets are used in prior research 
that differ in size, types of threat, ratio of malicious to benign websites, and date of 
collection. These differences make comparison of prior research and techniques 




Specifying, creating, and maintaining a training and evaluation dataset including both 
malicious and benign websites would be beneficial to the research community.  
Another possibility of future work involves the creation and evaluation of the 
research in this dissertation into a potential security tool. That is, follow on work could 
potentially involve building a component inside of a web browser or other tool that 
fetches websites. There are several areas to be addressed in this work. First, we can 
investigate different sources of training data and evaluate their effectiveness in an 
operational environment. The training data could be open source intelligence, data from a 
security operations centers, data from the users of the tool, or potentially a combination 
thereof. Second, we could evaluate the utility of using this tool as a blocking mechanism 
(preventing users or services from accessing a website) or as an aid to a user or a service 
making browsing decisions. By evaluating this solution as a blocking mechanism, we 
would gain insight into the usability of such a solution – particularly, is the false positive 
rate low enough to prevent disruption. By evaluating this capability as a supplement to a 
user, we would gain insight into if and how this mechanism benefits from user input. 
Additionally, we could gauge if this capability enables a user or service to make 
beneficial risk-based decisions on whether or not to visit a website. 
Lastly, the completion of this dissertation involved the creation of various scripts 
and software components. We are currently working on the release and sharing of code 

































Appendix A: URL Features 
1. Presence of an IP address in the URL 
2. Presence of a port number in the URL 
3. Presence of a well-known ports in the URL 
4. The length of URL 
5. Counts of each character 
6. Total count of digits 
7. Total count of letters 
8. Total count of special characters 
9. Counts of n-grams from files extensions in the URL 
10. Total count of file extension n-grams in the URL 
11. Counts of n-grams of TLDs in the URL 
12. Total count of file extension n-grams in the URL 
13. Count of respective words from [210] 







Appendix B: JavaScript Methods 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C: HTML 


















































































































































Element Attribute Features 
 
For the following attributes, we collected deeper information that fell into three 
categories. 
1. Certain attributes specify resources via URLs. For these attributes, we 
extracted whether the reference pointed to an OoD resource, an in-domain 
resource, a relative link within the page, and the protocol specified by the 
resource. We also captured the protocol specifying the location to the 
resource. Additionally, these resources are typically of a certain file type and 
we collected which file type as well. 
2. Certain elements can be of a “small size” or be a “small element.” We defined 
a small element as one that had a length or width of fewer than 2 pixels. 
The matrix below shows which additional attributes we extracted from the 








Appendix D: Full Tables and Charts 
Table D-1:  
The Count of “-“ Characters Had High Correlation  
with the Target Variable 
 
Correlation Values between Target Variable and 288 
Features on Dataset 2 
Features Dataset 2 
Count of ‘-’ character 0.3660 
marco contenttext 0.0094 
content-language text/html 0.0081 
URL Length 0.0188 
<link href=”https*”> 0.0252 
<link rel=”canonical”> 0.0240 
<link href> OoD 0.0173 
<script src> relative 0.0150 
<script src> absolute 0.0150 
Count of ‘w’ character 0.0022 
<link rel=https://api.w.org/*> 0.0248 
<script src=”https*”> 0.0182 
<link rel=”stylesheet”> 0.0172 
<link rel=”wlwmanifest”> 0.0243 
<link 
type=”application/wlwmanifest+xml”> 0.0243 
<link type=”application/rsd+xml”> 0.0245 
<link rel=”EditURI”> 0.0245 
<meta http-equiv=”X-UA-Compatible”> 0.0130 
<script type=”text/javascript”> 0.0174 
Total URL Extensions 0.0006 
Count of ‘u’ character 0.0199 
<script src> OoD 0.0153 
URL TLD “co” Count 0.0257 
<link rel=”dns-prefetch”> 0.0219 
<link rel=”shortlink”> 0.0243 
content-encoding gzip 0.0027 
<link type=”text/css”> 0.0148 
URL extension is “.c” 0.0277 
<link href=”*.xml”> 0.0164 
URL extension ”.com” 0.0205 
URL TLD “com” 0.0205 
<script async=true> 0.0100 
meta_charset_UTF-8 0.0154 
<link rel=”icon”> 0.0120 
Count of ‘.’ Character 0.0159 
<script src=”*.js”> 0.0131 
<link rel=”pingback”> 0.0188 
getElementsByTagName() 0.0085 
<link href> absolute 0.0085 
<link href> relative 0.0085 
Count of <link> tag 0.0085 
<link href=*.png> 0.0100 
Count of <script> tag 0.0070 
<meta http-equiv=”content-type”> 0.0234 
Count of ‘x’ character 0.0062 
expect-ctmax-age 0.0137 
expect-ctreport-uri 0.0138 
<link href=”*0”> 0.0150 
Count of ‘z’ character 0.0074 
vary accept-encoding 0.0069 
vary accept 0.0068 
via 1.1 0.0135 
URL endswith “.com” 0.0154 




Correlation Values between Target Variable and 288 
Features on Dataset 2 
Features Dataset 2 
<script type=”application/ld+json”> 0.0177 
<link href=”*.css”> 0.0055 
Count of ‘a’ character 0.0262 
createElement() 0.0040 
x-xss-enabled 0.0142 
x-cintent-type-options nosniff 0.0137 
<link rel=”publisher”> 0.0098 
Count of 4-character words 0.0314 
<link rel=”shortcut icon”> 0.0007 
Count of <div> tag 0.0031 
<link rel=”manifest”> 0.0095 
Count of <iframe> tag 0.0018 
<link rel=”apple-touch-icon-
precomposed”> 0.0118 
<link rel=”apple-touch-icon”> 0.0053 
indexOf() 0.0070 
<link href=”*.php”> 0.0076 
<img srcset=”https*”> 0.0091 
Count of ‘o’ character 0.0192 
Count of ‘e’ character 0.0073 
Count of <a> tag 0.000012 
<a href> relative 0.000036 
<link href=”*.json”> 0.0062 
content-length 0.0040 
<a href> absolute 0.0001 
Count of ‘c’ character 0.0182 
Count of <img> tag 0.0005 
Count of ‘p’ character 0.0055 
Total href attributes 0.0001 
Total HTML Tags 0.0002 
Count of ‘m’ character 0.0110 
<a href=”https*”> 0.0041 
Count of ‘r’ character 0.0146 
<script_src=”*.0”> 0.0107 
<img srcset> absolute 0.0084 
<img srcset> relative 0.0084 
<script defer=true> 0.0110 
setTime() 0.0058 
Count of <nav> tag 0.0049 
Count of <style> tag 0.0056 
<link type=”application/rss+xml”> 0.0115 
isNaN() 0.0008 
<link rel=”alternate”> 0.0047 
<iframe src=”https*”> 0.0024 
<meta charset=utf-8> 0.0154 
<link_type=”image/png”> 0.0046 
getTime() 0.0075 




strict-transport-security max-age 0.0060 
server nginx 0.0219 
Count of ‘v’ character 0.0066 
<a href> OoD 0.0019 
Count of <footer> tag 0.0045 
replace() 0.0058 
<iframe src> absolute 0.0007 
vary age 0.0082 
addEventListener() 0.0093 
<img srcset> OoD 0.0073 
vary user-agent 0.0083 
<iframe src> relative 0.0003 




Correlation Values between Target Variable and 288 
Features on Dataset 2 
Features Dataset 2 
JSON.parse() 0.0050 
vary cookie 0.0101 
Count of <ul> tag 0.0025 
bind() 0.0006 
Count of ‘y’ character 0.0103 
Count of <li> tag 2.1119 
<a href-=”*.aspx> 0.0064 
JSON.stringify() 0.0048 
trim() 0.0030 
Count of <main> tag 0.0027 
transfer-encoding chunked 0.0102 
log() 0.0055 
<a href=script:javascript> 0.0032 
connection keep-alive 0.0109 
Count of <span> tag 0.0005 
toLowerCase() 0.0050 
<link href=”http*”> 0.0012 
hasOwnProperty() 0.0053 
Count of 5-character words 0.0160 
<script src=”*.com”> 0.0050 
Count of <i> tag 0.0001 
Total TLDs in URL 0.0303 




Count of ‘i’ character 0.0096 
Count of <section> tag 0.0033 
concat() 0.0086 
decodeURIComponent() 0.0006 
Count of <meta> tag 0.0048 
Math.random() 0.0015 
Count of <time> tag 0.0019 
Count of ‘d’ character 0.0015 
<a href=”*.htm”> 0.0006 
<link href=”*.ico”> 0.0037 
Count of <button> tag 0.0006 
<link rel=”next”> 0.0037 
escape() 0.0196 
<img src=”https*”> 0.0042 
Count of ‘t’ character 0.0037 
cache-control no-store 0.0102 
test() 0.0048 
Count of <center> tag 0.0018 
join() 0.0086 
Count of <em> tag 0.0004 
Count of <article> tag 0.0036 
url_extension_.i 0.0069 
cache-control must-revalidate 0.0084 
Count of ‘n’ character 0.0081 
<link_href=”*.com”> 0.0021 
cache-control private 0.0089 
<a href=”mailto*”> 0.0027 
Count of <select> tag 0.0016 
Count of <form> tag 9.0816 
Math.floor() 0.0001 
split() 0.0054 
Count of <hr> tag 2.4394 
url_extension_.net 0.0011 
url_tld_NET 0.0011 
<img src> relative 0.0040 
<img src> absolute 0.0040 




Correlation Values between Target Variable and 288 
Features on Dataset 2 
Features Dataset 2 
<img src=”0*”> 0.0036 
Count of ‘s’ character 0.0001 
pop() 0.0079 
Count of 7-character words 0.0019 
Count of <noscript> tag 0.0023 
URL TLD “ne” 0.0009 
<iframe src> OoD 0.0017 
substring() 0.0025 
<link type=”image/x-icon”> 0.0014 
<form enctype=”application/ 
x-www-form-urlencoded”> 0.0013 
Count of <small> tag 0.0013 
Count of <ins> tag 0.0008 
<img_src=”*.jpg”> 0.0057 
Total <img src> 0.0050 
substr() 0.0016 
server apache 0.0043 
exec() 0.0023 
parseInt() 0.0007 
URL extension “.net” 0.0011 
Count of <dl> tag 0.0029 
push() 0.0008 
open() 0.0021 
<a rel=”nofollow”> 0.0036 
<link rel=”mask-icon”> 0.0048 
Count of <figure> tag 0.0003 
<form action> relative 0.0013 
<form action=”https*”> 0.0010 
find() 0.0021 
Count of <option> tag 0.0013 
<form action>_absolute 0.0015 
shift() 0.0078 
<base href> OoD 0.0121 
Count of <h1> tag 0.0025 
Count of <aside> tag 0.0008 
defineProperty() 0.0024 
Object.defineProperty() 0.0024 
<img src=”*.png”> 0.0019 
Math.max() 0.0029 
Count of ‘k’ character 0.0070 
<script src=”http*”> 0.0053 
pragma no-cache 0.0123 
<script language=”javascript”> 0.0045 
Count of <input> tag 0.0011 
connection  close 0.0043 
<form action> OoD 0.0016 
get() 0.0013 
<a href=”*.html”> 0.0077 
forEach() 0.0029 
Count of <strong> tag 4.4068 
Count of <source> tag 0.0004 
<a_href=”0*”> 0.0050 
Count of ‘b’ character 0.0101 
<a href=”*.pdf”> 0.0025 
Count of <textarea> tag 0.0001 
cache-control no-cache 0.0102 
Count of <ol> tag 0.0022 
keys() 0.0032 
<img src> OoD 0.0070 
slice() 0.0017 
<link rel=”preload”> 0.0042 
<meta http-equiv=”Content-Type“> 0.0234 
Object.keys() 0.0032 




Correlation Values between Target Variable and 288 
Features on Dataset 2 
Features Dataset 2 
Count of 6-character words 0.0057 
querySelector() 0.0035 
<script crossorigin=”anonymous”> 0.0064 
Count of 8-character words 0.0021 
<a href=”*.com”> 0.0020 
Count of ‘p’ character 0.0029 
Count of <td> tag 0.0012 
charAt() 0.0018 
unescape() 0.0040 
Count of ‘g’ character 0.0100 
<iframe src=”*0”> 0.0025 
Count of <dd> tag 0.0023 
Count of <tbody> tag 0.0005 
<form action=”*.php”> 0.0029 
<form action=”http*”> 0.0044 
script_charset_UTF-8 0.0051 
<img src=”http*”> 0.0095 
<img src=”*.jpeg”> 0.0007 
toString() 0.0021 
<script charset=”utf-8”> 0.0051 
Count of <tr> tag 0.0017 
Count of <base> tag 0.0035 
<base href> absolute 0.0035 
<base href> relative 0.0035 
<a href=”*.php”> 0.0033 
call() 0.0036 
Count of ‘l’ character 0.0101 
Count of <table> tag 0.0011 
Count of <label> tag 0.0027 
Count of ‘j’ character 0.0081 
Count of <dt> tag 0.0033 
Count of <font> tag 0.0002 
Count of <fieldset> tag 0.0011 
add() 0.0001 
Count of <br> tag 0.0007 
<img src=”*.gif”> 0.0043 
Math.round() 0.0032 
<iframe src=”http*”> 0.0044 
cache-control public 0.0024 
Count of <title> tag 0.0058 
<img src=”*.svg”> 0.0009 






Table D-2:  
Performance of a Several Models Built with Features from Prior Research Versus Discovered Features 
 
Model Performance over Various Scenarios with 99 Prior Features / 34 Identified Features 
Model 
No-sampling Over-sampling Under-sampling 










































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D-3:  
Performance of a Several Models Built with Transformed Features from Prior Research Versus Discovered Features 
 
Model Performance in Feature Transformation Scenarios with 99 Prior Features / 34 Identified Features 
Model 
Feature Transformation with Feature Selection Feature Transformation with PCA 













































































































































































































































































Table D-4:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 34 Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 1 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 34 Features on Dataset 3, 
Snapshot 02/02/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
2/9/2020 0.9948 6.37E-05 0.1905 0.9046 0.8960 0.9971 0.8094 
2/16/2020 0.9935 7.43E-05 0.2400 0.8799 0.8673 0.9964 0.7600 
2/23/2020 0.9919 6.35E-05 0.2978 0.8510 0.8331 0.9967 0.7021 
3/1/2020 0.9915 6.37E-05 0.3157 0.8420 0.8221 0.9966 0.6842 
3/8/2020 0.9909 4.24E-05 0.3383 0.8307 0.8086 0.9976 0.6616 
3/15/2020 0.9899 6.36E-05 0.3760 0.8119 0.7843 0.9962 0.6239 
3/22/2020 0.9890 5.32E-05 0.4036 0.7981 0.7666 0.9967 0.5963 
3/29/2020 0.9882 5.30E-05 0.4363 0.7817 0.7449 0.9966 0.5636 
4/5/2020 0.9880 4.23E-05 0.4447 0.7776 0.7396 0.9972 0.5553 
4/12/2020 0.9871 4.24E-05 0.4758 0.7620 0.7181 0.9970 0.5241 
4/19/2020 0.9869 3.19E-05 0.4846 0.7576 0.7123 0.9977 0.5153 
 
 
Table D-5:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 99 Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 1 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 99 Features on Dataset 3, 
Snapshot 02/02/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
2/9/2020 0.9970 0 0.1123 0.9438 0.9407 1 0.8876 
2/16/2020 0.9960 0 0.1491 0.9254 0.9205 1 0.8508 
2/23/2020 0.9948 0 0.1932 0.9033 0.8958 1 0.8067 
3/1/2020 0.9945 0 0.2036 0.8981 0.8899 1 0.7963 
3/8/2020 0.9940 0 0.2238 0.8880 0.8782 1 0.7761 
3/15/2020 0.9930 0 0.2614 0.8692 0.8563 1 0.7385 
3/22/2020 0.9924 0 0.2820 0.8589 0.8440 1 0.7179 
3/29/2020 0.9915 0 0.3155 0.8422 0.8237 1 0.6844 
4/5/2020 0.9911 0 0.3306 0.8346 0.8144 1 0.6693 
4/12/2020 0.9904 0 0.3546 0.8226 0.7994 1 0.6453 
4/19/2020 0.9900 0 0.3695 0.8152 0.7900 1 0.6304 
 
 
Table D-6:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with Re-selected Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 1 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with Re-selected Features on Dataset 
3, Snapshot 02/02/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
2/9/2020 0.9954 0.00010 0.1684 0.9157 0.9076 0.9953 0.8315 
2/16/2020 0.9942 0.00011 0.2116 0.8941 0.8828 0.9946 0.7883 
2/23/2020 0.9932 0.00012 0.2465 0.8766 0.8623 0.9938 0.7534 
3/1/2020 0.9928 0.00012 0.2653 0.8672 0.8512 0.9937 0.7346 
3/8/2020 0.9920 0.00013 0.2946 0.8525 0.8334 0.9929 0.7053 
3/15/2020 0.9912 0.00013 0.3233 0.8382 0.8158 0.9926 0.6766 
3/22/2020 0.9905 8.51E-05 0.3470 0.8264 0.8022 0.9953 0.6529 
3/29/2020 0.9897 0.00011 0.3750 0.8124 0.7837 0.9932 0.6250 
4/5/2020 0.9893 9.52E-05 0.3940 0.8029 0.7719 0.9943 0.6059 
4/12/2020 0.9884 0.00014 0.4256 0.7871 0.7498 0.9907 0.5743 
4/19/2020 0.9879 0.00012 0.4422 0.7788 0.7391 0.9917 0.5577 
 
 
Table D-7:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 34 Features  




Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 34 Features on Dataset 3, Snapshot 
03/08/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
3/15/2020 0.9949 4.24E-05 0.1893 0.9052 0.8971 0.9980 0.8106 
3/22/2020 0.9930 2.13E-05 0.2589 0.8705 0.8573 0.9989 0.7410 
3/29/2020 0.9914 5.30E-05 0.3148 0.8425 0.8229 0.9972 0.6851 
4/5/2020 0.9905 3.17E-05 0.3517 0.8241 0.8005 0.9982 0.6482 
4/12/2020 0.9898 3.18E-05 0.3769 0.8115 0.7845 0.9981 0.6230 
4/19/2020 0.9893 4.25E-05 0.3941 0.8029 0.7731 0.9974 0.6058 
 
 
Table D-8:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 99 Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 6 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 99 Features on Dataset 3, Snapshot 
03/08/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
3/15/2020 0.9970 0 0.1119 0.9440 0.9409 1 0.8880 
3/22/2020 0.9954 0 0.1689 0.9155 0.9095 1 0.8310 
3/29/2020 0.9945 0 0.2032 0.8983 0.8901 1 0.7967 
4/5/2020 0.9939 0 0.2269 0.8865 0.8764 1 0.7730 
4/12/2020 0.9930 0 0.2588 0.8705 0.8578 1 0.7411 
4/19/2020 0.9925 0 0.2767 0.8616 0.8472 1 0.7232 
 
 
Table D-9:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with Re-selected Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 6 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with Re-selected Features on Dataset 3, 
Snapshot 03/08/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
3/15/2020 0.9953 7.42E-05 0.1731 0.9134 0.9056 0.9967 0.8268 
3/22/2020 0.9939 6.39E-05 0.2216 0.8891 0.8782 0.9970 0.7783 
3/29/2020 0.9927 7.42E-05 0.2676 0.8661 0.8510 0.9963 0.7323 
4/5/2020 0.9919 6.34E-05 0.2972 0.8513 0.8334 0.9967 0.7027 
4/12/2020 0.9911 0.0001 0.3236 0.8381 0.8161 0.9938 0.6763 
4/19/2020 0.9905 9.57E-05 0.3470 0.8259 0.8014 0.9947 0.6520 
 
 
Table D-10:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 34 Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 1-6 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 34 Features on Dataset 3, Snapshot 
02/02/2020-03/08/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
3/15/2020 0.9982 0.00015 0.0584 0.9706 0.9664 0.9938 0.9415 
3/22/2020 0.9974 0.00012 0.0908 0.9545 0.9498 0.9949 0.9091 
3/29/2020 0.9965 0.00013 0.1230 0.9383 0.9321 0.9943 0.8769 
4/5/2020 0.9960 0.00015 0.1432 0.9283 0.9206 0.9933 0.8567 
4/12/2020 0.9952 0.00013 0.1710 0.9144 0.9055 0.9940 0.8289 
4/19/2020 0.9949 0.00014 0.1839 0.9079 0.8979 0.9934 0.8160 
 
 
Table D-11:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 99 Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 1-6 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 99 Features on Dataset 3, Snapshot 
02/02/2020-03/08/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
3/15/2020 0.9994 0 0.0224 0.9887 0.9884 1 0.9775 




Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with 99 Features on Dataset 3, Snapshot 
02/02/2020-03/08/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
3/29/2020 0.9985 0 0.0552 0.9723 0.9712 1 0.9447 
4/5/2020 0.9981 0 0.0675 0.9662 0.9647 1 0.9324 
4/12/2020 0.9976 0 0.0878 0.9560 0.9539 1 0.9121 
4/19/2020 0.9973 0 0.0981 0.9509 0.9483 1 0.9018 
 
 
Table D-12:  
Performance of a Random Forest Classifier Trained with Re-selected Features  
on Dataset 3 Snapshot 1-6 
Evaluation Over Time with a Random Forest Classifier Trained with Re-selected Features on Dataset 3, Snapshot 
02/02/2020-03/08/2020 
Snapshot ACC FPR FNR AUC MCC Prec Rec 
3/15/2020 0.9978 0.00012 0.0755 0.9621 0.9580 0.9949 0.9244 
3/22/2020 0.9971 0.00014 0.0988 0.9504 0.9450 0.9940 0.9011 
3/29/2020 0.9966 0.00014 0.1207 0.9395 0.9331 0.9939 0.8792 
4/5/2020 0.9962 0.00015 0.1347 0.9325 0.9252 0.9933 0.8652 
4/12/2020 0.9956 0.00018 0.1552 0.9222 0.9134 0.9923 0.8447 





Table D-13:  
Details of Which Features Changed Over Time, Beginning with the First Snapshot 




































<a href=”http*”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
<a href=”https*”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
Count of <center> tag 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 
Count of <div> tag 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 
createElement() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 
write() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 
addEventListener() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 
<form action=”*.php”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/1/1 1/0/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/1/1 
<form action=”http*”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 
cache-control max-age 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 
cache-control must-
revalidate 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 
cache-control no-
cache 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/1 
cache-control no-
store 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 
cache-control public 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 1/0/1/1 
content-encoding gzip 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/1/1 
content-language 
text/html 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 
content-length 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/0 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 
expect-ctreport-uri 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
server apache 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
strict-transport-
security_max-age 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/1/0 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
transfer-encoding 
chunked 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/0 1/0/1/0 1/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 
via_1.1 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 
hidden <iframe> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 
<img src=”*.jpg”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 
<img src=”http*”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
Count of <input> tag 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/1 0/0/0/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 
charAt() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/1/0 1/0/1/0 1/0/0/0 
charCodeAt() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/1/0 1/0/0/0 
push() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/0 
search() 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 
shift() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/0 
escape() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 
eval() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/0/0 
unescape() 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/0/0 








































<link href=”*.php”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 
<link href=”https*”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
<link href> relative 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/1/0/0 0/1/1/1 0/1/0/0 0/1/0/0 1/0/0/0 1/0/0/1 
<link 
type=”text/css”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 
Meta content index 
follow 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/1 
Count of <meta> tag 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 
getElementsByTagName(
) 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/0/1/1 
<script src=”https*”> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 0/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
<script 
type=text/javascript> 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
<source srcset> OoD 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/1/0 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 0/0/1/1 
Count of <style> tag 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/0/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 1/1/1/1 
Total HTML Tags 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/0/0/0 0/1/0/0 0/1/0/0 






Table D-14:  
Feature Change Based on the Related T-test 
Number of Features That Change Per a Given Time Difference (Measuring All Possible Intervals) - Related T-test 
Time Difference 
(Weeks) Measurements 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 0  
3 1 2 1 3 3 3 2 0 0   
4 3 1 2 4 7 5 6 3    
5 4 4 4 6 10 8 7     
6 8 10 9 9 12 10      
7 12 13 11 11 15       
8 13 15 13 15        
9 16 17 17         
10 19 22          
11 22           
 
 
Table D-15:  
Feature Change Based on the Two-Sample KS Test 
Number of Features That Change Per a Given Time Difference (Measuring All Possible Intervals) – Kolmogorov Smirnov 
Time Difference (Weeks) Measurements 
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0  
3 1 1 0 2 1 2 0 1 0   
4 1 1 3 2 2 3 1 1    
5 2 3 3 4 4 6 3     
6 5 5 7 6 7 6      
7 7 6 12 10 10       
8 10 12 18 11        
9 13 19 15         
10 16 15          
11 20           
 
 
Table D-16:  
Feature Change Based on the K-Sample Anderson-Darling 
Number of Features That Change Per a Given Time Difference (Measuring All Possible Intervals) - k-sample Anderson Darling 
Time Difference (Weeks) Measurements 
1 1 0 3 4 2 1 3 4 0 1 5 
2 3 5 3 4 4 5 2 7 1 9  
3 6 5 4 6 6 9 5 11 12   
4 11 6 9 17 12 14 11 9    
5 14 13 13 13 15 21 23     
6 16 20 20 17 21 25      
7 24 24 28 25 28       
8 23 29 31 32        
9 27 34 36         
10 36 40          
11 41           
 
 
Table D-17:  
Feature Change Based on the Kruskal Wallis H Test 
Number of Features That Change Per a Given Time Difference (Measuring All Possible Intervals) - Kruskal Wallis H test 
Time Difference (Weeks) Measurements 
1 1 0 2 3 2 1 3 4 0 0 4 
2 2 4 2 4 4 2 1 4 0 8  
3 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 8 7   
4 8 5 10 11 12 11 9 6    
5 13 12 10 8 13 18 15     




Number of Features That Change Per a Given Time Difference (Measuring All Possible Intervals) - Kruskal Wallis H test 
Time Difference (Weeks) Measurements 
7 22 18 21 22 21       
8 20 21 25 29        
9 22 28 26         
10 28 30          
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